We are following the current situation in Venezuela with both concern and hope. We asked selected members of our community what they believe would be the best course of action in the current complex situation in Venezuela that would open the way to the country’s democratization.
Pedro A. Urruchurtu Noselli
Member of DSLA, participant at the 29th Forum 2000 Conference, political scientist, coordinator of international affairs of Vente Venezuela, Venezuela
James Carafano
Participant at the 28th Forum 2000 Conference, senior counselor to the president of the Heritage Foundation and E.W. Richardson Fellow, USA
Maria Alejandra Aristeguieta
Member of DSLA, member of the Venezuelan opposition's international political council, Venezuela/Switzerland
Patricio Navia
Participant at the 27th Forum 2000 Conference, full professor of political science at Universidad Diego Portales and clinical professor of liberal studies at New York University, Peru/USA
Alejandro A. Chafuen
Distinguished Executive Fellow, Acton Institute, Argentina/USA
Pedro A. Urruchurtu Noselli
Member of DSLA, participant at the 29th Forum 2000 Conference, political scientist, coordinator of international affairs of Vente Venezuela, Venezuela
The best course of action is a clear, coordinated pathway that combines internal legitimacy with sustained international pressure, fully grounded in the understanding that what must be dismantled is not merely a political arrangement, but a criminal structure. That pressure assumes, and clearly understands, that democratization requires the dismantling of the criminal system that has captured the Venezuelan state. In that context, what occurred on January 3 with the capture and extraction of Nicolás Maduro points precisely in that direction: it establishes a credible threat against a structure that sustains itself through force, and therefore must be confronted, when necessary, through the use of force. Authoritarian and criminal power built on coercion does not yield to goodwill alone. That is why peace through strength is needed.
Some ideas about the next steps could be the following:
First, full recognition of the popular mandate expressed by Venezuelans with Edmundo González Urrutia as president-elect and María Corina Machado as leader of the democratic forces. Any democratic opening must begin by acknowledging the will of the people as expressed at the ballot box. Legitimacy cannot be fabricated through regime-controlled arrangements or cosmetic reforms.
Second, immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and an end to repression. Democratization is impossible while fear, persecution, and censorship remain tools of governance. The first concrete signal of a real transition must be freedom of people, of expression, and of political organization.
Third, what remains of the regime currently holding power must be compelled to dismantle itself through decisive and sustained international, particularly U.S., pressure. This necessarily means dismantling the repressive apparatus and removing the incentives that keep those in power clinging to the system. Additionally, Venezuelan political leadership, and particularly the legitimate leaders of the country, must be provided with the necessary guarantees to return to Venezuela as soon as possible and to fully exercise their rights, as required by democratic norms and as the people rightly expect. With repression, persecution, and political prisoners, no transition is possible.
Fourth, the remaining regime officials are not “new faces,” but the same individuals responsible for past abuses. They are the same figures responsible for repression, torture, corruption, and criminal activity. In other words, the cartel remains in command. There is no credible transition with them in charge, not only because the Venezuelan people, as our main focus, will not accept it, but because they lack the capacity to honor any commitments. Those who destroyed democracy cannot be entrusted with rebuilding it.
Finally, a credible, time-bound transition must be led by legitimate democratic actors, with clear and enforceable guarantees. In parallel, international allies must remain united and firm, aligning diplomatic recognition, pressure, and incentives strictly to verifiable democratic steps, not promises or partial gestures. The objective is not instability, but a peaceful and orderly transition that enables Venezuela to reintegrate into the community of democracies as a reliable and safe partner, begin national reconstruction, and emerge as the most important and secure ally of the United States in the Western Hemisphere.
James Carafano
Participant at the 28th Forum 2000 Conference, senior counselor to the president of the Heritage Foundation and E.W. Richardson Fellow, USA
Here I will focus on the American contribution to this effort.
I would start by saying this is the wrong question. The objective of support for any country going through political transition ought to be the promotion of “freedom, safety, and prosperity.” All these elements are crucial for a stable, resilient, and nourishing society. The challenge is finding a constructive, supportive path to achieving all three.
