

# Transcripts

Original version.

## Jiří Pehe

Ladies and gentlemen,

Welcome, we have met here to discuss a topic that certainly for the Czech Republic will be extremely topical and that is NATO. And it is not only the future of NATO, existence of NATO and whether NATO should be or not, but certainly we will experience NATO full blast next week and this is one of the first events that are organised under the auspices of Forum 2000. Just briefly, Forum 2000 was founded about 6 or 7 years ago. We organised 5 large conferences on topic of globalization at the Prague castle. In spring of this year we switched to a new model which is called Bridging Global Gaps and we are organising smaller seminars and conferences where we are trying to feature people who are against globalisation and people who are, let's say proponents of globalization, people from large economic institutions and their opponents. We had a conference in July this year where we had people representing different religions. And now we have a panel on NATO. I hope that this discussion will, at least, help people who are in favour of NATO and see it as an important institution and people who are against NATO or who are critical of NATO to some kind of if not agreement, then to understanding. This is why we are doing this and before we start I should say a few things about the programme. It is a long panel. We will go until 1.30. The first half will end at 11 and until then the panellists will be discussing various issues concerning NATO. Then in the afternoon after the break at 11.30 we will involve you. You can ask questions and make comments. Hopefully that will make you feel that you have contributed something to this discussion. Now, let me introduce our panelists. From the right Jiří Šedivý who is a director of Institute for International Relations in Prague, a professor at Charles University in Prague and also teaches at New York University in Prague and he is an expert on security issues and international policy. Petr Uhl, a journalist, former dissident, in fact I should mention that Petr Uhl just recieved a Major International Price in Vienna for his journalism and he is currently a commentator of Pravo one of the Czech dailies. Chris Donnelly, of course I don't have to introduce him, an advisor to secretary general of NATO, a person who has been crucial to NATO enlargement and one of the biggest experts on this particular issue. Miloslav Ransdorf on my left is a communist party depute, also an author of many books, articles, a person who has contributed to public discourse in this country and who belongs, I guess we will see it during this discussion, to the people who are more critical of NATO. John Shattuck, former Ambassador of the USA to the Czech Republic who is now a director of JFK Library at Harvard University and before he became the Ambassador here he had been under secretary of state in charge of human rights in the Clinton administration. Finally, we have Mr. Ondřej Slačálek, an editor of an anarchist magazine "A-KONTRA", certainly someone who will represent the views from the other side, which I believe, is against NATO. But as I said, we can come to some kind of agreement. Mr. Slačálek is also a student at the Charles University and represents younger generation of Czechs.

Now, I would start our discussion by asking each of the participants to make five-minute presentation telling us how you see NATO, what you think about the role of NATO after the fall of communism and especially since 11th September last year. And then we can go from there. I will start with Mr. Šedivý.

## Jiří Šedivý

Good morning ladies and gentlemen, Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure and privilege for me to be here. I will be speaking Czech.

V pěti minutách se pokusím zodpovědět otázku jak vidím současnou situaci NATO po 11. září 2001 a před pražským summitem. Především, vývoj po 11. září přivedl NATO do jisté krize smyslu, na jedné straně tady hned 12. září 2001 státy Severoatlantické aliance poprvé v historii aktivovaly článek 5, což bylo velké symbolické gesto, poté následoval přibližně měsíc intenzivního multilateralismu na straně USA, kde se vytvořily koalici a získaly mandáty pro následující operaci, kterou v Afghánistánu již v podstatě podnikaly mimo plánovací a velitelské struktury NATO a pouze se symbolickou přímou účastí spojenců s výjimkou Britů. To samozřejmě vyvolalo velké debaty o tom, na kolik je Atlantická aliance relevantní pro Spojené státy a současné bezpečnostní prostředí zejména ve vztahu k terorismu. Důvod, proč Spojené státy postupovaly samy je zaprvé technický, protože technická a technologická propast mezi evropskými spojenci a USA v podstatě nedovolují homogenní součinnost ve vojenských akcích. Také to souvisí s politickou kontrolou samotné operace. Tady se spojenecké státy poučily z kosovské krize, kdy nutnost dosahovat konsensus 19 brzdila v určitých fázích tuto operaci. A nyní, co z toho vyplývá pro Severoatlantickou alianci: Zdá se, jakoby v 90. letech Severoatlantická aliance získávala nový smysl své existence v mnohohrstevnatém rozšiřování. Rozšiřuje svoje role, rozšiřuje spektrum svých vojenských

nástrojů, rozšiřuje se teritoriální záběr, ve kterém operuje tzn. od poloviny 90. let vystupuje ze smluvně definovaného teritoria a působí na Balkáně a rozšiřuje pochopitelně také počet členů. To vyvolává problém managementu takto rozsáhlé a velice heterogenní organizace a Atlantická aliance na rozdíl od Evropské unie nemůže balancovat to mnohvrstevnaté rozšiřování prohlubováním integrace. A to je myslím základní otázka, kterou bude řešit pražský summit kromě relevance vojenských nástrojů pro boj proti terorismu. Domnívám se, že i přesto, že zde není možné integrovat způsobem evropským komunitárním tzn. přesouváním části suverenity na vyšší autoritu, existují zde určité nástroje prohlubování integrace NATO a posilování homogenity a o těch se bude jednat na pražském summitu. Je to především otázka dělby činností mezi jednotlivými členskými státy a otázka specializace jednotlivých států. V našem případě nabízíme specializaci zejména v ochraně a obraně proti zbraním hromadného ničení. Je to dále cesta hlubší mnohonárodní spolupráce tzn. vytváření mnohonárodních jednotek a velitelství a tady je velice silnou výzvou návrh amerického ministra Rumsfelda na vytvoření NATO Response Force, což by měla být skutečně integrovaná 20ti tisícová síla složená ze všech tří zbraní tzn. pozemní, letecké a námořní kapacity nasaditelná do 7mi dnů od aktivace. To je velice krátká doba na politické rozhodování států, které se této aktivy zúčastní. Měla by to být také síla, která by byla schopná se samostatně udržet v jakékoliv situaci po dobu nejméně jednoho roku. Je to tedy velice ambiciózní projekt, který bude v Praze také diskutován. Dalším takovým krokem k integraci je, domnívám se, vytváření většího množství společných kapacit ve vlastnictví Atlantické aliance. V současné době jsou to jen systémy IVEX. Nevyhnutelně budeme také svědky většího tlaku ze strany samotné organizace na jednotlivé členy v tom smyslu, aby plnily závazky, ke kterým se upíší mj. také na pražském summitu v rámci další iniciativy, která konkretizuje doposud poměrně roztržštěné spektrum cílů výstavby vojsk jednotlivých členů. My jsme byli svědky takového tlaku, myslím že poměrně účinného během návštěvy generálního tajemníka Robertsona na jaře r. 2001, po které byl odvolán ministr obrany. Po této explicitní kritice byla provedena reforma našich ozbrojených sil. Proto se domnívám, že pražský summit bude jeden z nejvýznamnějších summitů z historie NATO. Jeho agenda je skutečně velice ambiciózní a kontroverzní a některé věci budou zřejmě dojednávány at na samotném summitu, což také nebývá pravidlem. Předpokládám, že tento summit jako takový bude úspěšný, to znamená, že cíle, které mají být dosaženy, budou dosaženy, ovšem pak je otázka nakolik budou v praxi realizovány. Děkuji.

