Romania’s Repeated Presidential Elections

April 28, 2025

“Romania is the only country in Europe where a secret service officially computes the vote, managed the pandemic response, officially stores citizens’ private data, and wins major IT contracts, including some with EU funding,” writes ICDR member and Professor of Comparative Public Policy at the LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome Alina Mungiu-Pippidi for the Forum’s Bulletin regarding the upcoming presidential elections in Romania.


Alina Mungiu-Pippidi

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi is a member of the ICDR and a professor of Comparative Public Policy at the LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome. She has led Romania’s Coalition for a Clean Government for more than 20 years.


Having barely survived an aggressive takeover attempt by a rogue red-brown conspiracy during its presidential election at the end of 2024, Romania is now preparing for a repeat election on May 4. The cancellation of the first round in November 2024 has sharply divided both the country and international observers into two camps: those who denounce the Constitutional Court’s decision — arguing  that leading candidate Calin Georgescu had defrauded them at every stage — and those who believe that, despite his faults, the fact that Georgescu convinced two million people to vote for him justified his continued place in the race.

The fraud is amply documented. Georgescu entered the race by submitting a falsified statement of assets and interests — a mandatory and detailed document in Romania, published online for all public officials. His campaign was fueled by an army of rogues on TikTok and other platforms who bought and influenced votes using cryptocurrencies, and deployed “bots” to manipulate TikTok’s algorithm, allowing them to campaign at times and places when and where this was not allowed by the law. (TikTok later admitted these abuses to the European Commission and pledged that such violations would not happen again.) On the final day of the campaign, Georgescu submitted a financial statement claiming he had received and spent no campaign funds, which is in clear violation of the law.

Due to the nature of TikTok, where accounts were erased the day after the election, it was difficult to prove that Russia directly was behind all this, or just taking advantage, but the rogue conspirators (African mercenaries dealing in crypto) discussed among themselves that they were backed by the same companies which worked for Brexit. Eventually, Mr. Georgescu, who failed to mobilize mass protests, was banned a second time by the Electoral Court and charged by ordinary courts for a breach of the law on campaign funding and for antisemitic statements. His appeals to the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights — claiming a “Soros conspiracy” — were also unsuccessful.

Despite his disqualification, Mr. Georgescu’s popularity grew in the spring of 2025, as many perceived him as a victim of the "system"— banned from ruling because of his opposition to the European establishment. His main support base came from Romania’s strong anti-vaccine movement, in a country that has the lowest percentage of adult vaccination in the EU. His charismatic wife, who also served as his political partner, played a leading role in his public image, despite Mr. Georgescu’s own belief that women should pursue different paths than participation in politics. Mr. Georgescu made the courts' task easier thanks to an abundance of antisemitic and revisionist remarks related to Romania’s interwar history, and even attacking his supporters U.S. Vice President JD Vance and President Donald Trump — whom he has labeled as agents of Jerusalem.

Why did he garner so many votes? Georgescu drew support from two major groups: first, the rural population — in the most rural country in Europe  —where resentment has been growing over the flooding of the market with cheap Ukrainian grain. Second, he tapped into what I some years ago called the "lumpen-diaspora" — more than one million Romanians living precariously between Western Europe and their homeland, doing seasonal work and not belonging anywhere. Many had entered what they believed was “Paradise,” only to find themselves becoming toilet floor sweepers and garbage collectors, a deep blow to their self-esteem. Their online spaces are now saturated with anti-vaccine rage, conspiracy theories, and the like. The Romanian churches abroad, rather than helping to civilize the diaspora community, have in fact been the main driver of superstition. During the pandemic, they played a negative role, openly opposing official public health policies.

Together, the rural population and the diaspora have contributed to Romania leading Europe in rates of domestic violence, child abuse, human trafficking, and a whole range of social ills An attempt by the Constitutional Court a few years back to remove religion as a mandatory subject in schools largely failed: 98% of schools cooperated with the Orthodox Church to reinstate religious instruction as an "optional" subject. Meanwhile, Romania spends more public funds on building churches than hospitals — despite having one of the highest rates of child mortality.

Alongside the old Orthodox Church — conservative and historically unfriendly toward Ukraine (the Romanian minority in Ukraine has had issues for many years due to Ukrainian nationalism, a battle often fought through the churches) — various neo-Protestant sects have also drawn in marginalized groups, both within Romania and in the diaspora. Georgescu built a network of pastors who supported him, and he adapted his image across different TikTok communities: presenting himself alternately as a Protestant pastor, a fundamentalist Orthodox believer, and a "Third Age" figure. Each persona targeted a separate TikTok audience, all of which he managed to infiltrate successfully.