In the wake of the horrific destruction of World War II, the U.S. military, which participated in the liberation and occupation of many countries in Europe and Asia had a simple guide called the “disease and unrest” formula – find a plan to deliver responsible governance, a modicum of security and public safety, and sufficient economic activity to avoid famine, rampant disease, and economic stagnation. These were modest goals, but crucial to successful postwar reconstruction in many places, including West Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan. In the initial wake of World War II, there were only modest efforts at external interference. The Soviet Union initially focused the preponderance of its efforts on consolidating control over Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, in the West by 1948, most countries had elected stable governments and functioning economies. Massed displaced populations were subsiding. Populations weren’t starving. These efforts were the essential precursors to projects like the Marshall Plan, which would not have succeeded without them.
In contrast, more recent American efforts, despite significant investments in Iraq and elsewhere, floundered because of the failure to set these preconditions. Troubles stemmed as much, if not more, from external influences, than flawed and over-ambitious plans. Iraq had an open border with Iran, and the U.S. and its allies did little to stem external actors from flooding the country and fomenting violence. Likewise, in Afghanistan bad actors could float in and out through porous borders with Iran and Pakistan.
I have more optimism for the American contribution to the successful transition of Venezuela. Here is why. On the one hand, the U.S. plan seems more modest and realistic with phases designed to help achieve a balance of the three goals of freedom, prosperity, and security. Rather than taking over, the administration has made reasonable demands and set realistic outcomes. In addition, the U.S. is providing essential enablers in all three areas – particularly crucial is investment and restarting the local economy. Finally, and most important, expect Washington not to stand by and accept external actors seeking to destabilize the country. The U.S. government will closely monitor borders with Brazil and Colombia and hold those governments accountable if their countries are used as bases to destabilize Venezuela. Other external actors, including China, Russia, Spain, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah, either have limited means or will be wary of crossing U.S. efforts. I suspect the rest of the international community will be behind American efforts to help the Venezuelan people.
Maria Alejandra Aristeguieta
Member of DSLA, member of the Venezuelan opposition's international political council, Venezuela/Switzerland
January 2026’s defining news was the U.S. intervention in Venezuela to capture a bloodthirsty dictator. Far from a conventional invasion, the operation lasted just over two hours, caused no U.S. casualties, and resulted in the deaths of four Venezuelan civilians. Notably, Cuba suffered the highest losses, with around twenty special forces officers killed while protecting Nicolás Maduro.
The operation merits careful examination. It was innovative, risky, and highly controversial, especially in the context of an international legal order that has been steadily eroding. Calls for restraint came from across the globe, with some equating the action to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or warning it could legitimize a Chinese move against Taiwan. Europe – particularly the Brussels bubble – reacted with visible unease, concerned about what this might mean for relations with a former close ally. Yet, this is what a multipolar world looks like. It is the new order long discussed: more unstable, more violent, and more individualistic. The US administration recognized this reality and acted accordingly.
The fundamental problem is that international law lacks coercive power when states refuse to comply. As with other authoritarian regimes, this has long been the case in Maduro’s Venezuela, where international law proved ineffective. For over a decade –indeed, it took more than 15 years for the international community to acknowledge the scale of the crisis – regional and global organizations failed to curb systematic human rights abuses. Civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights were violated with impunity. The regime ignored rulings and recommendations, rejected monitoring and scrutiny, and was never held accountable.
More than 15,000 people have been executed by security forces, with a similar number unlawfully detained. Although the International Criminal Court opened an investigation in 2018, it has yet to issue a single arrest warrant. Meanwhile, around 8 million people have fled the country because of a regime-induced humanitarian and human rights crisis. International organizations largely addressed the consequences of this exodus across Latin America, rather than its root causes, doing so with insufficient resources and limited resolve.
Criminal gangs migrated alongside civilians and now operate in countries such as Chile, Spain, and the United States. Venezuela became a hub for global drug trafficking, while irregular armed groups from Colombia and terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah operated freely under regime protection. Whenever Venezuelans sought international support, the response was a mixture of indifference, lukewarm condescension and a patronizing demand that the opposition “do more.” For 27 years, Venezuela endured the gradual dismantling of its institutions and the rule of law, abandoned its traditional allies, and aligned itself with authoritarian regimes, ultimately suffering the effects of a war without external enemies. Throughout this period, the world largely failed to protect Venezuelans, despite the commitments enshrined in the UN system.