**Jiří Pehe**

Děkuji, nyní požádám Petra Uhl.

**Petr Uhl**

Dobrý den, dámy a pánové, já zneužiji těch pěti minut k tomu, abych prezentoval své osobní stanovisko k Severoatlantickému paktu, k NATO. Je to stanovisko kritické, ambivalentní a má historické kořeny. Já jsem působil od r. 1977 v Chartě 77, která byla velmi kritická jak k Varšavské smlouvě, tak k Severoatlantickému paktu. Zdálo se mi, že v té kritičnosti nebyl příliš velký rozdíl. Podle nás, našich názorů, žádná raketa nebyla mírová, ani ta východní, ani ta západní. A nebyli jsme sami ani v Československu ani ve východní Evropě. Tyto názory zastávalo Nezávislé sdružení u nás, ale také v Polsku atd. Jestliže jsme v Pražské výzvě předvíдали sjednocení Německa a volali po něm, tak zároveň jsme se vyjadřovali v tomto a dalších dokumentech Charty za rozpuštění obou vojenských paktů. V roce 1990 přišla určitá změna, Václav Havel také změnil svůj postoj - do té doby ještě jako československý prezident zastával názor, že by NATO mělo být rozpuštěno zároveň s rozpuštěním Varšavské smlouvy. Já jsem až do dneška a vlastně celých těch 12 let považoval tento obrat za nešťastný a upevňování a rozšiřování NATO za krok nesprávným směrem. Byl jsem proto odpůrcem vstupu České republiky do NATO. I když jsem stoupencem kolektivní bezpečnosti a nezastávám názor Švýcarska a Rakouska, že každý stát by se měl hájit vlastní armádou, nejvíce mi na vstupu ČR do NATO vadilo to, že nejen česká, ale i další národní příslušnosti v NATO brzdí vybudování evropské armády a evropských vojenských sil. Dále mi vadí posílení hegemonie USA, protože po pádu železné opony a po překonání bipolárního světa vzniká svět trochu monopolární, kde je supervelmoc jediná, a sice USA. Jejich role v Alianci je značná a to je předmětem mých obav. Vzhledem k tomu, že jsme spojeni s východoevropskými státy a zejména proto, že mi hodně záleží na dobrých stycích a sepejetí ČR se Slovenskem, nejsem v současné době stoupencem vystoupení ČR z NATO. Neřadím se tedy mezi odpůrce NATO a myslím si, že je třeba NATO reformovat, že se jeho rozšířením rozředí a hegemonická pozice USA, tak jak poroste váha Evropské unie, bude slábnout. Velmi se mi ale nelíbí, že rozšiřováním NATO vznikají určité prvky, byť v náznaku, nové železné opony, protože Evropa nekončí ani na hranicích slovensko-českých, ale ani na hranicích Slovenska a Polska s Ukrajinou a s Bílou Rusí, a že proces integrace by měl, byť ve výhledu mnoha dalších let, pokračovat. Poslední poznámkou skončím svých pět minut. Myslím si, že takové setkání jako je summit NATO v Praze je dobrou příležitostí pro občany této země Evropy, aby formulovali své občanské postoje, kritické postoje, jako mám třeba já, nebo dokonce odmítavé postoje, jako mají radikálnější občané vůči NATO, aby vyšli do ulic a pokojným způsobem manifestovali svoje názory, protože to je právě demokracie. Paradoxně tedy to, co vytýkáme NATO vlastně

slouží k tomu, aby se tato společnost dostala do debaty a aby byla svobodnější. Tímto paradoxním způsobem tedy NATO přispívá k rozšíření toho, co se kdysi nazývalo (pan Ransdorf tomu rozumí) říší svobody. Děkuji.

### **Jiří Pehe**

Thank you, I will ask Chris Donnelly for his remarks.

### **Chris Donnelly**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Approximately twice a century we see a revolution in the changing nature of conflict, the warfare. In the 1800 we saw the introduction of massive conscript armies by the French revolution. In the 1853 we saw warfare change by the introductory of rapid firing rifled weapons to rill away the telegraph. At the turn of the last century we saw the industrialization of warfare. Airpower, missiles, nuclear weapons. We are now right in the middle of just such historical changing of the nature of conflict. The old idea of warfare, the old idea of conflict and the old idea of what NATO was we now have to forget. And we have to come to terms with the future not sitting in the past. The nature of security has changed. When I first came to this city 13 years ago and talked to people, security and defence were two words whichwords, which meant the same in everyone's mind. We felt more secure if we had more weapons. Today, security is no longer measure just in military terms, and the threats to security in no longer the cold war or invasion or east-west conflict, it is a whole load of other things. And you can characterise them by things like government incompetence, organised crime, corruption, insecure borders, ethnic strife, religious extremism, terrorism. Second point. NATO has no guarantee of existence. NATO will only exist as long as its member nations want to keep it there. And are prepared to pay for it. NATO is not a supranational body. NATO is nothing more than are some of its members and NATO capabilities are nothing more than the capabilities of its member states. And NATO is in the middle of an evolution just as the member states are evolving to meet new security threats. NATO is half way evolved between a defence organisation, something which simply was and a security organisation, something which does an active security organisation. And it will continue to evolve as long as its members want it to and its members will keep it in existence only as long as NATO can give them a return on their investments. So the future of NATO is not in the hands of Brussels, it's in the hands of Prague and Washington and London and Paris and Berlin and so on. Do not see NATO as some kind of independent player. Thirdly, what does NATO actually do? How does it achieve its security value? And the answer is: it does three things. Its first function is to stop its members fighting one another. To defuse conflict, provide a forum where members can pursue competition without it becoming conflict. We don't normally say it that way, we say things like you prevent the re-nationalization of defence, but that's what we mean. And if you come to Brussels, I can take you for a drive around the city to the graves of about 3 million soldiers who died in the 20th century. None of them fighting Russians, all of them fighting one another. Second thing NATO does is that it gets countries to work together in a common course. The third thing it does is that it creates a culture for security. It makes arm forces interoperable, it makes defence cheaper, it makes security more certain. It is not an alternative to a European army. NATO has mechanisms for getting army forces and security to evolve to meet the new challenges of future, we see the EU doesn't have. If NATO does not succeed in helping European countries to adapt and change, than the European ESDP security defence policy will never come into existence. Thank you

### **Jiří Pehe**

Thank you, now we go to the left, Mr. Ransdorf.

