In light of the current situation in Iran, we would like to offer our community as broad and diverse a range of perspectives as possible on potential future developments in the country. We therefore asked selected members of our network the following question: In your view, what would be the most important steps to take in the current situation to ensure that the ongoing protests by parts of Iranian society help move the country closer to democracy?
Evan Firoozi
Participant at the 29th Forum 2000 Conference, executive director of NetFreedom Pioneers, Iran/USA
Nazanin Afshin-Jam Mackay
Participant at the 27th Forum 2000 Conference, human rights and democracy advocate, co-founder, Nazanin Foundation, Iran/Canada
Saeid Golkar
UC Foundation associate professor of political science, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, Iran/USA
Iqan Shahidi
Participant at the 29th Forum 2000 Conference, PhD candidate in intellectual history at Cambridge University, Iran/UK
Evan Firoozi
Participant at the 29th Forum 2000 Conference, executive director of NetFreedom Pioneers, Iran/USA
The protests that erupted in Iran in the final days of 2025 began, as many episodes of unrest in the country have, with economic grievances, most immediately the rapid devaluation of the Iranian rial. They quickly evolved into a nationwide uprising against the Islamic Republic itself. Unlike earlier protest movements, demonstrations spread across all provinces and reached far beyond major metropolitan centers into small cities, towns, and municipalities, revealing the depth and breadth of opposition to the regime.
Reports from inside and outside Iran indicate that between 10,000 and 20,000 people were killed during the unrest. The precise number remains impossible to verify, largely due to the regime’s severe restrictions on information. These protests also marked a grim first: a near-total digital blackout. Internet connectivity was shut down nationwide, mobile networks were rendered unreliable, and in some regions, even landline communications were disrupted. This isolation was deliberate, aimed at preventing coordination among protesters and shielding state violence from international scrutiny.
In response to the scale of repression, many Iranians openly called for regime change and looked to international actors, particularly the United States and Israel, whose leaders had previously expressed support for the Iranian people. Beyond political rhetoric, however, the magnitude of civilian casualties raises a serious question of international responsibility. Under the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), states are obligated to act when a government manifestly fails to protect its population from mass atrocities. Given the reported death toll and systematic use of lethal force against civilians, the threshold for R2P has arguably been met. This doctrine includes coercive measures, including military force as a last resort, to prevent further mass killing. Failure to act risks rendering R2P a hollow norm rather than a meaningful safeguard.
That said, military intervention is not the only, nor necessarily the first, step required to support democratic outcomes in Iran. Several immediate actions by the international community would significantly alter the current dynamics.
First, states should sever diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic and expel its diplomats. Continued engagement lends legitimacy to a regime that has demonstrated its willingness to use mass violence against its own population. Diplomatic isolation would signal that such actions carry tangible consequences.
Second, the regime’s control over global information channels must be addressed. While Iranians were cut off from communication, the Islamic Republic continued to broadcast state propaganda through international satellite platforms and official social media accounts. Removing state-controlled broadcasting from satellites and suspending accounts belonging to Iranian officials and institutions would limit the regime’s ability to manipulate narratives abroad while repressing information at home.
Finally, sustained support for independent technology groups is essential. The digital blackout exposed a critical vulnerability of modern protest movements: dependence on centralized communication infrastructure. Investing in censorship-resistant technologies that function during shutdowns is not peripheral; it is central to protecting civic space and enabling democratic agency under authoritarian rule.
Ultimately, Iran’s future must be determined by Iranians themselves. Yet international action, or inaction, will shape the conditions under which change is possible. Clear, coordinated, and principled measures, grounded in existing international norms rather than symbolic expressions of solidarity, are essential if the sacrifices made during these protests are to move Iran closer to democracy rather than into another cycle of repression.
Nazanin Afshin-Jam Mackay
Participant at the 27th Forum 2000 Conference, human rights and democracy advocate, co-founder, Nazanin Foundation, Iran/Canada
I am calling on the Forum 2000 community to act.
