Religion, Globalization, and Secularization

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Keynote Speech:
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Doris Donnelly: Good morning everyone, and welcome to our session on Religion, Globalization, and Secularization. I actually count twenty-four sessions in the Forum 2000 program this year, and five of those sessions have been specifically on religion. Roughly one-fifth of the entire program has been specifically on religion, not to mention the many intersections of the other sessions that have touched upon religion. Religion has a lot to do with the world we want to live in. This very crucial session has as its topic Religion, Globalization and Secularization.

But the topic is only as good as the people who have been selected to speak on the topic. We have, this is the truth, we simply have the best. Our keynote speaker is José Casanova. He comes to us from Spain, and I suspect that the reason he is here is because Spain – language, culture, country – has had a banner year this year. As you know, Spain won the World Cup. And as if that was not enough, Rafael Nadal took the New York Open. And not only in sports, but last week we heard that Mario Vargas Llosa, who is of Spanish heritage, won the Nobel Prize for Literature. So behind the invitation of José Casanova to this panel and to this conference, the organizers said, in their inimitable style: We have to have the very very best, the pre-eminent sociologist. So we have José Casanova with us.

Professor Casanova got his degree in Philosophy in Zaragoza, Spain. He has a Master’s degree in Theology from the University at Innsbruck in Austria and a doctorate in Theology from the New School for Social Research in New York, where he taught for a while before assuming his position at Georgetown University. There he is a Professor of Sociology and a Senior Fellow at the Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs.

You can read Professor Casanova’s CV in the folder for the conference. But I need to tell you a conversion story. Professor Casanova bought the party line with regard to sociology and modernism, which meant a correlation that the more modern a society, the less important was religion. And then, when he came to the United States, the conversion happened, and he saw there a very modern society where religion, in fact, was also very important. And that was the basis for the beginning of his work in a direction where – and I ask you to pay attention to this because he will probably use these words (these words all begin with the prefix “RE”) – he really has redefined, repositioned, reorganized
the vocabulary for sociology and sociologists. For example, he has talked about multiple modernities, new paradigms of secularization, in other words secularization-light and hardcore secularism.

Professor Casanova’s book, Public Religions in the Modern World, published in 1994, is still regarded as of seminal importance in sociology. It has been translated into Japanese, Spanish, Italian, Polish, Arabic, Indonesian, Farsi and Chinese. He has crisscrossed the globe and we are very happy he is here.

José Casanova: Thank you very much, Doris for a very kind introduction. I am rarely a Spanish nationalist. Only when it comes to sport am I still one. I am glad that you mentioned these achievements. These are the only achievements of nationalism I take seriously.

My presentation is going to be a kind of bird’s eye view of global processes, which means the view from nowhere. But hopefully it will at least illuminate some of the processes that we may be able to discuss in the conversation. I am of course very grateful to the organizers for giving me this opportunity. And greatly honored to have been asked to prepare some remarks about how these three categories: religion, globalization and secularization may in some way be related to one another.

Until recently, we modern secular Europeans, and we social scientists, thought that we already knew the answer. The answer was: religion is a thing of the past – a characteristic of relatively primitive or traditional or pre-modern societies – that is going to either disappear or weaken, or at most become just a private affair in modern secular societies. And this is what we understood as the process of secularization. This was clearly a process, which was obvious throughout modern European developments, and we thought that the rest of the world was going to follow these modern processes.

And by globalization, we meant precisely the global expansion of these European processes of modernization. The global expansion of the world capitalist system, the global expansion of the system of modernist states, the global expansion of the process of secularization. We now know that at least with the last aspect, processes of secularization, global history is going in very different directions.

We thought that societies, as they became more modern would become more secular, that is less religious. We already know that the United States is a society which, while becoming more modern, also became more religious. And we now see that the rest of the world, as it becomes more modern is not becoming less religious like Europe, but more religious, more like the United States. I am not trying to say that the United States are now more of a model for other states than Europe because this is also a false proposition. There are many parts of the world which are also undergoing a serious process of secularization.

I would say the entire world is becoming simultaneously more secular and more religious. What we have to stop thinking of is secularization as a process that brings the end of religion, or religious revival as a process that puts an end to secularization. Both processes, secularization and religious transformation, are happening simultaneously. Religious transformation is not simply the revival of a past traditional religious form; it is the construction of a very modern phenomenon. Religion in America is not a traditional residue from the past. It is a product of American modernity.

Now, some time ago, I proposed that when we discuss secularization, we distinguish between three different meanings of the term. Secularization one is secularization as the differentiation of the secularist fields – economy, state, science – from religion. Secularization two is the decline of religious beliefs and practices. Secularization three is the privatization of religion. In Europe all three processes happen to go together.

