OUR GLOBAL CO-EXISTENCE: **CHALLENGES AND HOPES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY**

CONFERENCE REPORT

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INTRODUCTION

It is our pleasure to present to you the Conference Report of the Forum 2000 Conference, "Our Global Co-Existence: Challenges and Hopes for the 21st Century", which was held in Prague on October 9-10, 2005. It includes the transcripts from the plenary sessions, as well as a list of participants and background information on the Conference and Forum 2000 Foundation.

The idea of Forum 2000 originated in 1997, when former Czech President Václav Havel, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Elie Wiesel and philanthropist Yohei Sasakawa invited world leaders to discuss the challenges humanity was facing on the threshold of a new millennium. Since then, this idea evolved into a long term project that includes annual Conferences, Interfaith Dialogue gatherings, Students' Forum 2000 and other activities aimed at creating a neutral place for a lasting and constructive global dialogue, searching for joint solutions and recommending concrete steps towards improving the current state of the world.

The aim of the first five Forum 2000 Conferences was to map the globalization processes and to note its positive results as well as the perils encountered by an increasingly interconnected world. This series culminated in 2001, one month after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, with the adoption of the Prague Declaration, which summarized the most pressing issues that had been identified, examined and discussed by the world's leading thinkers, politicians, economists and religious leaders in Prague during the previous five years.

The division between the developed and the developing worlds was the basis of the Forum 2000 Bridging Global Gaps (BGG) project, launched in 2002. BGG's aim was to bring to a single negotiating table representatives from the two poles of globalization: those who make decisions with a global reach and are able to turn growing interconnectedness into wealth and prosperity, and those who feel that a sizable part of the world's population is cut off from the benefits of globalization and suffers from its negative influences.

After completing the BGG series in 2004, the ninth Forum 2000 Conference in October 2005 refocused on the original aim of providing a relevant platform for an up-to-date dialogue about important and difficult issues which are key to the future of civilization. After the breakdown of the bipolar order, the world faces the challenge of finding a new system of co-existence among nations, geopolitical regions, cultures and religions. This co-existence is being complicated in some cases by the rapid development of technology, personal mobility and the influence of the media.

The discussions at the Conference explored and analyzed the roots of terrorism, the role of religion, anthropological theories of conflict in civilization, and in general, problems which are fundamental to these ongoing conflicts. The Conference plenary was divided into 3 panels: 1. Conflict or Co-Existence? Where do we go?; 2. Concepts of Co-Existence and Community; 3. Communicating between Communities: The Role of Media in Conflict of Perceptions.

The Forum 2000 Conference in 2005, after introducing the model of several parallel workshops implemented during the Bridging Global Gaps series (2002 - 2004), returned to its original structure of a permanent plenary session divided into panels with specific topics but with all the delegates present. Given the very distinguished profiles of the Conference participants, this structure realized its potential to create impressive and extremely stimulating and textured dialogue, debate and discussion. The executive summary of the Conference Report, including key observations, suggestions, and recommendations has already been distributed to selected heads of states, chief executives of international organizations, and other decision makers around the world. By the means of this Conference Report we intend to convey to a wider public the rich intellectual content of the Forum 2000 Conference debates. We hope that you will find it inspiring.

The Forum 2000 Foundation Team

• Václav Havel

In 1997, when I opened the first Forum 2000 Conference, I thought that it would also be the last one. In my opening remarks that year, I said that it is important to study the reasons why humankind does nothing to avert the threats about which it already knows so much. Since then, eight years have elapsed, we concluded the 9th Forum 2000 Conference and the world has not become a safer place to live in than it was in 1997. On the contrary, there is something dangerous and threatening in the development of our civilization, and one has to ask whether more catastrophes have to happen in order for humankind to wake up.

I do not have the least illusion that one or a hundred conferences like Forum 2000 can substantially change the world for the better. However, the aim of the Prague conferences is again and again to articulate and describe the dangers facing the inhabitants of different cities, regions, continents, and the world as a whole. Only good understanding of these dangers will allow us to develop new models of behaviour, new scales of values and goals, and thereby invest the global regulations, treaties and institutions with a new spirit and meaning.

The focus of 2005 Conference was global co-existence. It was not an easy theme. Since then we learnt some more bad news. It is news of a world that is far more complex and in a way far more dangerous than it was during its cold war days. It is news of violence inflicted on innocent civilians, of economic and social divides, of spiritual and cultural gaps, of diametrically opposed perceptions of the causal phenomena in the background of current conflicts. My wish for the 2005 Forum 2000 Conference was that it contributed to the search for answers to the issues and challenges of global co-existence. I always hope that this is not an unattainable wish. I, of course, know that such answers are difficult to find, but sooner or later we shall have to find them. We have only one world.