Reports from inside Iran suggest that between 20,000 and 35,000 people have been killed in just days. Witnesses describe warehouses filled with bodies. Families say authorities release remains only if they pay large sums or falsely declare that the deceased was a member of the Basij paramilitary forces killed by protesters. The wounded avoid hospitals for fear of abduction or execution. Jails are overflowing. Detainees have reportedly been injected with unknown substances before being released, only to die days later. There are reports of chemical agents used against protesters and of detainees being burned alive.
This is a modern-day massacre. Words of condemnation are no longer enough. Immediate, concrete action is required.
The UN Security Council should invoke the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), but vetoes from Russia and China have blocked this step. Many countries even refused to convene an emergency session at the UN Human Rights Council. Who then are millions of peaceful, freedom-loving Iranians supposed to turn to?
Iranians have done everything possible to establish a free and democratic system, yet they face a heavily armed, ideologically driven theocratic regime unwilling to relinquish power. European governments have not listed the IRGC as a terrorist organization or recalled ambassadors. Only a coordinated effort by the G7, the United States, and other liberal democracies can prevent further mass slaughter.
This is not only a moral issue. The regime’s missile and nuclear programs, its role as the leading state sponsor of terrorism, and its reach into transnational repression threaten global security, including in the West.
The free world must intervene. President Trump should fulfill his promises to act to protect civilians. European governments can suspend trade, recall ambassadors, and provide secure internet and communications support during the regime’s blackout, which conceals crimes against humanity. Humanitarian aid – including medical supplies and trauma care – must reach victims. Governments should also set red lines and ensure accountability for the regime’s actions.
Media and civil society have a crucial role: keep Iran in global focus, amplify verified information, and resist regime propaganda. Unity among Iranians is essential. Diversity of slogans and views should be respected, but internal rivalries cannot hinder survival or democratic aspirations.
Forum 2000 can play a uniquely constructive role at this critical juncture. Beyond convening an emergency conference, it can help facilitate the formation of a representative council drawn from across Iranian society and political affiliations. This should include Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, leaders of ethnic minority communities, and civil society representatives inside Iran with established networks, such as women’s organizations, labor unions, and teachers’ federations.
Such a council would provide unity, checks and balances, and reassurance of stability during the critical transitional period following the fall of the regime. An inclusive and representative framework is essential to prevent chaos, build trust, and lay the groundwork for a democratic transition that serves all Iranians.
This is a moment that will define not only Iran’s future, but the credibility of the international system itself. Immediate action from the Forum 2000 community, civil society, governments, and global media is essential to prevent further massacre and ensure the Iranian people’s aspirations for freedom and democracy are not extinguished.
Saeid Golkar
UC Foundation associate professor of political science, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, Iran/USA
Iran's protest challenge is not against a typical authoritarian regime, but a consolidated security state. Over a decade, the Islamic Republic has become a system where coercive institutions, mainly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and internal security, are key to regime survival. Governance now relies on monitoring, intimidation, and punishment rather than on ideological legitimacy, elections, or economic results. Therefore, protests alone, regardless of scale or courage, are unlikely to foster democracy unless they shift the power balance between society and the security apparatus.
Repression in Iran is institutionalized and strategic, not reactive. Violence, including lethal force, arrests, confessions, internet shutdowns, and surveillance, is planned to fragment protests, isolate groups, and increase the costs of participation. The key question is whether security forces can sustain large-scale repression, not if Iranians are willing to protest.
Any serious path toward democratic change must therefore focus on raising the cost of repression for those who organize and command it. This requires sustained international pressure targeting responsible institutions and individuals, not broad sanctions that harm citizens or reinforce the regime's narrative. Measures should target commanders, units, and structures involved in repression, including crowd control, intelligence, cyber surveillance, and judicial processing.
Accountability is key. Naming and shaming security units, commanders, prosecutors, and judges involved in abuses increases risks, constrains mobility, and shows impunity won't last. Sanctions, travel bans, asset freezes, and universal jurisdiction further undermine protection, weakening morale, causing fractures, and questioning the costs of obedience.