So, allow us to rejoice. Venezuelans welcome the capture of Maduro by U.S. forces; despite the tensions this creates with international law. The world is a better place with Maduro facing justice before an independent judiciary, and peace and prosperity in Venezuela now seem more attainable than they did at the end of 2025.
Nonetheless, the work ahead remains formidable. The U.S. strategy seeks to force the regime to dismantle itself from within. With Delcy Rodríguez as interim head of state, Washington expects concrete steps: the release of political prisoners, an end to migration and drug trafficking towards the U.S., and the dismantling of armed colectivos controlled by Diosdado Cabello and Cuba. Additionally, the U.S. is laying the groundwork for long-term investment, countering Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence while gaining access to Venezuela’s vast oil reserves and mineral wealth amid the global race for energy and rare earths.
Rodríguez is buying time, hoping a change in Washington will allow her to replicate chavismo’s survival playbook. The dictatorship and its allies will not surrender easily.
But Venezuelans are ready: ready to rebuild, to pursue a genuine democratic transition and to return home. We want to stop being a nation scattered across the world.
Patricio Navia
Participant at the 27th Forum 2000 Conference, full professor of political science at Universidad Diego Portales and clinical professor of liberal studies at New York University, Peru/USA
Given the recent developments, including the capture of the Nicolás Maduro and the survival of the dictatorship, those interested in promoting democracy in Venezuela should seize the window of opportunity to make progress without forgetting about the evident threats posed by the unpredictability of U.S. government policies and priorities and the clear, narrow interest in controlling Venezuela’s extensive oil reserves expressed by President Donald Trump.
The capture of Maduro creates a window of opportunity to carve a path to democracy in Venezuela, but the removal of Maduro from power does not guarantee the return of democracy. There are many allies to be found among members of the U.S. government and the Venezuela Democracy Caucus. But the fact that President Trump is more interested in oil and economic development than in democracy should be a sign of caution for those who believe that democracy is inevitable.
The evidence tends to show that democracy and development go hand in hand. You can’t have permanent development without a well-functioning democracy. In turn, it would be naive to claim that forcing a quick transition to democracy will automatically result in development. For democracy to survive and thrive, there must also be economic development.
It is unlikely that the current situation in Venezuela will be conducive to either development or democracy. The dictatorship in Venezuela is more concerned with staying in power than with promoting sustainable and inclusive development. Yet, precisely because what is left of the Maduro regime cares more about their own future than the well-being of the Venezuelan state, there is room to carve a path to a transition to a democratic government with competitive elections in the near future and with a gradual retrenchment of military rule. The example of the transition to democracy in Chile, where the outgoing Pinochet dictatorship retained some power and the military retained some autonomy, while the democratically elected leaders increasingly gained control of the political and economic institutions of the country might be a good example to follow. A clear transition calendar and road map should be established, with a certain date for elections and doorstep conditions outlined to ensure that those elections are competitive, free, and fair. Economic reforms should be put in place to get the economy moving again. The opposition should be given access to the media. A broad amnesty for opposition leaders and political prisoners should be adopted immediately.
Rather than a quick and potentially destabilizing transition to democracy that follows the ousting of the dictatorship, the only option available for Venezuela today is a gradual and orderly transition to democracy. It will take over a year and will be painfully slow for those who have suffered under the current dictatorship. But if it is done well, Venezuela can experience a gradual but certain transition to democracy like the one that Chile went through in the late 1980s. Compared to other countries that experienced a much faster but ultimately incomplete transition to democracy, the example of Chile shows that, sometimes, gradual and incremental steps allow countries to be more successful in building stable and strong democratic institutions.
Alejandro A. Chafuen
Distinguished Executive Fellow, Acton Institute, Argentina/USA
The recent capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. forces marks a pivotal moment in Venezuela's path to democracy. While many in the freedom movements advocate for the immediate installation of Edmundo González Urrutia and María Corina Machado, such haste would require a major military operation and risk unnecessary violence and deaths. A nonviolent transition demands a structured, step-by-step approach, leveraging the operation's success to incentivize cooperation from remaining regime elements.