We thought that these three processes, these three types of secularization, were intrinsically interrelated and connected with the process of modernization. Today, we know that this is not the case. These processes may go in very different directions throughout the world. And the interesting task, of course, is to know how they are interrelated, when they go together, and when they go in different directions.

Let me explain what I mean by the global process of secularization that is happening everywhere. The global process of secularization can be best characterized as the global expansion of
what Charles Taylor, the Canadian philosopher, characterized in his new book *Secular Age* as the secular immanent frame. The secular immanent frame is constituted by the structural interlapping of the modern secular cosmic order of science and technology, the modern social order of states, of administrative states, capitalist markets and mediatic public affairs, and the modern moral order of individuals claiming rights to liberty, equality and the pursuit of happiness.

Now all these three orders are often understood as purely immanent secular orders devoid of transcendence, and thus functioning *etsi Deus non daretur*, as if God would not exist. It is this phenomenological experience that according to Taylor constitutes our global age, paradigmatically, as a secular one, irrespective of the extent to which people living in this age may have religious or theistic beliefs. But as the contrast between Europe and the United States demonstrates, this process of secularization within the very same immanent frame may entail very different religious dynamics.

Despite its many variations, the general European pattern is one of secularization, namely secular differentiation and religious decline, or at least a decline of church and religiosity. The American pattern is one of secularization combined with religious growth and recurrent religious revivals. It is an open empirical question which kind of religious dynamic will accompany secularization, that is the expansion of the secular immanent frame and of secular differentiation in our Western cultures.

I could not talk as Peter Berger, a very close friend and colleague, talks of desecularization of the world because of China, for example. China is a very secular country, but there are of course religious revivals. They will probably become much more relevant as the communist state power loosens its control. Nonetheless, do not expect a radical religious transformation of Chinese societies, of any society. What we see throughout the world is that the religious and the secular are being constituted mutually, but in many different ways.

Now let us look at global religious transformations. When it comes to religion, there is no global rule. All world religions are being transformed radically today, as they had been transformed throughout the era of European colonial expansion. But they are being transformed in diverse and manifold ways. All world religions are forced to respond to the global expansion of secular modernity as well as to their mutual challenges. Today, to understand the transformations of all religions, it is important to look at the way they influence each other, then to look at the way in which they are based on their own traditions.

Sociologists of religion should be less obsessed with measuring either the decline or the growth of religion in the abstract, and be more attuned to the new forms which religion is assuming in all world religions at three different levels of analysis – at the individual level, at the group level, and at the societal level.

At the individual level, there is a process of increasing religious individuation, which was first initiated by Protestantism, but is now affecting and transforming all religious traditions – Catholicism, as much as Islam, Hinduism, as well as Buddhism.

What is really new in our global age is the simultaneous presence and availability of all world religions from the most primitive to the most modern, often detached from their temporal and spatial context, ready for flexible or fundamentalist individual appropriation.

This is certainly the case in all global cities today – from New York to Johannesburg, to Kuala Lumpur, to Singapore, to Shanghai, to London, etc. Anybody can be initiated into any ancestral cult, be born again or reincarnated into any religious self, remain a permanent seeker attuned to partial and consecutive revelations or illuminations. This is a very important process, and is going on in all religious traditions.

Now, at the level of religious communities, much of sociology had lamented the loss of *Gemeinschaft*, of community, as one of the negative consequences of modernity. Both individualism and societalization were supposed to expand at the expense of community. Theories of modernization were predicated on simple dichotomies of tradition and modernity, of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (community and society). Theories of secularization were based on the same dichotomies and on the premise that the process of modern rationalization made community non-viable.
But as de Tocqueville saw clearly, modernity offers new and expanded possibilities for the construction of communities of all kinds, and particularly, for the construction of new religious communities as voluntary congregations. Most of the so-called cults, the new religions, or the new religious movements, assume a form of voluntary congregation. So do most of the dynamic forms of Christianity, like the Christian-based communities in Latin America, or the Pentecostal Churches around the world, or the most dynamic forms of Islam, such as Tablighi Jamaat, and most Sufi brotherhoods. Even within world religions like Hinduism or Buddhism that have a less developed tradition of congregationalism, the latter is emerging as a new prominent institutional form, particularly in the immigrant diasporas.

Now, at the societal level, and this is the level at which most of us are obsessed with religion, at this level of what could be called imagined religious communities, secular nationalism and national civil religions will continue to be prominent carriers of collective identities. Processes of globalization are likely to enhance the re-emergence of the great world religions as globalized transnational imagined religious communities. While new cosmopolitan and transnational imagined communities may emerge, the most relevant ones are likely to be once again the old civilizations and world religions, but radically transformed.