### **Miloslav Ransdorf**

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen,  
Generally spoken, I would share many issues as expressed by Mr. Uhl. But I think that now the key issue, the key problem of the further development and survival of the NATO is whether European identity will be developed in coincidence with the USA or in divergence with the USA or even in conflict with the USA. Therefore, in my view, the biggest danger for further existence of NATO is the present shift in American policy. The policy of enforced steps and measures and the policy of high risk. It can be compared with the German policy before WW1 as depictedly described by a famous German historian Fritz Fischer. It is from Bismarkian "real politik" with the conscience of clear and given limits to Wilhelmian "welt politik" which was hardly calculable. And it led to the feeling of uncertainty for the partners on international scene. It can also lead to the denial of the principles of international law. And to the danger of legal nihilism and twice in the history of the 20th century this legal nihilism led European and world community to world conflagration. As to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as adapted in the time of the Washington summit in 1999, I

mean, that this principle of legitimacy turned upside down. And for the further existence of NATO, I am convinced that the NATO cannot function as the new holy alliance. I'm deeply convinced that soft sources of power and control also in the case of international terrorism are better than hard sources of power and control, so NATO should also deal with the questions of the culture. We have now a debate on which concept of the future is better and more correspondent to facts, whether the concept of Mr. Huntington or Mr. Fukuyama. I mean that in the battlefields of Balkans we have seen the end of postmodernity which shared the idea that all forms of public discourse are equal. Now, we can see that this point of view is not generally accepted and many times the acceptance of some kind of public discourse is given by the quantity of military units. I can mention one idea expressed by Mr. Bush senior in the time of the early 90's when he said about Mr. Milosević that he was Abraham Lincoln of the Balkans. Now, at the time of Mr. Bush junior, the former president Milosević is under the trial in the Hague. I would say that now we have the choice which has been expressed for the first time by the president of International Federation of Philosophical Societies in early 80's, who said that the choice is between the world culture and the world of culture. So I'm convinced that the question of culture and the dialogue of cultures and civilisations cannot be beyond the scope of NATO. NATO should also take into account these problems for further survival. Humanitarian intervention can lead to global commitment and global commitment could be beyond the possibilities and capabilities of this military alliance. And we have a very good study from Mr. Kennedy "The rise and fall of great powers" where he demonstrated in clear way that the problem for all great powers in the past was that the power claims went beyond real economic and social possibilities. As to dealing with these crazy states, we can speak about them as crazy, I mean that engagement is better than isolation. In case of Iraq, for example, the pressure in the formal sanctions led to great humanitarian costs. I recently visited Iraq and I can tell you that six to seven thousand children die every month in the consequence of the sanctions. And practically as a consequence of the sanctions middle class disappeared completely. For the transition to normal functioning society, for developing democratic elements in the society, for enlarging the space for freedom of the society it is very important that the structure of this society is more structured and sophisticated. I would say that to enlarge the space of freedom the use of soft sources of power and control, the use the symbolic capital as expressed in the form of Mr. Pierre Bourdieu is better for solving the conflicts in the future than to rely only on military force. Thank you.

### **Jiří Pehe**

Thank you, now I ask Mr. Shattuck.

### **John Shattuck**

Thank you very much. It's an honour and privilege to be back in this wonderful city of Prague and among many people whom I have had an opportunity to meet over the years. I will be very brief, but I think I will draw some lines between position I would like to outline and that which Mr. Ransdorf and Mr. Uhl have already outlined. Mr. Uhl raises the question of whether abolition of NATO as abolition of the Warsaw pact should have been the policy at the time that the Czech Republic came into being as Czechoslovakia. And I would put to the panel the question of whether under the circumstances of the world since 1989 it is possible to consider the abolition or significant transformation of the very concept of collective security. Mr. Ransdorf has raised issues regarding humanitarian intervention, as he puts it, or the use of security in addition to soft power to address the questions that bedevil the world today regarding the threats we all face. Let me outline those threats and answer those questions. First, there are really three threads. First there is what I would call the threat of human rights war. We have seen it brake out throughout the world in the period since 1989 and I think other panellists have referred to it. Certainly mass attack on civilians, the manipulation of ethnic and religious differences by cynical leaders, Slobodan Milosević being perhaps classic example in this region, but we have seen it elsewhere, we have seen it in Rwanda, in Sudan and many, many parts of the world. And these are serious dangerous destabilising forces in failed states. Second, we have seen the issue of international terrorism begin to emerge as a primary international security concern and not by any means just because of or since September 11th, but before that as well. Terrorism in many respect arises out of failed states, out of situations of regional conflict, it is no accident that terrorism emerged from Afghanistan and it has found very secure home in Sudan. There are states that are in great danger constantly of exploding. We have seen a third threat and that is developmnet and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and particularly the interaction between weapons of mass destruction and those engaged in terrorist activity. And these are real threats, there are threats that the world faces. How to deal with them is the question before us, obviously. How to deal with them? NATO is one answer to that question. NATO, I would pose it, is both, security power and soft power. And NATO, I would agree with Mr. Donnelly, is not a supranational organisation or an organisation that reflects the views of any one state most importantly. It is an organization of collective security of democracies. It was born as such, it came out of that struggle, it has always been intended to be a collective security for democracy and now it needs to exercise those collective security activities. It needs, I would argue, to extend not simply by

geographic determination, but by determination of those states that are interested in defending the principles of openness and freedom. NATO should automatically include states such as Russia and there is no reason why geographically it cannot include states well beyond this region. NATO needs to operate within a multilateral framework. It is not and should not be the instrument of any one state. The USA being perhaps the best example of that. It should be functioning within the United Nations framework wherever possible, but I would draw one distinction there and that is under the international convention to end genocide. Those states that sign the treaty on genocide commit themselves not only to punish but also to prevent genocide. So when the UN is unwilling or unable as it was in the case of Kosovo to agree about the ways and means of addressing a genocide, member states who have in fact signed the genocide convention should be authorised to go forward. So those are my preliminary views about this subject and I think we have certainly room for plenty of discussion on this panel about it. I hope we could all agree that the world in which we live this is not a world in which we can afford to eliminate the very concept of collective security and NATO, which is perhaps the greatest collective security organization of democracies in the world ever seen. This instrument needs to be reformed and needs to be used and it is the instrument that will be discussed when the NATO summit takes place here next week. Thank you very much.

### **Jiří Pehe**

Thank you, Mr. Slačálek, please.