• Yohei Sasakawa

Globalization has been a central topic throughout the series of Forum 2000 Conferences held over the past eight years. The impact of this universal and irreversible phenomenon, and the responses to it have been diverse. The Forum 2000 Conferences have tackled the issue of globalization from a wide range of perspectives: industrial, economic, political, social, and environmental. The massive wave of globalization has brought with it not only numerous benefits but also negative consequences such as the unfair distribution of wealth and opportunities. In light of this situation, Forum 2000 has taken up the challenge of humanizing globalization, or in other words, giving a human face to globalization. Forum 2000, with its diversity of participants and views, can be a significant force in creating new norms and ethics for globalization.

The topic chosen for 2005 year's Conference, solving the problems of global co-existence, focused on one of the most important and current issues of our turbulent world, and is critical to a peaceful future for mankind. I hope that lively and productive discussions at the 2005 Conference brought important impulses that will help to make the world a better place for us all.

DELEGATES' PROFILES

• Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd

Egyptian scholar of Islamic Studies, lives in the Netherlands. He studied literature and Qur'anic hermeneutics, and later came to criticize the monopoly of Qur'anic interpretation by Islamic orthodoxy. In 1995 a Cairo appeals court ordered Abu-Zayd to divorce from his wife on the ground of his alleged apostasy. After having received numerous death threats, Abu-Zayd and his wife decided to leave Egypt. He became a visiting professor at Leiden University and since 2002 he is professor of 'Islam and Humanism' in the University of Humanistics in Utrecht. He also participates in a research project on Jewish and Islamic Hermeneutics as Cultural Critique. He is involved in the Working Group on Islam and Modernity at the Institute of Advanced Studies of Berlin (Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin).

• Akyaaba Addai-Sebo

Mr. Akyaaba Addai-Sebo is an independent Consultant on Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Transformation. Formerly Special Envoy of International Alert. He helped to broker peace negotiations between the fighting groups in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Initiator of UK's annual celebration of Black History and Africa's contribution to World Civilization in October. Black History Month aims at promoting harmonious race relations, tolerance and co-existence. Currently, consultant to The Listen Charity's (UK) advocacy and fundraising campaign in support of the exemplary work of expert children's charities mostly in developing countries.

• HRH El Hassan bin Talal

Prince of the Jordanian Hashemite Royal Dynasty. Writer, philosopher and economist. Prince Hassan is president of the Club of Rome and chairs and is a member of many international organizations. He is an advocate of tolerant co-existence of Islam, Judaism and Christianity and the active dialogue between these religions. His Royal Highness supports democratic processes in the Islamic world and plays also a prominent role in the Middle East peace process. He is author of several books about the Middle East.

• Kim Campbell

Former Prime Minister of Canada. She entered Cabinet in 1989 as Minister of State for Indian and Northern Affairs. The following year she became Canada's first female Justice Minister. In 1993, Campbell became Minister of National Defence and then went on to become Canada's first female Prime Minister (1993). After retiring from politics, she served as Consul General of Canada in Los Angeles and then was a professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Currently she is Chair Emerita of the Council of Women World Leaders, President of the International Women's Forum, as well as Secretary General of the Club de Madrid.

• Robert Cooper

Senior British diplomat, Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the Council of the EU. Previously, he has served as foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Tony Blair. Author of several publications including recent book The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century. Professor of Social Theory & Organization and Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Applied Economics, University of Limburg, Belgium.

• Pál Csáky

Deputy Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic for European Affairs, Human Rights, and Minorities. He is also Deputy Chairperson of the Hungarian Coalition. From 1990 he is Member of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. From 1994 till 1998 he was Member of the Joint Parliamentary Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic and the European Parliament. He is Chairperson of following councils and committees: Government Council for Minorities and Ethnic Groups, Committee of Ministers for European Affairs, Government Council for Sustainable Development and Committee of Ministers Against Drug Abuse and Drug Dependencies, etc. He is author of many articles and publications, mainly in Hungarian.

• Gareth John Evans

Gareth Evans has been since January 2000 President of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group. He came to Crisis Group after 21 years in Australian politics, thirteen of them as a Cabinet Minister. As Foreign Minister (1988 - 96) he was best known internationally for his role in developing the UN peace plan for Cambodia. He has written or edited eight books - including Cooperating for Peace, launched at the UN. He was Co-Chair of the International Commission on intervention and State Sovereignty. He is currently a member of the Zedillo International Task Force on Global Public Goods and the Blix Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction.

• Bronislaw Geremek

Historian and European Parliament Deputy, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland (1997 - 2000). Former advisor to Solidarity and Lech Walesa. National Parliament (Sejm) Deputy (1989 - 2001); chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Comittee and Sejm European Legislation Committee. Professor at Warsaw University, professor at the College de France and College of Europe, member of Academia Europea, Royal Historical Society and PEN Club. He has authored a number of publications translated to many languages. Awarded and decorated with many prices and orders like: Légion d'Honneur, Grosses Verdienstkreuz mit Stern des Verdienstordens der Bundesrepublik Deutshland, l'Ordre National du Mérite etc.