Therein lies the merit of Huntington’s thesis of the *Clash of Civilizations*. But of course he thought of them as geopolitical territorial units. This is not what is happening to these world religions. There is a fundamental tension in the modern world between two well-recognized principles:

- On the one hand, the principle of inalienable right of an individual person to freedom of conscience, and therefore to freedom of religion and to freedom of conversion. This principle is assumed in all modern democratic societies in the form of an unquestioned, universal human right.
- On the other hand, there is also the increasing recognition of the collective rights of peoples to protect and preserve their traditions and their cultures from colonial imperialist and predatory practices. That recognition is primarily enshrined in United Nations documents under rights of indigenous peoples. It could easily be turned into a general principle of the reciprocal rights and duties of all peoples of the world to respect each other’s traditions and cultures, constituted on the basis of what could be called an emerging global denominationalism. It is the proliferation of deterritorialized transnational global emerging communities or global image encompassing the so-called all-world religions, as well as many new forms of hybrid globalized religions, such as the Bahá’ís, the Mnis, the Hare Krishnas, Afro-American religions, Falun Gongs etc. That I call the emerging global denominationalism. Of course they compete with many other forms of secular and imagined communities, as well as with mother nationalism.

The emerging denominationalism in this respect includes both religious as well as secular denominations. By denominationalism I mean a system of mutual recognition of groups within society. It is the name we give to ourselves, and the name by which others recognize us. In the distinctive of the American system of religious denominationalism it means the fact that it is not regulated by the state, that it is voluntary, and that it is a system of mutual recognition of group identities.

Parallel to the general process of secularization, which started as a historical process of internal secularization within western Christendom, but was later globalized during European colonial expansion, there is a process of constitution of a global system of religions. Indeed, we talk of the world religions as if they have been here forever. We know, of course, that Hinduism as an -ism is a product of the 19th century. Buddhism is a product of the 19th century. They did not exist as -isms before; no Buddhist called himself a Buddhist before the 19th century, no Hindu called himself a Hindu before the 19th century, yet all Hindus call themselves Hindus today. In this respect, religions, rather than being something of the past, are products of our modern global world. This global system of religions comes as a process of global religious denominationalism, where all the so-called world religions are redefined and transformed in contraposition to the secular through interrelated reciprocal processes of particularistic differentiation, universalistic claims and mutual recognition.

Like the denominationalism of the United States, global denominationalism is emerging as a self-regulated system of religious pluralism and mutual recognition of religious groups in global civil society. Each world religion is being constituted on the global level through similar interrelated
processes. Again, I repeat, of particularistic differentiation, universalistic claims and mutual recognition.

As Roland Robertson has emphasized, universal particularism and particular universalism, are intrinsically interrelated and inherent to the processes of globalization. Each world religion claims its universal right to be unique and different, thus its particularism, while at the same time presenting itself globally as a universal path for all of humanity. Global denominationalism emerges through a process of mutual recognition of the particular and the universal claims, and in this respect, there is a growing global trend of mutual recognition of all cultures. But it is not happening smoothly nor without conflict.

What is at stake, ultimately, is recognition of the irremediable plurality of all universalisms and the multiplicity of modernities. Namely that every universalism and every modernity is particularistic. One could say that we are moving from a condition of competing particularist universalisms to a new condition of global denominational contextualism. Thank you very much.

Doris Donnelly: We thank you very much, Professor Casanova. We have a lot to think about, a lot to discuss, so let’s move on to our next speaker, Gilles Kepel. Gilles Kepel is a pre-eminent French scholar, and arguably the foremost expert on political Islam. He has been recognized as being one of the most insightful and shrewdest interpreters of the Muslim world.

He is presently a Professor at L’Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, affectionately known as Sciences Po. He holds doctorates in Political Science and Sociology and speaks Arabic, French, English and Italian. I have read only two of his books, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West* and *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East*.

One of the things that Professor Kepel does that is of interest to me as a theologian is that he understands the power of a symbol, the power of a symbol to disclose something more than meets the eye. He discusses the symbolism of the attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, close to Wall Street, as a symbol of the vulnerability of the United States’ political and economic system. But also the symbols of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, as symbols of the moral decrepitude of the United States, especially under the regime of Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld. Monsieur Kepel, je vous en prie.

Gilles Kepel: Dékuji. Thank you very much. Thank you so much for your very kind introduction and I fear that you raised the expectations maybe a little too much. You were kind enough when you introduced me to not mention football, because football and France this year did not go so well.