### **Ondřej Slačálek**

Děkuji za udělení slova a za to, že mi zde byla umožněna účast. Rád bych se trochu ohradil proti tomu, co tady říkal pan Pehe. Rozhodně tu nereprezentuji odpůrce NATO ani lidi, kteří proti němu budou za pár dní protestovat, rozhodně zde nemluvím za nikoho jiného než sám za sebe. Důvod toho je prostý. Většina těchto lidí by sem patrně ani nešla, vzhledem k tomu, že toto setkání je organizováno pod titulem Mosty přes globální propasti. Ani já nevěřím, že takové mosty lze postavit a že v podobě v jaké to je prezentováno by to bylo nějakým způsobem účelné. Domnívám se, že důležité není jestli se spolu dokáží dorozumět příznivci a odpůrci globalizace, což je beztak dosti vágní a mnohdy zinterpretovaný pojem, ale že je důležité, zda se budou řešit globální problémy a zda budou vyřešeny, zda budou vyřešeny příčiny toho, že denně umírá několik tisíc lidí díky nedostatku základních potřeb, zda budou vyřešeny neudržitelné trendy směřující k destrukci životního prostředí. Můj osobní názor je, že toto nelze řešit dokud bude trvat systém založený na konkurenci a systém, který nyní existuje a jehož je NATO součástí. Nechci proto přeceňovat jeho význam. Je to pouze nástroj tohoto systému, je to pouze jeho sluha a jeho role se různě proměňuje. Stačí se podívat na poslední vývoj, kdy NATO nebylo dost dobré k vedení války proti terorismu a tuto válku si vedly USA naprosto samy bez ohledu na NATO. Nyní se NATO snaží být ještě papežštější než papež a snaží se tuto agendu převzít. Podle mého názoru na významu bude spíše ubývat a stane se spíše nástrojem pro integraci dalších a dalších států k paralyzaci jejich eventuálních samostatných aktivit, které by jindy mohly vyústit pro dominantní západní státy nepříjemným způsobem. Vše bych souhlasil s Johnem Shattuckem, který hovořil přede mnou, pokud se jedná o rizika, ve kterých se nacházíme. Ano, po celém světě probíhají útoky na lidská práva, je tu skutečně hrozba mezinárodního terorismu a je tu skutečně hrozba rozvoje a šíření zbraní hromadného ničení, zejména jaderných zbraní. Pokud se ale podíváme na NATO tak mi přijde hovořit o něm jako o záruce čelení těmto rizikům jako naprostý výsměch. Hovořilo se tu o porušování lidských práv. Nebyly to ale členské státy NATO, kdo podporoval například Pinochetovo Chile nebo Suhartovu Indonésii? Neporušuje velmi brutálně a cynicky lidská práva Kurdů členský stát NATO Turecko? Hovořilo se tu o podpoře mezinárodního terorismu. Nebyly to ale právě USA, kdo zaplatil výcvik dnešního arcizloduchovi Usámu bin Ládinovi a jeho kolegům? Nebyly to právě ony, kdo podporovaly celou řadu zločinných států např. Irák, kde jim vůbec nevdaly rozsáhlé masakry Kurdů, které si vyžádaly desetitisíce nejspíš statisíce mrtvých? A konečně, hovoří se tu o hrozbě zbraní hromadného ničení. Nebyly to ale právě USA, které tyto zbraně hromadného ničení jako první vyvinuly a jejich použitím proměnily Hirošimu a Nagasaki v jaderné hřbitovy? Dle mého soudu hovořit o NATO jako o garanci bezpečnosti, dokonce jako o někom, kdo je povolán vést humanitární války je naprosto cynické. Domnívám se, že za vší tou rétorikou o boji za lidská práva v humanitárních intervencích se v dnešní době skrývá především rozsáhlý střet mezi elitou vázanou na nadnárodní kapitál a jakousi kontraelitou, která je vázaná na jednotlivé národní státy. O tom byla také válka v Jugoslávii, ne o lidských právech kosovských Albánců. Vypravovat o tom, že mosty v Bělehradě nebo konvoj uprchlíků byly legitimní cíle sice, lze, dle mého soudu to ale byly spíše doklady toho, že se jednalo o válečný zločin a jeho pachatelé by měli být postaveni před tribunál pro válečné zločince a to, i když by se nemělo hovořit o provaze v domě oběšenecově, včetně hostitele tohoto setkání. Navzdory tomu, že se hovoří o rizicích, navzdory tomu, že se NATO tváří, že jim bude čelit, je spíše součástí problému než jeho řešením. To, čeho jsme nyní svědky, především velmi častého účelového nafukování těchto rizik také vytváření určité ideologie výlučnosti západu jejímž prorokem byl již zmiňovaný Samuel Huntington je velmi nebezpečná snaha, která může vést ke skutečnému ohrožení bezpečnosti, mnohem většímu než kterému se NATO tváří čelit. Domnívám se proto,

že jakýkoliv kompromis, jakákoliv dohoda, jakákoliv reforma ve skutečnosti tento problém nevyřeší. Co je nutné, je zásadní změna systému, která se bohužel v dnešní době patrně neobejde bez revolučních změn. Víím, že pojem revoluce je někdy brán téměř jako sprosté slovo, ovšem podle mého jsou v historii situace, kdy je nutné učinit určitý pokrok a etablované instituce mu brání. Kdyby nedošlo k násilným a krvavým revolucím, například v Americe v 18. století a Francii na konci téhož století, neměli bychom tu dnes patrně ani demokracii ani lidská práva. Děkuji za pozornost.

#### **Jiří PEHE**

Now I would go to a few questions that I have in my mind after these first presentations. Firstly, Mr. Donnelly spoke about new notion of security. He said that concept of security has changed and some of the other remarks were actually related to it. We have heard about terrorism and about proliferation of nuclear weapons that John Shattuck mentioned, Mr. Donnelly himself mentioned drug trafficking and other possible threats. If we talk about this new notion of security, I wonder whether NATO can actually serve in the role of preventing all of these threats or dealing with them. Drug trafficking, of course, is something that functions on the international scene but it's also a domestic affair just like many of those other threats. Another question I wanted to ask is a question to Petr Uhl. When he speaks about a paneuropean security alliance or mechanism, he would include states that are not democratic. We have heard that NATO is a community of democracies. We can doubt it; we can say that Turkey certainly doesn't meet some of those criteria. Basically all states that are now members of NATO have democratic regime, at least formally. So would you include states such as Belarus, for example, that certainly don't meet those criteria? And finally one question I would like to ask Mr. Ransdorf. He started with a very interesting proposition saying that we will have to wait to see whether the European identity will be formed in conflict with the USA or in coincidence. And this is very interesting question that goes to the core of the current conflict within the Transatlantic Alliance and maybe we should elaborate a bit on that, but to bridge all of these questions I would ask our panelists to, of course you can comment on each other's remarks as well, but I would also ask you to answer these questions and a broader question: in the future, should NATO in its changing role act beyond the scope that it has acted so far? We know, for example, that NATO intervened in former Yugoslavia outside these borders, but should we be prepared for NATO to act in situations when, let's say, a terrorist attack comes from an Asian country? Should NATO be prepared to intervene in such country, to go outside Europe? So these are my questions. There will be more, but now let's start again with Mr. Sedivý

#### **Jiří ŠEDIVÝ**

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. To the notion of paneuropean collective security system NATO is actually now becoming something like that by means of its robust enlargement it is going to cover the majority of European states. And by means of its functions it has already provided a number of collective security functions both in terms of setting conditions for the future members: that we should put in order our houses in terms of protection of minorities, military relations and democratic control of our military, that the states that want to get in NATO must settle their issues with their neighbours etc. This really has had an immense impact on the improvement of democracy and on the stabilization of the region. There was a debate on new dividing lines before the first enlargement. The reality is that the first enlargement was accompanied by intensification of relations with those that were left out and the same is going on now. Look at the NATO-Russia Council, which is step further and we will see, it's now upon Russia, how Russia will use that. Concerning humanitarian intervention doctrine there is nothing like that explicitly in Washington's materials or communiqué on one hand, on the other hand NATO is regional organization according to the chapter 8, I guess, of the United Nations and according to this NATO can be asked actually to act in the situations that are threatening an international peace and therefore the potential of its global activity is here. But what is most important to keep in mind is that NATO is now more of a collective security with its traditional collective defense core preserved.

#### **Jiří PEHE**

Thank you, Mr. Uhl.