• André Glucksmann

One of France's most renowned philosophers, considered a member of the French New Philosophers who supported the 1960s protest movement and opposed the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. He struggles against complacency in the face of totalitarian ideology of whatever kind. Author of Master thinkers or Dostoïevski à Manhattan. His most recent book is Le Discours de la Haine published in 2005. Throughout recent crises he has consistently been an outspoken advocate of the "devoir d'ingérence" or the "duty to interfere".

• Václav Havel

Former president of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic (1990-2003). Mr. Havel is a playwright, political activist, one of the first Spokespersons for Charter 77, and a leading figure of the 1989 Velvet Revolution. He is also the founding father of Forum 2000, which organizes major annual international conferences, roundtable debates, Students' Forums, and other activities.

• Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao

He directs the Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies (CAPAS) and has been a presidential policy adviser since 1996. He is one of Taiwan's leading sociologists and has written widely during the 1980's on the transformation of Taiwanese social structure and political democratization, particularly the position of the middle classes. During the course of the last decade, his work has focused on environmental protest movements and civil society development. He is also professor at the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica in Taipei, Taiwan, president of Taiwan Association of Southeast Asian Studies and Standing Supervisor of Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.

• Anwar Ibrahim

Former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia. He founded the Malaysian Youth Movement in 1971 and was its president for 10 years. While serving as Minister of Education, Anwar Ibrahim was elected President of the UNESCO General Conference (1989 - 1991). In 1998 Newsweek International named him Asian of the Year. He was sacked from the government on September 2, 1998, later stripped of his party membership and incarcerated on 20 September on trumped-up charges. He regained his freedom on September 2, 2004 after acquittal by the Malaysian Federal Court. He is currently a senior associate member of St. Anthonyęs College, Oxford University.

• Hiroyuki Ishi

Professor of School of Public Policy, the Hokkaido University.

During his career in Asahi Shimbun Newspaper (1965 - 94), he assumed Science Writer, Correspondent of New York Bureau, Science Editor and Senior Staff Writer, and he did researches in 125 countries in the world. He has held a number of positions, including Ambassador to Zambia, Visiting Professor of the University of British Columbia, Canada, Special Adviser to the Secretary General of United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). He is the author of Crisis of Global Environment, Acid Rain, The Destructions of Earth, Undermined Forests and others.

• Mats Karlsson

Swedish economist and Country Director for Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone at the World Bank. Prior to that he was the World Bank's Vice President responsible for managing the global communications programs and overseeing relations with the United Nations. In the past he had served as the State Secretary for International Development Cooperation at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as Sweden's Governor for the African, Asian and Inter-American Development Banks.

• Petr Kolář

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. After several years of research career at the Czechoslovak Academy of Science, Nobel Institute in Oslo and other institutions, Mr. Kolář joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1993. He was Director of Department for Czechs living abroad and Nongovernmental Relations (1993 - 1995), Director of the Third Territorial Department (1995 - 1996), Foreign Policy Coordination Adviser to the Foreign Minister, Ambassador to Sweden (1996 - 1998), Adviser to the President of the Czech Republic (1998 - 1999), and Ambassador to Ireland (1999 - 2003).

• Sergei Kovalyov

Biologist by profession, former member of the Russian Duma. Former head of the Human Rights Committee of Russian Parliament and first Commissioner for human rights in the Russian Federation. Defender of human rights and opponent of the war in Chechnya. Former Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. He was also imprisoned in 1974 for what were called "anti-soviet activities", and spent ten years in jail and in exile. Sergei Kovalyov is holder of many international awards and was twice nominated for Nobel Prize.

• Michael Melchior

Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's office, responsible for Israeli Society and the World Jewish Community. Rabbi Melchior is an Israeli politician and Labor-Meimad member of the Knesset. Born into a dynasty of rabbis in Copenhagen, Denmark, Melchior made aliyah in 1985. He received his rabbinical ordination from Yeshivat Hakotel in Jerusalem. He is the former Chief Rabbi of Norway. In July 1999, he was appointed Minister for Israeli Society and the World Jewish Community and he has resumed these responsibilities in the current government, having previously served as a Deputy Minister for Education and Deputy Foreign Minister.

• Aliaksandr Milinkievich

One of the opposition leaders in Belarus. Since 1976 he has been working for the Grodno Yanka Kupala State University as an Associate Professor. From 1990 to 1996 he has been employed as a Deputy Mayor of Grodno in charge of matters dealing with social life of its citizens. He wrote 60 scientific works dealing with laser equipment and technology, history of culture, science and architecture of Belarus. He is a co-author of Encyclopedia of Architecture of Belarus and Encyclopedia of History of Belarus. He is the Chairman of the "Ratusha" Grodno Regional Public Amalgamation and coordinator of the Foundation of the local development (Minsk). He is a Secretary of the "Grodnenskaya Initsiativa" (Grodno Initiative) Coordination Committee.

• Dominique Moïsi

He is deputy director of the French Institute of International Affairs (Ifri); chief editor of Politique Ètrangère, Ifri's quarterly publication; and a professor at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris. He is a regular columnist for the Financial Times, Quest France and other European newspapers. He is a member of the Board of the Aspen Institute, Berlin; patron of the Advisory Council and Expert of the Moscow School of Political Studies, and a member of the Expert group of the European Parliament on the prevention of conflicts in Brussels.