The reason I mention that is because football and religion are now perceived in France as having a sort of bizarre relationship. As you know, the shameful defeats and shameful behavior of the French soccer team in South Africa was heavily discussed by the French press and amongst the chattering classes in France. By some, it was linked to the fact that actually most of the players on the French team were Muslims. And that they came out of what is now the only recognized French word – in the old days, it was *parfum* or *Champagne* – now it is *banlieue*, which means the outskirts of the big cities, which are peopled usually by immigrants from the Third World or people who are now French, but who are of immigrant descent. What was questioned was whether or not there still was a sort of moral and national fiber that could support a national football team. As opposed to 1998, when the French won the World Cup, and where the hero of France was a guy called Zinedine Zidane, which is “quintessentially” a French name. Although I am being a little ironic, this is what we are. France was a colonial power in North Africa, and now North Africa is very much present in France. Zinedine Zidane, being the son of a Berber from Algeria, born and raised in Marseilles, is quintessentially French, just as Gilles Kepel, the son of a Czech immigrant, is quintessentially French.

At the time it looked as if the French system of integration had managed to have a national dimension that brought together people of different faiths and that led them to win the soccer world cup. Well, they had to have some other qualities, of course. I am a staunch integrationist. I would be unable to play football, and I am an atheist with no interest in football, so that is probably why I am on this panel. And being Czech-French, what else can I be?

The issue with the team was to what extent had some sort of communalist fragmentation, that was based on diverging identities, led to the fact that the team was structurally disunited, if you wish.
One commentator, the conservative philosopher Alain Finkielkraut, who is very keen on football, actually said: “La France des cités l’a emporté sur la France de la cité”, where les cités means the projects and la cité means the city in the Greek sense. This feeling that you belong to a city, to a polis - speaking in Greek - has vanished and the peculiarity and particularity of people has come to the forefront.

What is happening here? At the moment I am conducting research on the outskirts of Paris in the very areas where the riots started five years ago (it will be the fifth anniversary at the end of this month). What is very striking is that, as opposed to previous findings, we are now seeing there the birth of a sort of enclave community or enclave culture with a very strong emphasis on religion as protection against a society whose values are not really deemed to be valid anymore.

To go back to José’s variation on particularist universalism or universal particularism: it is complicated, as are all strong concepts. Mr. Casanova’s experience was based on what he saw in America, to a large extent. I would like to put some questions here about what is happening in Europe.

I think we can use some of the lessons we learn from what happens among Muslim groups in Europe, and use them to question what is happening among Jews in Europe. French Jewry was arch-secularized. Now the influence of the Hasids and the Lubavitchers is extremely striking, for instance, in the third generation of Jewish immigrants from North Africa. They would not pale in comparison with Tablighi Jamaat, that was just mentioned, which is an Islamic pietist group which considers that seclusion from society, cultural seclusion, is quintessential for identity.

France was, and still is, I believe - although it has had to come to terms with a different situation - a country of integration. It used to be said in the Greece of the fifth century B.C. under Pericles, that what made a Greek Greek was not that he was born Greek, but that he went to the Palestra. That was the gymnasium, the lycée, the secondary school, or junior high, as we would say in the States. Language, culture, the reception and internalization of cultural values were more important than the color of the skin, or religion, or what you owned.

The problem is that this feeling is being undermined and, if I may say so, is also being “overmined” - it is being questioned from the bottom and from the top. From the bottom not only by ideologies, but by organizational forms that have to do with class stratification of society, like unions, or left-wing political parties. They have been unable to come to terms with the post-industrial world. Therefore there is a feeling that those identities that provided people who were not pleased with their place in society with political and social mobilization, are no longer efficient.

Then there is a need for new identities to defend you against what is perceived as evil, that will give you an ideal, and a feeling of dignity; something that young people, both in the States, and on our side of the Atlantic call respect. This on the other hand, if I may say so, is undermined from the top. It is questioned by the European Union process, which is depriving nation states of their capacity to define an identity.

I am very struck, when I conduct interviews with respondents from the outskirts of Paris, by the fact that they spend their time comparing their fate in the projects with what they see on TV and on satellite television. Some look at French TV, others watch Al Jazeera even if they do not understand it. What they rebuild out of this, for instance, from identification with Palestinians, is that the French police is besieging Clichy-sous-Bois just like the Israelis besiege Gaza.

This is something which is made possible because of a vacuum at the top. The EU is largely unable not only to provide political leadership, but to provide a strong positive identity. We are going to face a major crisis because of this. You may say that the U.S. also has difficulty with that but it nevertheless has a strong state with whom people may identify, or may reject. But they have something to grab. The EU is very difficult to grab and it is perceived as a bureaucracy, as an impediment, as a non-elected body. Within that, we have this search for religious identities. I do not know whether we should call them religious - this might be my main difference with José Casanova here. They’re making use of a language which is full of a religious vocabulary. Whether or not we should satisfy ourselves with the religious label will be my philosophical question to José. Thank you.
Doris Donnelly: You may recall, those of you who were present at the Opening Ceremony on Sunday night, that President Havel made a plea for wonder and awe and transcendence that he felt was in decline in the world.