Reducing the regime's repression capacity is as crucial as challenging its willingness. Its ability to shut down the internet, monitor, identify protest leaders, and deploy security forces is a key advantage. External actors and the diaspora can help society resist surveillance by supporting secure communication, anti-censorship tools, and digital security training, preventing protests from being isolated. Additionally, investing in documenting human rights abuses with credible standards ensures repression is recorded and doesn't fade into silence and fear.
Crucially, foreign governments should avoid symbolic engagement or rhetorical moderation that lowers pressure while repression continues. Diplomatic gestures that ignore ongoing violence act as a pressure-release valve for the regime, reinforcing belief among security elites that they can repress domestically while negotiating internationally. Engagement should be contingent on measurable improvements in human rights and accountability.
In short, the path toward democracy in Iran lies in weakening the institutional foundations of repression by increasing the political, legal, and personal costs of violence; reducing the state's surveillance and control capacity; and preserving broad social unity. Only when the security state's ability to govern through fear is eroded does democratic change become a realistic and sustainable outcome.
Iqan Shahidi
Participant at the 29th Forum 2000 Conference, PhD candidate in intellectual history at Cambridge University, Iran/UK
In response to your question, I see the current situation in Iran through two closely connected dynamics: the configuration of the opposition – particularly outside the country – and the realities unfolding inside Iran itself.
Before addressing this, I should clarify that I do not identify myself as either a monarchist or a republican. My assessment is offered from an analytical and civic standpoint rather than a partisan one. The current divisions within the opposition, and the factors that sustain them, are the result of dynamics and shortcomings on both sides. Historical grievances, mutual mistrust, unresolved questions of political legitimacy, and competing visions of Iran’s future have all contributed to this fragmentation, and responsibility for it cannot be placed exclusively on one camp.
That said, the present wave of protests has been accompanied by the growing prominence of monarchist discourse, particularly calls for the return of the Pahlavi monarchy. This has had a tangible impact on the broader opposition landscape. Large segments of the republican opposition – often defining themselves in opposition to monarchism – have been hesitant, largely silent, or even openly critical of these protests. While there are important exceptions, many republican actors have focused their criticism on the political approaches associated with Reza Pahlavi, especially in recent days, rather than offering unequivocal support for the protests themselves.
This reaction is especially striking given that millions of Iranians are on the streets, unified – rightly or wrongly – around shared slogans and, in some cases, a single political figure. From an objective perspective, this fragmentation is deeply troubling. In moments of mass mobilization and extreme repression, prioritizing ideological boundaries, historical disputes, or factional interests over the immediate demands of society significantly weakens the prospects for democratic change.
The second dynamic concerns developments inside Iran. Here, the picture appears far more unified. Large segments of society are expressing a clear and radical demand: the complete dismantling of the Islamic Republic as a political system. The state’s response has been brutal. Internet shutdowns, severe restrictions on communication, and the widespread use of lethal force have become central tools of repression. Hundreds – and very likely thousands – of people have been killed or seriously injured. What is unfolding increasingly resembles a massacre rather than ordinary authoritarian repression.
Despite the clarity and scale of popular demands, the Iranian people are structurally unable to translate their aspirations into political reality. The monopoly over weapons, military force, and coercive power remains firmly in the hands of the state. This imbalance leaves society exposed and largely defenseless in the face of sustained violence.
Under these conditions, responsibility cannot rest solely with Iranian society. There is a clear moral and political duty for the international community to act. While I recognize the constraints imposed by realpolitik – particularly among European states – there are still concrete steps that could meaningfully support Iran’s democratic movement. One such step would be the closure of foreign embassies in Iran, signaling a fundamental withdrawal of diplomatic legitimacy from the regime. In addition, suspending financial and trade relations with the Iranian government would increase pressure on its capacity to sustain repression.
In my view, only a combination of a more responsible and reality-based opposition – capable of temporarily setting aside internal divisions – and sustained, principled international pressure can help ensure that the current protests move Iran closer to democracy rather than being crushed at an immense human cost.
The views expressed in these works are the responsibility of its authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Forum 2000 Foundation or its staff.