#### **Petr UHL**

Ano, o tom se špatně hovoří, protože ve sporu je vize, představa o jednotě světa, kterou by neměla narušovat ani evropská integrace a realita světa, který je rozdělen na určité sféry zájmů - možná tak, jak o tom hovořil pan Slačálek, i když nejenom on. Já osobně se domnívám, že vyjdeme-li z reality, existuje Evropská unie a vedle ní existuje nikoliv zcela totožná, ale zhruba odpovídající západoevropská unie jako vojenské seskupení některých evropských států. A já se domnívám se, že tato západoevropská unie by se měla transformovat ve vojenskou sílu Evropské unie s tím, že by Unie spolupracovala jak s USA v rámci transformujícího se Severoatlantického paktu NATO, tak i s Ruskem. Postupně by tedy tato kolektivní bezpečnost evropská ve spolupráci s USA a Ruskem měla převážít roli NATO. Co se týče demokratických

a nedemokratických států, považuji Turecko přes velmi tvrdé porušování lidských práv za stát demokratický, i když 10% volební klauzule mě zvedá ze židle. Považuji všechny balkánské státy za státy demokratické (nemám žádné zprávy z Albánie, proto ji ponechávám stranou) stejně jako Rusko a Ukrajinu. Jediný stát v Evropě, kde mám vážné pochyby o tom, zda zbytky demokracie nebyly zcela potlačeny diktaturou je Bělorusko. Domnívám se, že Evropa zvládne i nedemokratické diktátorské Bělorusko a že pomůže jiným státům balkánským a evropským, kde se demokracie teprve rozvíjí a kde dochází k většímu porušování lidských práv než v České republice nebo ve Francii (ale i tam k němu dochází, neměli bychom se tedy vydělovat). To, co říkal pan Pehe na mě působilo velmi nepříjemně jako uznání toho, že tady přece jen je nějaká železná opona mezi demokracií a nedemokracií a my to jen konstatujeme a musíme se bránit. Tak to prostě není. Námitky na adresu USA byly někdy nespravedlivé a můžeme o nich diskutovat. Přesto nikdo nepochybuje, možná ani pan Slačálek - ta závěrečná slova o tom svědčila - že USA jsou demokratickou zemí, i přesto jak si počínaly např. v Súdánu nebo v Somálsku. Není to tak, že USA chtějí být papežštější než papež, ale boj proti terorismu je povinností civilizovaného světa. A není přípustné, aby USA monopolizovaly tento boj. Čili ten, kdo se dere kupředu, aby také kolektivně proti terorismu působil, je podle mého názoru přítel demokracie a naší civilizace a USA v tom bohužel hraje negativní roli tím, že tento boj monopolizují. Podle mého názoru je tu v první řadě Rada bezpečnosti, která je systematicky obcházena právě USA. Její roli proto musíme posílit ve spolupráci s NATO a EU a její členové v rámci NATO musí dosáhnout určité změny mocenského postavení o rozhodování a používání této vojenské síly proti těm třem nebezpečím, která je uznávám. Bělorusko zvládneme, pane Pehe.

### **Jiří PEHE**

Já doufám. Později se můžeme vrátit k otázce, o kterou jste zavadil, a sice k roli USA. Moje otázka je, zdali bychom tu Vaši otázku nemohli obrátit a zeptat se, zda-li to, že Evropa nemá svoji vlastní obranu, není do té míry zásluhou hegemonie a jakéhosi tlaku USA, ale neochotou Evropy investovat do své vlastní obrany. Myslím, že tuto otázku bychom si měli také zodpovědět. Já osobně jsem velmi skeptický k tomu, že bude kdy vytvořena ze západoevropské unie nová evropská obranná aliance. Nyní požádám Chrise Donnellyho. Please, Mr. Donnelly.

### **Chris DONNELLY**

I would just like to pick up two points, as I listened to the commentary. Firstly, it's important to think of NATO as a tool of its members and not to overestimate what NATO is or what it can do. And to understand that it was a tool designed for a specific function at the time of the cold war and that now the requirements changed and therefore the member nations have to amend the tool to amend NATO so it fulfills the new function that they want. And we are in the process of that change. The second point I would like to pick up on chairman's last statement that NATO is a collective agency. If the evolution of the world and the collapse of the Soviet Union's super power has left the USA as the only super power and when there is a gap between US military and defense capabilities and European capabilities then it is ludicrous to blame that on the USA. If there is a security gap, if there is a gap between capabilities, and if Europe hasn't got the capabilities then it is Europe's fault, it's our fault for not investing in capability because we are perfectly able to do so in Europe if we wish. And that leads me on the third point raised by another of the panelists. One of the issues for the future is: will European identity as it develops develop in convergence with or in conflict with the USA and that is a key issue. At the moment NATO is the only organization, which brings together, in the security arena, Europe and the USA on equal bases to prevent the arising of differences of opinion into conflict. That is the prime function of NATO. Finally, few issues: the first issue is not to confuse what NATO is and does and what its members are and do. NATO does not control its members; it has, if you like, a cultural influence. It provides a forum to the members to influence one another, but it doesn't come straight to a nation, it does not tell to the USA or the Czech Republic or Turkey and any other country how to run its own affairs. It has an influence, it has a collectivizing influence, but that is all. And to say that it in some ways supported Chile or Indonesia – again, I would categorically state that this is not and has not been the case. Can NATO deal with these new security threats as the chairman asked? The answer is it cannot. Most certainly, it cannot adequately deal with all of them. It is a tool, which will only be usable for certain elements of the security problem. It cannot be the only show in town. We have to develop other tools including with the EU including with the US and OSCE which deals with the security environment. NATO, just as it is not perfect is also most super powerful. Thank you.

### **Jiří PEHE**

Thank you. Mr. Ransdorf.

### **Miloslav RANSDORF**

There are two key issues: The future of NATO and the enlargement of NATO, which will be discussed now at the forthcoming Prague summit. First, to the future of NATO. I can mention a parallel from the world literature, a famous novel by Robert Mussele "!!! Der....". In this novel one group formed a society for the

celebration of the 7th anniversary of the peaceful rule of the emperor Franz Josef and they looked for a new idea for Austria, for the monarchy. The war began so the peaceful rule was over and the emperor died. However, the society worked for further times.

The situation now is relevant to this. After the end of a cold war, NATO is looking in vain for a new identity. It was a very good tool for the time of the cold war. It functioned very effectively, but now the representatives of NATO are looking in vain for a new identity because new threats and challenges require other responses, other answers, other options and solutions.

As to the enlargement of NATO, I can mention another parallel from literature. A Czech writer Karel Čapek wrote a brilliant collection of stories and in one story the physicist Archimedes is speaking with Roman soldiers. They say that it is urgent for the Romans to have broader frontiers, broader borders, new borders, larger borders, new areas, new territories and Archimedes says: "I do not deal with the politics, but I know as a physicist that strength is being bound, these borders are beyond your possibilities," and I mean that new and new commitments can lead to a situation which will not be transparent and manageable. And to the threats of terrorism, many times terrorism appears in the countries where broader strata of population are losing soil under their feet. For example Indonesia: Indonesia was famous for having very tolerant Islam. It has been imported by merchants not by warriors. After the collapse of Indonesian economy, after the decay of middle strata when local currency lost 80% of its value, Islam became militant. And new militant groups emerged at this time. Therefore it is necessary to stabilise these societies to deprive terrorists also the possibility to use symbolic capital, moral legitimisation and it is necessary to promote rationalisation potential in these societies. In Islamic countries there is great social critical potential, but I cannot mention any economic doctrine which has been created in these countries. And economic rationality is very important for the present world.

Thank you.

#### **Jiří PEHE**

Thank you. John Shattuck, please.

#### **John SHATTUCK**

Well, I think I escaped the first round of your withering question, Jiří Pehe, but I won't pass; I will take advantage of being given the floor again. Let me get one point at the outset. I am here, of course, representing myself; I am not representing any particular organization or government. So I hope whatever I say is treated in that spirit. On the other hand I do represent the USA as well. My personal views on the subject of NATO are strong. Let me make a few very quick points.