There is an exception to that and the exception falls with Professor Tomáš Halík, who is a Professor of Sociology at Charles University and also a Catholic priest in charge of the university chapel which is packed to the rafters every Sunday. They come not only to hear Father Halík, they come to hear a message that has been rejuvenated by him. And I want to say that, having been there, it seems that the message is not exactly relevant, it is not appealing, but it is an appreciation of the Christian gospel that Father Halík is able to translate for his audience. It is rather impressive, I must say.

In addition, Father Halík is a spokesperson at the Vatican and in Prague in interreligious and intercultural dialogue. His sweep is rather broad, and it is a pleasure to have him address us now.

Tomáš Halík: Thank you, Doris. It is a great privilege for me to sit at the same table with the greatest stars of sociology of religion of our age. I see religion from the perspective of sociology, from the outside, and at the same time from inside, as a priest and theologian and active participant of interreligious dialogue. I will try to use this advantage. Interfaith Dialogue is an integral part of the Forum 2000 conferences every year, and I have been involved in it from the very beginning.

This time, I would like to add some remarks to a different important sort of dialogue: the dialogue of religion—mainly Christianity in our part of the world, and Christianity and Judaism with secularism. It strikes me that Christianity, the religion of incarnation, was actually always syncretic, multi-path. It was incorporated into various cultures, none of which were non-religious. Whether it was the original Judeo-Christianity or Hellenistic Christianity, or later Christianity of the ancient Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Celts, Slavs, Germans, etc.

What is remarkable, however, is that traditional Christianity has led a symbiotic existence for about two centuries with the only culture in the history of humanity which seems to be secular. It is European modernity, a culture that needs to comprise religiosity because it grew out of the roots of the Christian religion. The Christianity we experience in Europe today is not pure. Nor was it ever pure. And it probably cannot be pure in view of the nature of its incarnateness, but is profoundly intermixed with the secular culture of the West. Paradoxically, it is only Christianity that prevents that secular culture from completely turning into a religion or pseudo-religion. Always, when traditional religion stops its traditional role, some other phenomenon starts to play the religious role to integrate and interpret society.

I have written something about the pseudo-religious role of the media. They are now integrating society, they are now interpreting our world, they are now giving us the symbols, the great stories. The secular culture of the West is secular and non-religious insofar as it is Christian. If the Christian components were to disappear from European culture, that culture would not become atheistic, but religious or pseudo-religious, religious in a non-Christian and often anti-Christian sense. Even its atheism then becomes religion (indeed the state religion, as was the case of Marxism for instance).

It is in the interest of Christianity and Christians to uphold the secular component of European culture, but to criticize the tendency of secularization becoming a religion. In this way, Christianity defends the true nature of European culture, whose identity for centuries lies in the compatibility of secularism and Christianity. Clearly, the Christian and secular components of European culture can never fully coalesce. There will always be a certain tension between them. It depends on a large number of circumstances whether the tension will be fruitful or take the form of trench warfare detrimental to both sides.

Obviously, modernity will never be entirely Christianized. And there should be no attempt to achieve this utopian goal, not even under the appealing slogan of the new evangelization of Europe. Charles Taylor has shown why Christianity cannot tackle the mission to present-day modernity in the way that Father Rich in the seventeenth century went about incorporating Christianity into Asian cultures. This is because modernity is a culture that is already deeply imbued with Christianity
although it cannot be called unreservedly Christian. What is non-Christian about modernity? According to Taylor it is, in fact, often not neutral, not potentially open vis-a-vis Christianity, as were the remoter pagan cultures, but is systematically anti-Christian.

I fear that if Christianity and secularism were to go their separate ways, or if one of the components were to gain a total victory and displace the other, Europe would jettison its obligation to its own past, as well as its future. In any event, whichever of the components emerged victorious, and whichever of them gained independence from the other, both would be the losers.

I think a similar conclusion was reached in the celebrated dialogue between Cardinal Ratzinger and Jürgen Habermas at the Catholic Academy in Munich. Secular humanism and Christianity have a mutual need for each other as a corrective to one-sidedness. And a similar position is adopted in John Paul II's encyclical *Fides et ratio*: belief without reason is dangerous. Rationality without the ethical and spiritual values that stem from belief is also one-sided, and therefore dangerous.

What Christianity would look like if it really wanted to free itself from the legacy of the Enlightenment, and from today's secularism, can be seen in contemporary Christian fundamentalism and traditionalism. What laicism and secularism would look like if they wanted to turn their back totally on Christianity, we can only surmise from the language of such intolerant and would-be totalitarian ideologies as the attempts to impose the new speech of political correctness, or to spiritually castrate or lobotomize specific cultures under the slogan of multiculturalism.

