Dinko Gruhonjić, Faculty of Philosophy of Novi Sad
When we talk about democratic resilience in the Western Balkans, we must start from one uncomfortable but necessary word: stabilitocracy.
For many years, parts of the region have operated under systems that formally maintain democratic institutions - elections, parliaments, constitutions - while in practice concentrating power in narrow political networks. These systems are often tolerated internationally because they promise short-term stability. But in the long term, they produce democratic erosion, institutional fragility and deep social polarization.
You can see stabilitocratic dynamics in systems where elections exist and are regularly held, but where the same political networks maintain overwhelming control over institutions, media space and economic resources, often while being perceived externally as guarantors of regional stability.
In Serbia today, there is effectively no local government controlled by the opposition, which is one of the clearest indicators of the current state of democracy in the country. This situation is closely linked to electoral processes that have been repeatedly criticized for various irregularities, as well as to a media landscape in which the vast majority of outlets consistently favor the ruling structures. Together, these factors significantly narrow the space for genuine political competition and undermine public trust in democratic institutions.
Closely connected to this is what we can describe as hybrid authoritarianism: it does not abolish democratic procedures. Instead, it captures them.
In practice, this tends to work through several mechanisms:
First, delegitimization of critics.
Independent journalists, civil society organizations and academic voices are often labelled as “enemies of the nation”. This creates an atmosphere in which criticism of government policy is reframed as an attack on the state itself.
Public discourse in Serbia has increasingly included narratives portraying critical journalists, academics and civil society actors as “foreign agents” or “traitors”. This framing shifts the debate from policy criticism to questions of loyalty to the nation, which is a classic tool used in hybrid authoritarian environments.
My colleagues and I - journalists and academics - are regularly described in regime media as “foreign agents” simply for criticizing public policy or corruption. In some cases, such public stigmatization of critical voices has been followed by professional or institutional consequences, including pressures within academic environments and even loss of employment. This sends a strong signal to the broader academic and professional community about the risks associated with public criticism.
In such an environment, the message is very clear: criticism is not treated as part of democratic debate, but as disloyalty to the state itself. Once that line is crossed, public hostility and pressure become much easier to justify, including threats that can directly affect the physical safety of those targeted.
Second, state capture of the information space
One of the least discussed but most important issues is opaque media ownership. In several countries in the region, especially Serbia, media markets are heavily influenced by telecom operators, state-owned enterprises, or companies closely linked to ruling political structures.
This creates a system where media do not need to be formally censored. They are economically conditioned instead.
Advertising flows, public procurement contracts, and access to infrastructure become tools of political control. As a result, pluralism exists on paper, but not in practice.
In Serbia media control rarely takes the form of direct censorship. Instead, it is often exercised through market distortion, including the strategic use of state advertising, state-owned enterprises and telecom-related economic leverage to reward loyal outlets and marginalize critical ones.
This is also visible in the allocation of public funds to media through project-based co-financing schemes, where budget resources are frequently distributed in ways that favor politically aligned outlets over critical ones.
I recently spoke with an editor of a small independent local outlet who told me something very simple: “We don’t need anyone to censor us. If we lose access to public advertising or local project funding, we simply cannot survive.” This shows how media control today often works not through bans, but through economic dependency.
This brings us to a key question: How can independent media survive - financially and physically - when the state treats them as enemies?
Independent media in the Western Balkans often operate under three simultaneous pressures:
- Economic pressure - through distorted markets and selective state advertising.
- Political pressure - through smear campaigns and regulatory pressure.
- Security pressure - including harassment, threats and strategic lawsuits (SLAPP’s).
Despite this, independent media continues to exist. But increasingly, survival depends on external support, cross-border cooperation and audience trust, rather than on domestic market conditions.
This is not sustainable in the long term. If democratic resilience is to be real, independent journalism must be able to survive inside its own society, not only thanks to international support.
The situation in Serbia
In recent years, we have seen mass civic mobilizations, particularly among young people, demanding accountability, rule of law and fair political competition. These movements are not anti-European. On the contrary - they are deeply aligned with European democratic values.
Recent civic mobilizations, particularly among younger generations in Serbia, demonstrate that democratic expectations remain strong within society. The key question is whether political and media systems will allow these democratic demands to translate into fair political competition.
In conversations with students in Serbia, I often hear a very simple sentence: “We don’t want special treatment. We just want rules that apply to everyone.”
The upcoming electoral processes will therefore be more than routine elections. They will be tests of institutional credibility, media pluralism, and public trust.
For the European Union, the key challenge is not only geopolitical. It is normative.
If EU integration is perceived as a purely technical process - chapters, benchmarks, procedures - it risks losing credibility among citizens.
But if it is clearly linked to everyday democratic realities - media freedom, fair elections, rule of law - then it becomes meaningful.
So, what can be done?
First, the EU should continue supporting independent media, but with a stronger focus on long-term sustainability, not only project-based funding.
Second, transparency in media ownership and public advertising should become a core democratic conditionality issue.
Third, democratic resilience should be measured not only through formal institutions, but through the real functioning of public debate, media pluralism, and civil society space.
Finally, democratic resilience in the Western Balkans will not be built only through institutions. It will be built through citizens, especially younger generations, who increasingly demand accountability, transparency, and dignity in political life.
The Western Balkans is not just a region waiting to join Europe. It is a region where the future of European democracy is already being tested.
The views expressed in these work are the responsibility of its author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Forum 2000 Foundation or its staff.