• Mike Moore

Former Prime Minister of New Zealand (1990) and Director General of the World Trade Organization (1999 - 2002). In 1984 Mr. Moore became Minister of Overseas Trade and Marketing, and later became Minister of External Relations and Trade. Between 1990 and 1993 he was leader of the Parliamentary New Zealand Labour Party. From 1999 Mr. Moore is a member of the Order of New Zealand (New Zealand's highest honor). After leaving the WTO Mike Moore was appointed to the Global Commission of International Migration, a United Nations Organization launched in 2003.

• Boris Nemtsov

Radio physicist by profession, Boris Nemtsov is a Russian politician and advisor to the President of Ukraine. His political career started in 1990 when he was elected as a Deputy to the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation. Mr. Nemtsov served as a governor of Nizhegorodsky district. In 1997 he was First Vice Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Minister for Fuel and Energy Sector, and a member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Currently he is a chairman of the Council of Directors of company Neftyanoy and since February 2004 a member of Committee 2008: Free choice of the Russian Parliament.

• John O'Sullivan

Editor-at-Large of the National Review, conservative political commentator and journalist in Britain and the United States. In 1970 stood as Conservative candidate for MP, later served as aide to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Mr. O'Sullivan has held editorial positions at The Daily Telegraph, The Times, Policy Review, United Press International, and the Canadian National Post. In May 1996 he founded the New Atlantic Initiative group. In 1991, Mr. O'Sullivan was honored with a Commander of the British Empire (C.B.E.).

• Jacques Rupnik

Political scientist specializing on Eastern Europe. Studied at the Sorbonne in Paris and Harvard University. Professor at the Institut of Political Studies in Paris since 1982. Research Associate at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University 1974 - 1975, specialist in Eastern Europe at the BBC World Service 1977 - 1982. Executive Director of the International Commission for the Balkans at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1995 - 1996. Member of Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 1999 - 2000. Author of several works on Eastern Europe and European integration.

• Ghassan Salamé

Former Lebanese Minister of Culture (2000 - 2003). At present, Professor of International relations at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris and Senior Advisor to the UN Secretary General. He has been on the board of the International Crisis Group, L'Institut du Monde Arabe, the Arab Thought Forum, The Bibliotheca Alexandrina. Author or editor of a dozen books such as: Quand l'Amérique refait le monde; Democracy without Democrats; The Foundations of the Arab State, The Politics of Arab Integration etc.

• Yohei Sasakawa

Chairman of The Nippon Foundation, renowned Japanese philanthropist, educated in the field of political economy. Mr. Sasakawa has initiated projects and worked on a global scale in such numerous areas as public health, education, and social welfare. His life's work is the elimination of leprosy, and as WHO Goodwill Ambassador for Leprosy Elimination he is striving to eliminate the disease and the stigma associated with it. Agricultural development in Africa is another of his major concerns, and he has conducted the Sasakawa Global 2000 Program in more than ten Sub-Saharan African nations in an effort to help them achieve self-sufficiency in the area of crop production. Together with Václav Havel and Elie Wiesel, he co-founded the Forum 2000 Project.

• Karel Schwarzenberg

Member of the Senate of the Czech Republic, former Chancellor to the President of Czechoslovakia Mr. Václav Havel (1990 - 1992). He was a chairperson of the Helsinki Conference for Human Rights (1984 - 1991) and actively supported Czech political exiles and opposition movements in Czechoslovakia.

• Ida van Veldhuizen-Rothenbücher

Ida van Veldhuizen-Rothenbücher is Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Czech Republic. After studying International and Notarial Law at Leiden University, she followed a postgraduate study at the Netherlands Institute for International Relations. She joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1974. After postings in Bonn, Jakarta, Luxembourg, and The Hague she became in 1994 Political Advisor at the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to NATO and in 1998 Ambassador to the Republic of Croatia. She has been Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Czech Republic since 2002. She supports many social, cultural and economic projects in the Czech Republic.

• Martin Walker

Editor of United Press International. He is also a senior fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC, a senior fellow of the Global Business Policy Council, and of the World Policy Institute at New York's New School University. In 25 years as a journalist with Britain's The Guardian newspaper, he served as bureau chief in Moscow and the US, as European Editor and Assistant Editor and was awarded Britain's Reporter of the Year prize. He is also a regular broadcaster on the BBC, NPR and CNN, and guest panelist on 'Inside Washington' for CBS, and 'White House Chronicle' on the Public Broadcasting Network. His books include Waking Giant: Gorbachev and Perestroika, The Cold War: A History, Clinton: The President They Deserve and America Reborn.

• James Woolsey

Lawyer, former director of the U.S. Central Intelligence, and the Ambassador to the negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in Vienna from 1989 to 1991. Currently, he is the chairman of the Board of Freedom House, a trustee of the Center for Strategic & International Studies, and the Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments. He also serves as vice chairman of the Advisory Board of Global Options LLC and is a member of the board of directors of other private companies.