At the present time, these two distinguished trends, Christian fundamentalism and militant secularism, indulge in mutual provocation, and thereby grow stronger. The one legitimizes the other's existence. And so not only do they keep each other alive, but they become radicalized through never-ending conflicts. Although each of them proclaims the need to eradicate the other, they mutually need each other. Extremists cannot exist without an enemy. Both of them are right to call the other a threat. But a greater threat comes from the mutual demonization.

I am worried about all types of fundamentalism and fanaticism, both religious and secular. A fundamentalist is a human being whose faith is too weak to sustain doubts and critical questions. People often eliminate these doubts using the projection method. In other words, they project their own doubts onto others, and then see in the others, particularly in the more open-minded members of their own community, dangerous enemies. When tension in our world is too great, and when frustrations and fear reach a high level among people, and entire groups of people, ordinary everyday language and the language of secular politics is not powerful enough to express those emotions.

A little remark to Gilles Kepel and to what he said about sports. I remember my experience from Prague after the victory of our team in hockey at the World Cup. There were many people crying in Prague. The goalie Hašek was the star, and he was not merely a man, he was called a god. I was discussing this in my seminar with the students, this special popular theology of our people. If emotions are so strong, secular language is not able to express them, and so people spontaneously reach for religious symbols and language. Yes. People spontaneously reach for the language of religion.

Political leaders use the power of religious rhetoric and religious symbols. Religion becomes a weapon in political conflicts. Wherever people start using religious rhetoric in political arguments and other differences of opinion, when they start to regard their opponents as demons, great Satan, the evil empire etc., they frequently project onto them their own demons, their dark sides, and their own negative characteristics. Then the clashes of opinion are in danger of escalating into actual destructive conflicts. This kind of devilment leads to the strategy of destruction. The world these days is full of monsters chiefly because religion gets dragged into political, social, and ethnic conflicts.

The philosopher Richard Kearney recalls the advice of psychoanalysis: when people are pursued in their dreams by monsters, they should dare to look the monsters in the face, while they are still dreaming. They will be surprised to discover that the monsters are not very unlike themselves. I think we must try to look our opponents in the face and perhaps we will be surprised that they are not very unlike us. I think the culture of dialogue is very important for the world today.
Doris Donnelly: Since several people have picked up on the football metaphor, we shall continue with it. We shall continue with Professor Grace Davie, who is the last person to speak because, as in all games, you need somebody very strong to wrap up. Professor Davie is totally competent and confident. We have confidence in her that she is able to do that.

She is widely known in the field of sociology in Britain, Europe and in the United States. Currently, she holds a Chair in Sociology at the University of Exeter, where she also directs the Centre for European Studies. She has written prolifically: articles, books, co-edited some books, and she has written in particular about a couple of subjects that I would like to call to your attention in the event that she does not mention them.

One of the things she talks about is vicarious religion, which is religion performed by an active minority on behalf of a much larger number who understand and approve what the minority is doing—vicarious religion. She also writes tellingly about obligation or consumption of religion—that the obligation towards religious practice has dwindled, and, at the same time, the desire to consume certain elements of religious practice has grown. She has also written tellingly of the inability of the established churches or perhaps the inability of established religions to discipline the beliefs and behaviors of a great majority of the population.

Grace Davie: Thank you for your welcome. I am delighted to be here. If you really want to swim to the bottom regarding football, I will tell you I lived for twenty years and raised three sons in Liverpool, a city with a premier European club, now third from the bottom of the English Premier League and close to receivership. However I am still proud to be a Liverpudlian.

I want to speak initially about the difference between reality and perception. It is commonplace now to say that God is back. That is the title of a recent book by two distinguished journalists from The Economist—a book of which we should take careful note. But is God back? Because that implies that He, or perhaps She, went away. I am not sure that God is back in that I think what has really changed is our perceptions of religion rather than the reality.

Think for a moment of the discussion of Islam in Europe. Totally correct, I entirely agree with many of the things that Gilles Kepel said. But Muslims have been in Europe since the 1960s and 1970s, the height of the secularization debate, but they were not called Muslims. They were Algerians, they were Pakistanis, they were Bangladeshis, they were Turks. Suddenly, we reconstruct a population. Maybe they reconstruct themselves—I do not deny that. But is it reality or our perception that is changing?

I think we need to work hard not so much on the discussion of religion now, but why political, economic and social science got it wrong for so long. And this, I think, is a very serious issue because I am not quite sure that they have got it right now. Let's just think of some examples: three world events and a recent election. The recent election is President Obama, relatively recent.

I sat on a very distinguished panel of political scientists in my own university in Exeter, who were discussing this issue, and somebody from the audience, rather late in the afternoon, said: “What is the significance of religion in Obama's election?” And to a man and a woman they said: “None.” Now that simply is untrue. They had constructed Obama to the European liking, in which sense he was a man of color but not a Christian. He most certainly is a Christian, not only in personal conviction, but also in his extensive experience in community work in Chicago.