The Maduro capture demonstrated U.S. military precision, intelligence superiority, and resolve. This creates leverage: figures like Delcy Rodríguez understand they could face similar fates. The U.S. must maintain pressure through targeted sanctions, asset freezes, and interdiction of narcotics and illicit oil exports. By controlling authorized oil revenues post-capture, the U.S. can secure financial flows, starving criminal networks while funding stabilization efforts.
Next, secure the territory and liberate all political prisoners. Liberation means not just physical release but also the restoration of full civil liberties – no house arrests, travel bans, or speech restrictions. With territory under control, recognize González Urrutia as the legitimate winner of the July 28, 2024, election, despite its flaws (e.g., Machado's disqualification). He should form a transitional government focused on institutional reforms, including judicial independence and electoral integrity.
This government must swiftly call for new, free elections – ideally within six months of assuming power, allowing three to six months for preparation. Total timeline: nine to 12 months from González's inauguration. Machado, now eligible, could run, ensuring broader legitimacy. International observers (e.g., from the OAS and EU) should oversee the process to prevent fraud.
To ensure stability, address the destructive legacy of socialism through restorative justice. Establish transparent mechanisms for victims to claim restitution, funded primarily by assets seized from regime profiteers. Minimize conflict by gradually phasing out subsidies, partnering with major private sector players and international aid for economic recovery, and promoting reconciliation dialogues to heal social divides.
Machado wisely avoids rigid timelines, recognizing that intelligence on power dynamics – largely held by the U.S. – will dictate pacing. A rushed process invites chaos; a deliberate one builds enduring democracy. By prioritizing security, legitimacy, and equity, Venezuela can emerge as a stable, prosperous nation.
Ivan Pilip
Member of the ICDR, board member and director of international relations, CASLA, Czechia
The regime that has ruled Venezuela for more than a quarter of a century is one of the worst in the Western Hemisphere. It has led the country into economic collapse, imprisoned thousands of people, and around a quarter of the population has gone into exile. It has respected no principles of international law, dismantled the rule of law in the country, and has remained in power through violence and rigged elections. According to all documents from the electoral commissions, it has been proven that the presidential election in July 2024 was won by the opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia by a clear margin, and that he is the legitimate president of the country.
Given the complete illegitimacy of the regime and its violence against its own population, the attack on the regime on January 3, carried out outside the framework of international law, can in principle be considered justifiable. However, such an argument requires that its primary aim be the restoration of the rule of law and democracy in the country. In this context, however, two fundamental questions remain: what motivation the Trump administration actually had for regime change, and how it intends to address the overall transition and stabilization of the country.
Overall, it appears that the arrest of Nicolás Maduro is a step that may open the path to change, but many more problems remain to be resolved. This is also felt by the people of Venezuela, who did not take to the streets to celebrate the fall of the regime, because the end is still far from over. The best solution to the situation would be an agreement between part of the regime and the opposition, in cooperation with the United States, and the start of a gradual transfer of power and stabilization of the country. Other scenarios threaten to deepen the crisis that has plagued Venezuela for many years and to have repercussions for international politics: if the regime withstands the pressure, it will mean a major defeat for the White House and a strengthening of authoritarian regimes worldwide. If it falls only after further military actions and a possible U.S. military administration with minimal involvement of the domestic opposition, the trend toward a new division of spheres of influence will be reinforced. An equally problematic solution is the current situation, in which the overall power structure remains unchanged – except for Maduro and his wife – the opposition does not participate in the country’s political development, and the United States cooperates with the formal head of state, Delcy Rodríguez, in the interest of distributing extracted oil and maintaining general stability in the country.
Systemic change is necessary primarily in the interest of Venezuelan citizens and the overall recovery of the country. This cannot be achieved through partial adjustments to the existing arrangements, but only by initiating a transformation leading either to the assumption of power by a legitimate government (i.e., today’s opposition) or to free elections. Such a development should be supported by democratic institutions around the world, because real change cannot consist of replacing a Cuban protectorate led by Maduro with an American protectorate led by Rodríguez.
The views expressed in these works are the responsibility of its authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Forum 2000 Foundation or its staff.