• Mai Yamani

Mai Yamani is Research Fellow with the Middle East Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. She is expert in social, political and human rights issues in Arab States, particularly in Saudi Arabia. Dr. Yamani is author of the books Cradle of Islam: the Hijazi Quest for an Arabian Identity (2004), Changed Identities: The Challenge of the New Generation in Saudi Arabia (2000), Feminism and Islam: Legal and Literary Perspectives (1996) and others.

James J. Zogby

Dr. James J. Zogby is founder and president of the Arab American Institute (AAI), a Washington, D.C. based organization which serves as the political and policy research arm of the Arab American community. Since 1985, Dr. Zogby and AAI have led Arab American efforts to secure political empowerment in the U.S. Through voter registration, education and mobilization, AAI has moved Arab Americans into the political mainstream. For the past three decades, Dr. Zogby has been involved in a full range of Arab American issues. Dr. Zogby has also been personally active in U.S. politics for many years.

PLENARY TRANSCRIPTS

OPENING CEREMONY

• **Oldřich Černý:**
(speaking in Czech)

Mr. Havel, Mr. Sasakawa, Your Excellencies, esteemed participants of the conference, dear ladies and gentlemen, good evening. Allow me to welcome you here on behalf of four foundations:

1. Forum 2000 Foundation - the main organizer of this conference,
2. Dagmar and Václav Havel Vize 97 Foundation, which allows us to use this beautiful venue tonight,
3. Nippon Foundation,
4. The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, without whose understanding and support each of us might have been spending this evening somewhere else.

At the beginning of this week, I discussed some final details of this year's Forum 2000 Conference with President Havel, and Václav Havel asked me, "Which Forum is it, anyway?" "The ninth, Mr. President." "Really?" said Václav Havel and he said it in such a tone that I am still not really sure whether he meant it as an expression of joy that Forum 2000 fares so well or whether, on the contrary, he was momentarily distressed that the time passes so quickly.

I really do not know exactly to what we owe the fact that tonight we are opening the ninth annual conference. Maybe it is due to the choice of themes which bear relevance to what is going on in the world. Maybe it is due to the fact that in Europe there are not many such large conferences so widely open to the interested public. However, I am one hundred percent sure to whom we owe the Forum 2000: two people, President Havel and Mr. Sasakawa.

Mr. President, your Forum 2000 Foundation would like to invite you to take the floor.

• **Václav Havel:**
(speaking in Czech)

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends. Allow me to most sincerely welcome you here and thank you for attending. I am really surprised that this is already the ninth Forum 2000 conference because, when we were preparing the first one, we thought that it would be a single event. At least that is how it was designed. But it just so happens that maybe we shall live to see the tenth anniversary Forum 2000 conference. What was the meaning of that first conference? It was the same as the meaning of all those that followed it, that is, to invite people of various professions, nations, religions, people from various spheres of civilization to meet together and discuss the future of our civilization, the state of today's world, the threats and dangers that hover over it and how to face them. These are issues that were written up in countless clever books. Nevertheless, I myself began to get directly acquainted with those problems only during my presidential travels; before that I did not have a passport and knew everything from hearsay only. Thus, again and again, I realized the enormous variety, plurality of today's world and the pride with which one sphere of civilization would like that all the other ones would follow suit. I realized this enormous self-perpetual motion of the

current civilization that strives to make everything the same, so we do not recognize whether we are in a Prague hotel or a Tokyo airport. This effort is confronted by the will of nations and cultures to keep their identities to stay themselves, to preserve their traditions, their customs. This discrepancy was the impulse for that first conference, whose participants insisted that it continue as a series of conferences that would again and again address this theme from various angles and points of view and put forward a question: how it is possible that although humankind knows so much about its problems it does so very little to face them or solve them? This year's gathering, therefore, puts emphasis on coexistence of various cultures, coexistence in our globally interconnected world as one of the main themes of all preceding conferences.

Ladies and gentlemen, tonight I am here in a two-fold role, both as a co-initiator of the Forum 2000 conference series and as a host. Vize 97 Foundation, that I together with my wife established some years ago, is hosting this opening ceremony tonight, because one of its programs is a reconstruction of this church space, which has been opened to the public about a year ago. We called it "Prague Crossroads" in the hope that it will become a platform for meeting people, cultures, and spiritual trends; a platform for discussions. And if such a place devoted to such a pre-determined purpose is available, where else should Forum 2000 open than just here. Thank your for your attention.