Of course he has been many other things as well. Let us think too of the global events about which Gilles Kepel has written so eloquently: the Iranian revolution in 1979, the collapse of communism in 1989, and 9/11. I cannot quite get over the fact that my own disciplines—economic, political, social science—failed to predict any one of these. We call ourselves and sometimes are arrogant enough to consider ourselves predictive scientists.

We are trying to make up for lost ground. That is true. But I think there is a very serious indictment of our thinking which requires considerable reflection and humility. For example, in the questions we are invited to discuss, I am more perplexed by why Harvey Cox wrote The Secular City, than why he now writes Fire from Heaven, though I admire any senior academic who is prepared to change their mind. I think that requires courage, and I respect it.
What is to be done? This is how I would grasp the nature of modernity. I would ask first: Is it one thing or many? I like Eisenstadt, Shmuel Eisenstadt, who died very recently. I like and respect his notion of multiple modernities. I think it is helpful. I also like the notion that modernities are not given, but are continually constructed and reconstructed in different ways, in different places by real living human men and women and communities. They are not givens, they are made, and this is a process in which the religious factor is central.

What does it mean to be modern? This is an empirical rather than a theoretical question. Modern societies, if they are, as I would like to see them, the future, the world I would like to live in, must allow space for the prophetic voice. The prophetic voice, in my view, is a voice that disturbs. That voice might be religious, or it might be secular. I want to maintain that it is as modern to draw from the resources of the religious to critique the secular as it is to draw from the resources of the secular to critique the religious. It is the quality of the argument that counts. This is a real challenge for Europeans - even more for European social science - who do not deal well with the prophetic, the emotional, the unusual and the challenging.

In this respect, I would follow Jürgen Habermas: All of us, in every discipline, whatever it is, must look again to the core of our thinking in order to take seriously, and where appropriate, to accommodate the religious factor. This, if taken seriously, will be a real, radical revolution in social scientific thinking. Increasingly urgent debates have to happen both in academia and beyond. But I ask: Is sociology and all sociologists, all our disciplines up to the challenge? I sincerely hope so. Thank you.

Doris Donnelly: We have a little bit of time. Professor Casanova, Monsieur Kepel, Father Halík, Professor Davie, question to anyone?

José Casanova: Gilles made a very important point about the label of religions. What do we mean by it? Religion today is a category that means so many different things that in the end it really means nothing. There are very prominent scholars of religion, namely those who are actually in the science of religion and religious studies, not social scientists like ourselves, but those who really try to study what religion is, and who have come to the conclusion that we should get rid of the category precisely because this does not mean anything when it means everything.

Of course, the problem is that they are asking, “get rid of the category,” at the very same moment when the category has become, de facto, a global social fact and we cannot do without it. Every society in the world, every constitution, and everywhere you go today, everybody uses the category of religion. This is of course a completely new phenomenon. It has nothing to do with the past.

We have of course three ways of dealing with this issue. One is that in the way in which we have done social science thinking we can develop a general theory of religion, and we can are not ourselves religious. We now know that this is impossible—we have failed—we cannot have a general theory of religion. A second is, of course, a theological question to distinguish false from true religion, authentic from inauthentic, orthodoxy from heterodoxy. This is for the theologians to do. I would not dare to tell somebody: You are wrong when you call yourself religious.

The task is to simply reconstruct historically the way in which we are constructing religion and the category of religion everywhere in the world today. How this phenomenon is happening and how we are reconstructing it are very interesting questions. We have to abandon the notion that religion is a thing of the past that is somehow coming back. No, it is something very new that is emerging together with globalization. We can of course go back to traditions and we can reconstruct those traditions. But it is the very complexity of the global process which is the really interesting thing.

Gilles Kepel: Very briefly to follow up on what José said, and to echo what Grace said: that Obama’s image in Exeter was constructed for a European audience, and that it had nothing to do with religion. You contrasted it with the fact that in America, he was perceived as a Christian. Well, José said,
whispered, and I had it in my mind too, that he was simultaneously constructed as a Muslim by a significant amount, the majority of the Tea Party people.

Now this goes back to what you said: what does it mean to construct Obama as a Muslim, politically? And where is the border of religion and non-religion? Is it the fact that his middle name is Hussein? I will tell you a story. Barack is a Swahili word that comes from Mubarak in Arabic, which means Benedict—blessed, right? Hussein is the name of the grandson of the Prophet and the big figure in Shia Islam. So his name translates as Blessed Hussein. Obama in Farsi means: He is with us. So the Blessed Hussein is with us. No wonder he tried to reach out to the Iranian leadership, but failed miserably because they sensed the danger.