First, on the question of working with countries that are not completely democratic of which there are certainly several in the context of NATO, as several panelists have pointed out. Indeed, developing strong relations amongst countries to defend against the threats that I've outlined and that other panelists seem to agree with, clearly, that is something that needs to be done whether formally, in the context of NATO or somewhat more informally, or in new ways as being done at the moment between NATO and Russia. Clearly, that does need to occur and needs to occur on a regular basis and not simply in a military security fashion, but it needs to occur in this very complicated unstable world. Democratic and non-democratic countries need to work together wherever they possibly can, so I have no question if that is something that should occur.

Secondly, let me make a caution, however, in the case of the collaboration with non-democratic countries on the subject of terrorism. Here I think there are dangers and there are also necessities and certainly one has to find alliances around the world to be able to deal with the threats of terrorism. But I think there is the danger from time to time in striking alliances with authoritarian regimes which may choose to define terrorism broadly and to include within that definition those who are in fact fighting for freedom within their own countries. There is a potential danger that that kind of alliance can encourage an authoritarian regimes in to crack down even more strongly on those who are trying to exercise their human rights within those countries. As I say, this is something that is a challenge right now because there has to be some degree of interaction between democratic and non-democratic countries. But we need to be very cautious of the dangers that lie in working with authoritarian regimes in "cracking down on terrorism."

A third, on the question of US-European relations and particularly in the context of security, I agree with Chris Donnelly who said that NATO is in fact the framework, and I think Mr. Šedivý said this as well, for addressing whatever conflict there may be and it's a good framework and it is a framework that needs to be strengthened in that regard. One would be concerned about the further development of potential conflict, particularly as Europe perhaps chooses to go its own way and not develop a security capacity that is sufficient to be able to address the threats that are going on. And in that sense I do think it is absurd to say that the USA is somehow responsible for an unwillingness of some European governments to invest in those kinds of security measures. And then finally, can NATO deal with security threats alone? The answer is: clearly not and nor these threats need to be addressed entirely within a military framework. They need to be addressed in a much broader diplomatic framework; they need to be addressed by foreign assistance, they need to be addressed by finding ways of expressing common cause with reformers in countries like



Indonesia, for example, who are trying to bring about change within their own countries and that is not a military matter, it is a matter of expressing solidarity with those who are trying to pursue democratic means. So NATO is by no means the only or even perhaps the principle mechanism for addressing the security threats we have in the world, but it is a very important one and it is one that needs to be strengthened in the ways that we have been talking about. Thank you.

### **Jiří PEHE**

Thank you. Pan Slačálek.

### **Ondřej SLAČÁLEK**

Já bych si na úvod dovolil zareagovat na tu výtku, která nevím jestli vznikla nepochopením nebo chybou v překladu. Neobviňoval jsem NATO jako organizaci, která podporovala Indonésii nebo Chile, pouze jsem prohlásil, že členský stát NATO, tedy USA, Suhartovu Indonésii a Pinochetovo Chile podporovaly, což je fakt. Hovoří se zde o boji proti terorismu a mám dojem, že rozdíl mezi mnou a v podstatě asi všemi ostatními panelisty je, že oni tento boj proti terorismu berou vážně. Berete jej jako fakt, jako důvod k válce. Mým osobním názorem je, že je z velké části spíše než skutečným důvodem záminkou. Záminkou, která je nyní používána k upevnění hegemonie jak bloku západních států, tak USA v jejich rámci. Samozřejmě, že tady hrozba terorismu existuje. Je ale v rámci války proti terorismu řešena? Velká část atentátníků na Světové obchodní centrum pocházela ze Saúdské Arábie. Ze stejné země, z místního milionářského prostředí pochází i údajný a patrně i pravý inspirátor tohoto útoku Usáma bin Ládín. Tento stát je absolutistická monarchie a s nějakými lidskými právy bychom tam asi příliš nepořídili. Přesto, dopadly na Saúdskou Arábii nějaké sankce v rámci boje proti terorismu? Byla jakkoliv postižena? Když to srovnáme s Irákem, jehož účast na těchto útocích se hledaly velice špatně a pokud vím, tak se jednoznačné důkazy nenašly, a který stále čelí embargu, jež mělo rozsáhlé následky na lidských životech. Můžeme uvést další příklad. Mluví se tu o humanitárních intervencích a jako jejich prototyp bylo uváděno Kosovo. V Kosovu ale byla podpořena Kosovská osvobozená armáda, což je teroristická organizace financovaná z prodeje drog. Jak vážně se tedy bere válka proti terorismu? Nebere se velmi selektivně? Ještě mne velmi zaujala jedna věc. Převážně z levicových řad tu padala slova o civilizaci, slova o povinnostech naší civilizace a padla tu velmi zajímavá věta, že na bitevních polích Jugoslávie skončila postmoderna. Nskončila ale ona pro velkou část světa ještě dříve než začala? Nskončila v etnických konfliktech v Africe dávno před Jugoslávií? Začínám se obávat, že skutečně podléháme tomu evropocentrickému nebo euroatlantskokentrickému vidění světa a domnívám se, že to je velmi nezdravé a přesně to, jak možná chtějí propagátoři NATO, abychom viděli svět. Já jej ale tak vidět odmítám a domnívám se, že mám blíže afghánskému rolníkovi, jemuž padaly na hlavu bomby než těm, kteří vydali příkaz k tomu, aby mu ty bomby na hlavu padaly. Děkuji za pozornost.

### **Jiří PEHE**

Děkuji. Já bych jen připomněl, že kdybych byl afghánským rolníkem, tak by pro mě tyto bomby byly stejným nebezpečím jako například Talibán, pokud bych s ním náhodou nesouhlasil. K tomu se ale můžeme vrátit.

I would like to open the panel to discussion, so if you feel sort of need to react to some of the things that have been said, please do so and in the last half an hour maybe we should also go back to the question asked before, which is whether NATO can legitimately act outside its borders. Whether this is legitimate and if yes, what is the role of Russia in all of that? Is it something that is a good thing or is it going to dilute NATO? Maybe we can start with Petr Uhl.

### **Petr UHL**

Já bych chtěl říci, že NATO, pokud operuje mimo své hranice, tak by to mělo být zásadně a výhradně na základě rezoluce Rady bezpečnosti OSN. Jakékoliv operování mimo tento mandát je narušením světového systému bezpečnosti a proti tomu bychom se měli zásadně stavět. Pokud se týká Ruska, já se domnívám, že kooperace je nezbytně nutná a tato ruská paralela mě napadla, když mluvil pan Slačálek. Samozřejmě, že je pravda, že se boje proti terorismu zneužívá pro posílení vlastní hegemonie, že to dělají USA, s tím s Vámi naprosto souhlasím. Vyznat se tedy v tom klubku mocenských zájmů je velmi obtížné. To nás samozřejmě nezbavuje povinnosti udělat všechno proti terorismu a to včetně vojenských operací. Já bych to uvedl na druhou stranu. Samozřejmě, že Putinova vláda v Rusku zneužívá boje proti čečenským teroristům pro upevnění své moci, pro upevnění vlády pevné ruky, pro potlačování lidských práv v samotném Rusku a že vznikají xenofobní nálady vůči Kavkazanům na moskevských ulicích. Samozřejmě, že toho Rusko využívá, aby diskreditovalo onu ideu, že Čečensko by snad mohlo být nezávislé, pokud by si to čečenský lid přál. To ale neznamená, že budeme zavírat oči před zločinným a banditským systémem, který nastolili ti, které svět, Evropa a Česká republika zvláště považuje za jakousi politickou reprezentaci. Tento systém byl zločinný stejně jako UCK a je třeba proti němu bojovat silou a jednat je třeba s těmi, kteří se terorismu nedopouštějí. Víím, že ta situace je komplikovaná, ale i Rusko zneužívá boje proti terorismu, který v Čečensku opravdu je, je tam od roku 1990-91, bez ohledu na to, že každý národ, každá část země

má právo na odtržení a na samostatnost. Tohoto boje je zkrátka zneužíváno, ale to neznamená, že se přidáme na jednu nebo na druhou stranu. Na jakou stranu jsme se přidali v konfliktech ve Rwandě a Burundi? Samozřejmě, že jsme byli vždy proti těm, kteří nejvíce porušovali lidská práva, kteří se dopouštěli masových vražd atd. To ale neznamená, že bychom měli podporovat hegemonii USA nebo putinovské tendence přitvrzení režimu.