• **Yohei Sasakawa**

Your Excellency, President Havel, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, the Forum 2000 conferences have been held with great success for the past eight years under the pre-eminent leadership of President Havel. As you know, this Forum was first established to provide a place where intellectuals and leaders could come together to share their wisdom and experience. Here they have developed concrete measures toward the common goal of world peace. Globalization has been a central topic throughout the series of forums. The first five years of the Forum was dedicated to the formulation of broad philosophies on globalization. The past three years, on the other hand, have consisted of more advanced and specialized discussions aimed at the development of codes of conduct based on these shared philosophies. In other words, we have worked on the development of a new paradigm for social change. And now, as President Havel has said, the time has come to put these plans into action. The Shared Concern Initiative - a brainchild of the Forum, led by President Havel - has already begun to put various plans into action. The initiative is composed of a number of Forum participants, including myself. It issues a joint statement with the aim of addressing and resolving the important challenges of today's world. It is a significant initiative aimed at putting ideas into action. The theme of this year's forum is "Our Global Co-Existence: Challenges and Hopes for the 21st century." When we think about these challenges we face for global coexistence, I cannot help but always feel that the current globalization process falls short in terms of humanity and ethics. I believe that we need to return to the basics and create a new kind of globalization: one with a human face. Last winter, I received a Christmas card from Prague with the one-line message "Do not do to others what you do not want done to you." That message is very similar to the message that I had been trying to convey using various expressions at the beginning of every Forum. "Do not do to others what you do not want done to you" is a philosophy shared by various religions in Asia, including Hinduism, Confucianism and Buddhism. I also believe that it is a basic law of peaceful human coexistence. You could even say that this idea lies at the foundation of human ethics. I'd be very pleased if I could say that this Asian notion is gaining wider recognition and understanding for I believe that acceptance and patience for different views and ideas lie at the core of human nature. Looking on at this year's participants, I feel very encouraged. We are fortunate to have many delegates who are most qualified and eager to discuss the issue of global coexistence, its challenges and hopes. This is exactly the direction that this Forum has been heading from the very beginning. The diversity of participants here is evidence that we are on the right track; that we are well on our way

to realizing our goal to provide a platform where a diversity of values can interact and promote greater understanding and tolerance. I'd like to welcome all of you gathered here. I look forward very much to a lively and constructive exchange of views on our common concerns. In closing, I'd like to express my deepest gratitude to the organizers of the Forum for their hard work in organizing such a wonderful Forum. Thank you very much.

• Oldřich Černý:
(speaking in Czech)

Chairman Sasakawa, thank you for your kind words about Forum 2000. There are two world renowned Mike Moores walking around this world. The first one is Mike Moore the filmmaker, whom we do not invite to our conferences. The other one is Mike Moore, the former prime minister of New Zealand and former Director General of the World Trade Organization, whom we nearly always invite. And I am very glad that this year he was finally able to make it. Ladies and gentlemen, Mike Moore…

• Mike Moore:

I'm always a little embarrassed when I'm introduced as a former New Zealand prime minister. It's true I was the youngest prime minister in a hundred years, but it's equally true that I was the shortest serving. They couldn't wait to get rid of me. I don't know why I support democracy so much when I see what it's done to me in my own country. People ask me about this and I always explain, "Well, I was young. You do stupid things. It's not something I'm proud of, but I'll devote the rest of my life to try and recover my family's good name." But I guess it's as director general or former director general of the WTO that I've been invited here, and that's the position I had when I first met President Havel, who has been a personal hero. He's a person of great moral consistency and clarity. There is school of historic thought that says there are no great men or women. There are only great occasions and great opportunities. I beg to differ. I think I could write a very good novel thinking what would happen if President Havel had been president of Yugoslavia and Milošević president of Czechoslovakia. I think there might have been a great difference. This is a conference of serious issues and substance and I look forward to the discussions. There's much to talk about. There's much still to be done. There are dangers everywhere and the possibility of miscalculations everywhere. But just occasionally, now and then, particularly for the benefit of the young, we should look back over the last twenty years and celebrate some of the great achievements.

Twenty years ago, Central Europe and Eastern Europe were under the jackboot, as was all of Latin America. Now, all of Latin America save Cuba is freer. There's never been a time in the history of our species when so many people have enjoyed the right to govern themselves. And over the past fifty years, we've seen the greatest and sustained lifting of living standards in history - life expectancy up twenty years, infant mortality down two thirds, literacy exploded, hundreds of millions of people from China and India and elsewhere have been lifted from extreme poverty. I think we have learnt what works and what does not. Consider Haiti and Malaysia - same living standards in 1960. South Korea and Ghana - same living standards in 1960. Now South Korea has an income equal to Portugal's. And look how Portugal's income, living standards and human rights have exploded since the fascists left and they joined a wider, freer and better Europe. In 1945, both Burma and Thailand had the same living standards. Now Thailand is five times richer and many times freer. Those countries that do the best are those that respect human rights, property rights, have independent courts, an honest, professional public service, accountable, replaceable politicians, an active civil