Why is it that you choose something that has to do with religion in order to identify someone and to demote him as a leader? Saying this guy is a Muslim means he is unfit to be President of America? Add the Ground Zero polemics regarding the mosque and his poor handling of the matter, from my own point of view at least, that brings us to something that may not have much to do with your traditional understanding of religion, but has to do, in depth, with American politics.

Tomáš Halík: Just to stress that both the Americans and Catholics have a Benedict at the top. Additionally Obama is also Emanuel, which is the name of Christ. A few remarks: Professor Casanova: it is really a problem, the definition of religion. I think that the concept of religion as a general concept, which has some species—Judaism, Christianity—is quite modern. It comes from the Cambridge theologians of the seventeenth century. They started to work with this concept. On what you said earlier—that a Hindu would never call himself a Hindu—I remember a nice story of Umberto Eco. He said that he visited, some years ago, an African village, and asked a little boy: “Are you a Muslim?” And he said: “No, I am an animist.” So, Umberto Eco said: “No animist will say about himself ‘I am an animist’ without having a degree from the École Normale Supérieure in Paris.” He said, that a hundred years ago, a French anthropologist came to Africa and the people told him a lot of nonsense. Then he came back and created a system called animism. He taught this way in Paris, and they taught it to the Africans. The effect is that the little boy in an African village says: “I am an animist.” It is similar with the other problems in this context.

Gilles Kepel: We call that “la mission civilisatrice de la France” in France—the civilizing mission of France.

José Casanova: This is precisely what I call denominationalism. There goes the question why there were no Muslims in Germany forty years ago, when I used to work in the factories with immigrants. There were only Turks. There were no Muslims. Now there are no Turks, but only Muslims. There is a process of mutual recognition which, if you look at it in the Hegelian sense, can be very violent. When people recognize each other or cannot recognize each other. We need to reconstruct how this or that category has emerged as modern categories.

Gilles Kepel: What you mean, José, is that twenty years ago, it was Türken raus!, and now, it is Muslime raus (out)!

José Casanova: Certain denominations are different. It was much more difficult to be a German Turk because the German nationality was defined by Jus sanguinis (right of blood) so you cannot be at the same time Turk and German. But you can be a German Muslim. In a certain sense, there are greater possibilities for the integration of Muslims into Germany than of Turks into Germany—because of their transformation in this respect to German nationality.

I see some positive aspects in this process. I think that indeed France was the only European country, similarly to the United States, it was a country of integration which was able to incorporate immigrants and turn them into Frenchmen. We know, of course, that it was the school and army that turned Persians into Frenchmen, and now those institutions simply cannot do it anymore.
Grace Davie: I want to make a footnote on this. But then, if I may, I want to tackle it from a different direction. My footnote is that some of the resistance to these changes or reconstructions of identity comes from scholars who study them. The people in my country, who are so disconcerted about the discussion in terms of religion, rather than ethnicity, feel their subject is slipping away from them.

Social policy experts have difficulty dealing with these issues. But if you go to development studies, you find a much bigger welcome to the notion of religion. Those who work in the developing world, are only too aware that often, particularly where there is a failed state, the only extended network and effective way of working is through religion and through religious networks.

From this, I want to raise a bigger point. I have been thinking considerably about the relationship of religion and territory, religion and power, global denomination, and all these words that we are using. This is something I've considered over many years. We tend to be critical of power, the powerful and institutional power, but we feel that to be powerless is a disadvantage and not helpful. We regard the word to empower as to be something constructed from the positive. Now, we are not being consistent, and I think that the power of religion can be badly distorted, and hijacked, and wrongly used. I do also believe that religion is deeply empowering to individuals and groups in an entirely positive, creative, constructive way. It is to be welcome in the modern world. Thank you.

Doris Donnelly: Can we have a final word from anybody?

José Casanova: One thing to what Tomáš Halík talked about. I am a little concerned. We Europeans like very much to talk about our uniqueness. We heard about the uniqueness of Europeans, the uniqueness of Christianity. We celebrate Christianity. To put it in the famous sentence of Marcel Gauchet: the religion to exit religion, a notion that somehow Christianity is the only religion that somehow can produce its secularity.

I am not sure of that. I think that Chinese religion also had that. Confucianism has a very similar relationship. I think we Europeans have to be a little bit more humble when using our universalism as the true particularistic universalism. Not any other universalism, since ours is so particularistic. The more we know about the rest of the world, the less we talk about only Europe and only Christianity.

Doris Donnelly: Exactly. Thank you for those concluding comments. I did notice that some hands were up in the audience, but I am going to ask that any of you who do have questions, just come and talk to the panelists at the conclusion of this gathering. I thank you all for being here.