#### **Jiří PEHE**

Děkuji, myslím, že je to slovo do diskuze, i když je to trochu stranou našeho tématu. Jiří Šedivý se hlásil.

#### **Jiří ŠEDIVÝ**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a bit ironic, I would say, that Mr. Uhl uses very similar legalistic arguments that the communist authorities were using when he was in prison and when there were attempts at intervening into the internal affairs of the communist regime from several western governments. And now you are calling for very strict adherence to those concepts like a state of non-intervention. It is not true that the USA has been systematically bypassing the Security Council of the UN. And the very recent development just disproves what you said. Now, you've got here unanimously supported resolution on Iraq. And concerning the whole issue of the legality of interventions: NATO did just one humanitarian intervention, which was Kosovo and there was very large legalistic debate about it. The former Ambassador Shattuck definitely knows a lot about that and it is by no means resolved or decided though you've got a number of indirect pre and ex post legalizations or steps that actually legalized, not directly in terms of giving mandate, the NATO action. I would agree that using UCK as a ground force was a deep mistake, but this was given by the situation within NATO by its refusal to use own ground force. I would like to quote from Kofi Annan's excellent speech in 1999 to the concept of sovereignty when he actually compared the state sovereignty and the individual sovereignty concept defined in terms of human rights. He said to those for whom the greatest threat to the future of the international order is the use of force in the absence of the Security Council mandate. In the context of Rwanda: "If in those dark days and hours leading to the genocide a coalition of states has been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did not received prompt Council's authorization, should such coalition have stood aside and allow the horror to unfold?" And I think that we are really in the middle of a debate and the principle of that debate is a tension between legitimacy and legality. The concept of humanitarian intervention is not a part of the international law. But I believe that it is a matter of perhaps 10 to 20 years when it will be introduced and when there will be clear criteria for humanitarian intervention adopted by the international community. And recognizing the character of the wars in 1990's when about 8 million people were killed, 90% of them were civilians and in 90-95% it was internal conflicts, we must deal with this issue and we also must transform the whole legal system that was established after WW2 for very different conditions and with very different visions of the future. Thank you.

#### **Jiří PEHE**

Thank you, two panelists are raising their hands Mr. Ransdorf and Mr. Shattuck.

#### **Miloslav RANSDORF**

I would agree with Mr. Šedivý that the issue of legitimacy is the key issue of the international policy now and not only in case of national states, but also on the international level. For example, should we take seriously the claims of the American policy that their agenda No.1 are human rights when the USA does refuse the Roman Protocol and the International Criminal Court? Should we take their claim seriously? I can understand some legal criticisms, but it cannot correspond to the general position of the USA in this key issue of human rights. Secondly, I would say that this humanitarian intervention led to double or multiple standards and double and multiple standards are confusing the international political scene. It leads to lack of transparency and to possible mistakes and conflagrations. For example, lack of transparency led to the war in the Middle East in 1967; this war was not wished by all participants but all states finally got involved in this conflict. Thirdly, the problem of dependence. Many European states are criticizing the USA that they are dependent on the world power, but the problem is that we are now to do not only with dependence, but also with interdependence. Many times we depend on local nationalisms, in the case of the Balkan wars, for example. And there was also dependence on local nationalisms which led great European powers to conflagration in 1914, to the conflict which was not expected in its extent, in its depth and in its consequences. So please, take into account these questions of interdependence as well and the risk that this type of policy can lead the whole world into an abyss, by the lack of transparency, by the fact that this political environment may not be transparent and manageable.

#### **Jiří PEHE**

Thank you. Mr. Shattuck and Chris Donnelly.

#### **John SHATTUCK**

I would start from the basic proposition that intervention need not be of military nature. This is a multidimensional issue involving what we have seen systematically since 1989 and the world, I would argue, has failed to deal with since the change in the nature of world relations. And again we have seen conflagrations against civilians. Massive numbers of civilians cut down, raped, systematically killed by those who are actively trying to pursue their own political agendas for cynical reasons and fanning the flames of religious and ethnic and racial divides. Most powerfully we've seen it in Rwanda. And let me say very clearly that we all failed, the USA, NATO, the African countries, there was no support for addressing that humanitarian crisis and we must find a framework for being able to deal with that again. In the case of the former Yugoslavia I think there was failure for several years until finally the part of NATO engaged in that matter and stopped that systematic slaughter. How do we go about addressing these questions? I think there is a number of strategies of which military intervention is only a small part and even when military intervention is considered it needs to be considered very carefully. At first we need a better system of early warning, of ways of engaging and we've talked earlier on this panel about engaging with countries that are not democratic, and finding refugee crisis that begin to develop or severe repression that is occurring in a country. And the world as a whole, not just any individual country like the USA to be sure, need to begin to address these diplomatic and other means before they get out of control. In the case of Yugoslavia it was a severe mistake, in my view, for European countries and then the USA to recognize a number of the breakaway states in Yugoslavia and for those countries to fail to give signals to Milosević and Tudjman that there were going to be severe consequences if they pursued their ethnic purge and genocidal regimes. Those kinds of early warning should have taken place. When early warning fails there needs to be a consideration of intervention, but very carefully, there need to be criteria for when intervention is considered. Certainly, the existence of genocide or crimes against humanity is the threshold consideration, but even beyond that we need to look to see whether there is regional destabilization, whether the countries in the region are themselves willing to participate in that kind of humanitarian intervention and finally we need to assure ourselves that the intervention itself will not lead to a wider war and that the means used are consistent with the aims trying to save lives and are not simply broader military means that may result in a greater loss of lives. And beyond intervention we need mechanisms of justice and here I would agree with those who would argue that the USA has made a mistake in not joining the International Criminal Court. I personally have long advocated USA membership in that organization, I think the ICC is a flawed instrument, and the USA and other countries should work within that framework to try to improve it. If there is no justice when you have had genocide then you are going to continue to have spiraling crimes, you'll have retributions; if those who started the process are not stopped the danger is that the conflict will continue.

That is why justice is so important, that is why the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda are so important in The Hague. There also needs to be a forthcoming strategy, means and ways of the international community coming together to assist countries that have collapsed as in the case of Bosnia or in the case of Afghanistan or any country, which is a failed state. Nation building is an international responsibility and the EU, the USA and other various regional organizations can very actively participate in that and are doing so, I think, in many instances today. That is a very important part of this, it is not a military aspect of humanitarian intervention, but it is a crucial part.