With Georgescu out of the race, he has been succeeded by AUR — a party that first rose to prominence by attempting to amend the constitution to ban LGBT marriage a few years ago, and later fought against vaccination. It is led by the younger but politically savvy nationalist activist George Simion. With Georgescu’s help, AUR has managed to negotiate a deal that means Simion alone remains in the race. As a result, he now leads the polls with around 25–30% support, running on an anti-establishment, anti-corruption, and anti-EU platform.

The grand coalition that has ruled Romania for the past two years — the Liberals and the Social Democrats — lost the November election when they competed against each other, due to their poor candidate choices. Now, they have agreed on a single candidate: Crin Antonescu, a retired politician who has spent the past decade supported by his wife, former European Commissioner Adina Valean. However, Antonescu commands little respect or popular traction. He also has no international experience — a serious drawback for a job that is heavily focused on foreign affairs, security, and justice.

The alternative contender who rose from below and leads the pro-European camp is the independent mayor of Bucharest, Nicusor Dan. Dan, who won a second mandate in Bucharest, is an activist who fought the developers’ mafia in Bucharest and is supported by small parties and individuals. Long ago, he lost control of the party he founded — the Save Romania Union — to a group of opportunists with alleged ties to the secret services. A faction in this party is now attempting to return to supporting Dan, but since they began the campaign with another candidate, party leader Elena Lasconi, they are now trapped in a legal nightmare and are unlikely to make much of a difference.

Finally, there is former Prime Minister Victor Ponta, a pure opportunist who flew to Mar-a-Lago simply to take a selfie (much like Mr. Simion, who was smuggled into an event there under the credentials of someone from Giorgia Meloni’s party just to photograph himself near the Trump family). Ponta, who faced multiple corruption charges but escaped prosecution thanks to changes in the law, has spent the past 10 years living between Belgrade — where he holds citizenship and maintains close ties to Sebastian Ghita, a fugitive businessman and former top IT contractor for the Romanian intelligence services — as well as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Once styling himself as Matteo Renzi’s younger cousin, Ponta has tried to reinvent himself as Calin Georgescu’s brother-in-arms, attempting to cobble together a grotesque, last-minute anti-EU candidacy. He still commands the loyalty of some former Social Democrat clients, enough to siphon votes away from Antonescu.

What is already, unfortunately, clear is the failure of the centrist parties — those that ruled alongside the secret services, and more often than not, were ruled by them. Romania is the only country in Europe where a secret service officially computes the vote, managed the pandemic response, officially stores citizens’ private data, and wins major IT contracts, including some with EU funding.

There is no independent media or polling agency, despite the plurality of interests and secret services backing them. (In the presidential race alone, several candidates are associated with the external intelligence service, the protection and security service (bodyguards), etc.) If, by some miracle, Mr. Dan wins, he would have the power to appoint the heads of these services, but not to fundamentally change their behavior: the parliamentary committees meant to supervise them are notoriously subordinated and cannot play any oversight role.

This infiltration of politics and society also helps explain the rage on social media. Whereas Romania’s civil society was thriving 20 years ago, it has now been hollowed out and replaced by "official civil society" — “security” groups and influencers invested in by the secret services. Romania’s secret service budgets — covering about seven agencies, which are legally allowed to operate private companies and can thus fund media outlets and CSOs — are now larger than Germany’s, despite Germany having four times Romania’s population.

And yet, they lost the November election — some say because they were infiltrated themselves. More likely, it was because monopolists eventually lose the survival skills that competition demands.

The lesson for Romanians is clear: they should consider amending the constitution to end the system of directly electing the president. Direct elections have always been a populist idea — and with the rise of platforms like TikTok, it now becomes suicidal in that voters invest their social expectations in the presidency, even though the president’s formal powers are strongly concentrated in the areas of defense and foreign policy.

In the second round of the election, Romanians will rally behind Dan or Antonescu, as public opinion remains strongly pro-EU and pro-NATO. However, George Simion and his large group of anti-Ukraine, populist followers will not disappear after the presidential vote. They will have to be dealt with to prevent them from winning the next legislative elections in four years, as they have now risen to the top of party popularity rankings. If Antonescu wins, he will prolong the life of Romania’s old political parties. If Dan wins, he will face the daunting task of creating a pro-presidential party.

References: Long Shadow: How Romania’s Securitate Turned the Revolution into Riches | Balkan Insight Project MUSE – Explaining Eastern Europe: Romania's Italian-Style Anticorruption Populism


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