society, free trade unions, a free and competitive media, and religious tolerance - freedom of religion and freedom from religion. The more open economy, the more open societies always do best. This can be no historic accident. There was an argument, a sort of theory to rationalize appeasement of dictators during the Cold War, that we should support the strong man theory of development. You can still hear echoes of it in my region - the Asia Pacific. And they used to say that only strong men can force up change, that democracy doesn't work for the very poor. The populist politicians would play on ethnic and religious differences. This story played out in Europe in the 1930s with attacks on decadent democracies. It's just not true. Even among the poorest countries, the more democratic, the more tolerant, the more open, the better the result. Can I commend to you a recent study by the US Council on Foreign Relations entitled The Democratic Advantage, and here it nails down the argument by a comparison of low-income democracies versus low-income autocracies, measuring literacy, life expectancy, infant mortality, agricultural production, debts, deficits, access to clean water. Low-income democracies get a result 20-40% better as opposed to autocracies. Democracies, at least since the second war, have not gone to war with each other. Eighty percent of all interstate conflicts are instigated by autocracies. They are more vulnerable to civil war. There's never been a famine in a democracy - a free country with a free media. No country has ever gone bankrupt because it's had too much trade or too much foreign investment. The commercial competition that applies the blowtorch of transparency is a cleansing agent against the perils of crony and phony capitalism and the corruption that goes hand in hand with that kind of protection and privilege. And I'll make the case that, in the main, globalization has not made countries poor. It's the absence of it that has. Those countries and those people that are locked out - their face is pressed against the window. They wait in vain for a train that won't come home if their governments and societies are closed. There is much wrong with the global trading system, but it's a case of not enough trade, not too much trade. And it is a tragedy that, for the last fifty years, wherever poor countries have an advantage - in textiles or in agriculture, then the rich countries want special exemptions. And you can see this happening now with wealthy countries worrying about issues such as outsourcing, which will of course already give benefits to tens of thousands of poor countries. In December this year, hopefully in Hong Kong, there will be progress on the Doha development round. In agriculture alone, if we could cut that deal, that will bring five times more to Africa than all the overseas development assistance put together. When the Tokyo round of negotiations were launched, President Kennedy said, "This new round will help developing countries like Japan." I think that makes the case for the benefits of an open trading system. So we know what works. We know which levers to pull. We've learnt that democracy, property rights, social mobility through equality, through investment and education - we know that tolerance and diversity are now good economics as well as good in themselves.

When I look at the problems the world faces and the discussions we'll be having tomorrow, I can't think of a problem we face that cannot be improved by more openness, more democracy, more ownership and more human rights. So we know what works. We know which levers to pull, but for some reason we haven't the ability to purchase this ticket. Why is that? Leaders who don't miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity, who are devoted to opinion polls and focus groups, lose their nerve too quickly, because by its nature politics can be a short-term thing. And this building reminds me of a story of a very devout man. He was a bit of a God-botherer. He prayed to God five to ten times a day. He irritated the Lord. And he would pray over and over again - "God, let me win Lotto." This went on for year after year, five to ten times a day - "God, let me win Lotto." Even the Lord got irritated and he's a patient woman. And with a flash of lightning, the Lord came down to earth and saw this bloke. And he said: "Help me out here, buy a ticket!" We know what works. We know what fails. We just, I think, need to buy a ticket.

OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE AND PANEL 1: CONFLICT OR CO-EXISTENCE? WHERE DO WE GO?

• Jacques Rupnik:

Ladies and gentlemen, Excellencies, dear friends, welcome to the opening of the ninth meeting of the Forum 2000 conference. It was meant initially as a single conference. Nine years later, you begin to wonder if it's not becoming an institution. And institutions, as we know, once created, have a tendency to keep going.

That was certainly not the intention of the founding fathers, who precisely wanted to avoid such traps and wanted to create a loose network of people with different views but with shared concerns. So not another conference on globalization, not really an institution – Forum 2000 was perhaps a state of mind. The real reasons for Forum 2000 today have to do with the place, the host and the issues. It is a sign of the times that Prague, after a long eclipse, has become again a meeting place for intellectuals and politicians to discuss issues of international significance. This has something to do with the personality of the convener of the Forum, President Václav Havel who, over the years, has through his writings as well as his personal itinerary, created a loose network of people of very different persuasions from different parts of the world. He brought them together in Prague to exchange their views about the challenges facing us, with no short-term political agenda but as an attempt to take the long view concerning the opportunities, the challenges and the threats posed by globalization. Forum 2000, after nine years, has even become an object of study. Professor Musil is conducting such a study and he said they did a word count for the last eight sessions of the Forum. The most frequently used word, he told me, is the word "uncertainty." Henry Kissinger who was one of the speakers at the Forum used the words "uncertainty in our understanding of the present world." So, this brings me to the relevance of this year's meeting concerning the conditions and the pitfalls of our globalized existence.