Finally I would put forth the proposition that the international community needs to find ways and means of addressing repression and some references made earlier to Saudi Arabia. I would agree that Saudi Arabia certainly needs to find ways of changing some of the very repressive mechanisms that are working in that country and friendly countries working with Saudi Arabia need to find ways of helping in that regard because repression is in many cases the way in which terrorism and failed states can occur. So these are a variety of mechanisms that need to be considered. They are not just military nature and they are not just NATO nature. And one final point I would make about Kosovo and the question of genocide and acting outside of the UN Security Council. As I said earlier, there is a convention which some one hundred countries in the world have signed, the convention to prevent and punish the crime of genocide, and that convention obligates those countries that have signed it to take steps not only to punish, but also to prevent acts of genocide. And it is under that convention when the UN Security Council is unable to agree as to an intervention, then I think the intervention in Rwanda should have been completely authorized and unfortunately was not, and I argue should have been very much. Thank you.

**Miloslav RANSDORF**

Mr. Shattuck, when is the USA going to sign the International Convention against Torture?

**John SHATTUCK**

The USA has signed the International Convention against Torture and it has also been ratified.

**Chris DONNELLY**

One or two comments on what has gone before. Firstly, I think we have to recognize that the international system such as it is is not perfect, it is not without fault. And we should also recognize it in the real world.

States often face the choice of the less of two evils. And it is easy with them to hindsight the level of criticism. But it is often much more difficult at the time to decide what is the right thing to do. We often and will in the future often face the dilemma: do we stand back or do we intervene and which of the two evils is the lesser one and do we have the capability to do anything? May I remind you of the quotation which is from the late 18th century that "for evil to flourish it only requires that good men do nothing". For that I would firstly say that it is perhaps the motto for the future. Second point. Yes, terrorism is a symptom not the cause and the cause is poverty, lack of democracy and so on. These created bases for terrorism. Yes, we do need to help these societies, this is a new world, security is no longer just an issue for the military diplomacy, it brings in agencies for international development and so on. Let us work and try to resolve the problems before they come to us. That is in no way in contradiction to the idea that we should also maintain defense and security shields to protect our societies against people such as terrorists. The two are now two pieces of the same part, part and part of a new security. Third point. There is an idea that NATO is looking for a new job, NATO is looking for something to do to keep it in business. This is, believe me, not so. At the December 1999 summit the member nations decided to keep NATO going after the end of the cold war simply because of its capacity to provide a mechanism to resolve conflicts between the members and that is one of the main functions. And the problem since then has been that the member nations have kept giving NATO tasks to do in the changing security environment for which NATO was not originally designed and for which NATO has now to try to develop the capability. Our problem is not finding new job for NATO, our problem is providing NATO, evolving NATO to do all the jobs that now need to be done, for which there are no other international institutions capable of doing.

#### **Jiří PEHE**

Thank you. Well, I think that one of the arguments that I heard before was basically that NATO is an alliance that was created to protect states and therefore it will find it very difficult to deal with these new challenges. Maybe you can come back to it later or if you want to answer it now.

#### **Chris DONNELLY**

Indeed, NATO is an organization which was designed to protect states 50 years ago and the fact is that NATO has to evolve to meet the new challenges. This is not criticism of the organization or the states that keep it being, this is just the essence of the world we live in.

#### **Miloslav RANSDORF**

Before the founding of NATO there were three tasks for NATO: to keep Russia out of Europe, to keep US in Europe and to keep Germans down. It was the first formulation of the task for NATO.

#### **Chris DONNELLY**

Yes, but it is not a current task.

#### **Ondřej SLAČÁLEK**

Já bych chtěl zareagovat na to, co říkal pan Uhl. Já s ním naprosto souhlasím, že proti terorismu je nutno vystupovat a to třeba i násilím, třeba i ozbrojenou silou. Ovšem ani já ani pan Uhl nejsme v pozici lidí, kteří by rozhodovali o tom jak bude tato vojenská síla použita. Máme proto v naší pozici podporovat vojenské zásahy států u nichž jsme mnohokrát v minulosti viděli, že daný problém spíše akcelerují než jej řeší a to navíc s velmi citelnými „vedlejšími“ ztrátami na životech a ekologickými a dalšími dopady? Domnívám se proto, že úloze obyčejných lidí, řadových občanů spíše odpovídá to, že budou kritizovat zločiny své vlastní vlády a ne ji podporovat v těch či oněch aktivitách. Kritizovat zločiny jejich oficiálních nepřátel sice můžeme, ale zdá se mi to poněkud laciné. Dále bych si dovolil zareagovat na to co řekl pan Shattuck. Nechci ho nějak napadat, ale na druhou stranu se mi zdálo, že tím, co říkal o Saúdské Arábii zde předvedl názornou ukázkou toho dvojího metru, o kterém jsme zde také hovořili. Když mluvil o Saúdské Arábii, používal takové pojmy jako pomoc přátelských států při řešení problémů s lidskými právy. Divím se tedy, že se podobné přátelské státy nenašly v případě Iráku, Afghánistánu apod. Další věc, která se mi zdá vhodná do diskuze je určení definice terorismu. Musím se přiznat, že jsem se po relevantní definici dosti pídil a vlastně jediná, která mě napadla byla, že terorismus je použití násilí, které ten, kdo je označuje za terorismus nepokládá za legitimní. Proto bych se rád zeptal kolegů panelistů jaký na to mají názor oni. Děkuji.

#### **Jiří PEHE**

I think that John Shattuck could probably answer these questions.

#### **John SHATTUCK**

Saudi Arabia needs to reform. We certainly hope that Iraq will reform. Iraq is being given an opportunity to do that right now. And Saudi Arabia issue, the Egyptian issue, the issue indeed worldwide is how those

who are engaged in the struggle for reform within their own countries can best be supported from the outside. I think this is not a question of double standards. I think in the case of Saudi Arabia that probably is very difficult. I can assure you as an Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights who worked on the issue globally, Saudi Arabia was certainly not the most malleable when it came to human rights. But the world needs to find way of addressing these questions and it needs to find them urgently. The UN Security Council is one such mechanism. There is no question about it and probably the most important mechanism. It is now being implemented very clearly and I would hope effectively in the case of Iraq.

**Jiří ŠEDIVÝ**

Thank you. On the question of double standard, indeed it is quite relevant and it is quite legitimate argument, but I think it was Karl Marx who said that we try to shape our histories in our lives and we cannot be successful to do it completely because we live in conditions that are not of our choice. So we are sort of being burdened by the past. Just pointing to what the USA did 20 years ago and whoever did 50 years ago and 300 years ago etc. leads us nowhere. We are here with certain problems and just being in a circle of mutual recrimination and invoking the past leads us nowhere. Concerning the choices we should intervene everywhere, ideally, because there are universal norms and values. But we cannot do that because we don't have means etc. The other option various realists suggest is, that if we cannot do and act everywhere and anytime, we should do nothing. This is also impossible, therefore we must be selective, because we've got selective interests, limited means and therefore we will always be accused of double standard. That is inevitable, but it is better than doing nothing or pointing to the past and passing crimes etc.

**Jiří PEHE**

Thank you, I think we have to finish now and have a brake. After the break all of you in the audience are welcome to participate in our debate.