Perhaps the major reasons why we still feel the urge to meet in Prague for the ninth Forum are not just that some of the main issues concerning the foundations of an international community remain relevant but also because of the assumptions many people shared in the 1990s no longer seem to be working or no longer seem to be as persuasive. When Forum 2000 was conceived a decade ago, the dominant view of post-Cold-War globalization was that the opening of borders meant more trade, more growth and that in turn would help bring about more democracy and more respect for human rights. At some level of generalization, you can still defend such a view, but I think that the present decade, particularly since 9/11, has also brought to the fore the darker side of the globalized world, with the rise of new threats, nationalist tensions and religious divides, which in a way force us to return to what were some of the key questions that were present at the creation of Forum 2000. What are the sources of co-existence and divisions between cultures and civilizations? What are the foundations and legitimacy of universalist modernizing projects? And what are the contrasting and conflicting perceptions of these issues in the media, which have become an actor in their own right in this process? These will provide some of the main themes for our discussions today based on a shared feeling of responsibility for the world we live in. No one represents better that sense of responsibility – "responsibility as destiny," as he once put it – than the moving spirit of Forum 2000 President Václav Havel. It is a great honor and pleasure to give the floor to President Václav Havel.

• **Václav Havel:**
(speaking in Czech)

Ladies and gentlemen, Esteemed guests,
First of all, I would like to sincerely welcome you on the occasion of this year's Forum 2000 working session.

Let me begin by touching upon one dimension of the problem to be debated at our conference for the ninth time – that is co-existence of different spheres of civilization and cultures in today's world. After the bi-polar world broke down and the iron curtain crashed down, we experienced something that no one expected. The world was faced with the task of finding a new world order, a new system of co-existence for nations, states, and continents.

This co-existence is at the same time confronted with the breathtaking developments of new modern technologies, with the immense influence of modern media and with fantastic mobility. We are witnessing such a mobility of population on our planet today that in one day, more people move from place to place than in the whole year one hundred years ago. People traveling or fleeing from their countries to other countries are more directly than before confronted with the "otherness" of their neighbors, which results in various tensions and problems.

What, then, should be the spiritual starting point or the principles of a new world order? What things should become key to the new way of co-existence? All world religions have something in common; they articulate the same basic moral imperatives. This is true in every religious system in its own way – metaphysically anchored, but in the end, similar to each other. Therefore, I would say that there exists a spiritual and a moral minimum that is shared by all, or at least by a substantial majority of all cultures and spheres of civilization or religions of today's world. I have spoken several times about this issue during past Forum 2000 conferences.

I recall one story, which I will share with you. It happened on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the UN and at the summit of many heads of states where I was supposed to represent the Czech Republic. One important foreign politician asked me to try to write a short, inspirational manifesto; a statement, in which I would attempt to formulate a common will to cooperate on the basis of a spiritual and a cultural minimum. It was to be based on common imperatives which everybody wants to honor, while, at the same time, manifesting the will to honor the "otherness" of others; not elevating one sphere of civilization or culture above the other and to respect everything that makes them different from each other.

By using simple, uncomplicated and understandable words, I was supposed to write a text, which would then be processed by a complicated procedure and become a manifesto of the summit. I wrote the draft and gave it to the politician who asked me for it. He liked it very much but after about a fortnight he left a message that, although everybody likes the text and everybody agrees with it, it cannot be approved.

I think that this story illustrates what we so often debate at Forum 2000 conferences: a discrepancy between reflections and deeds. How many wise books have been written about the threats and dangers hovering over the world and what humankind should do to avert them? We probably have never had such a thorough and complete knowledge of ourselves. But it is as if we are carried by some blind perpetual motion in a direction which we say is dangerous – or at least ambiguous – without being able to draw - a lesson from this reflection and take some action. It is the same as with that UN summit. It's as if there were a mysterious barrier between reflection and action.

As you know, Forum 2000 was supposed to take place only once, and all of us are surprised that this is the ninth conference. It is a Sisyphusian effort to yet again and again remind ourselves of the issues, to analyze them and to speak of them in the hope that someone will transform some of them into concrete deeds, which is reflected by the fact that we, again and again, meet here to follow up on our last debate and to deepen it.

I am looking forward to all the wise words that will be said here, and I wish success to this conference.

• Jacques Rupnik:

Thank you very much, President Havel, for these opening remarks. My main duty, the organizers told me, is to announce now that next to this main meeting there will be two parallel meetings of great interest. One concerning the Middle East and problems of the water in that region and the second, I think very topical, concerning Belorussia, and, as you know, the candidate running for the opposition in Belorussia is here in Prague and will be present at that meeting, and I think that it is particularly significant that Forum 2000 has organized such a meeting with him. Usually, Forum 2000 used to meet for two or three days, and we enjoyed a very leisurely pace in those days. Now, still covering the same range of topics, with an array of very brilliant and talented people, we only have one day, and that makes it very tough for moderators, who have to moderate themselves – that applies to me as well – but above all the speakers. And with that warning, let me pass the floor to the first moderator, Mr. Nemtsov, who will introduce the next session. Boris Nemtsov is known to you as a leading Russian politician. He was the first vice-prime minister of the Russian Federation. He has recently been an advisor to the Ukrainian president, and it is a pleasure to give him the floor to conduct the next session.

• Boris Nemtsov:

Thank you, Mr Chairman. Thank you, Mr President, for the invitation to be with you. This is the first time for me to take part in this outstanding forum that you have organized in Prague. I will be a moderator of a very exciting morning session, entitled "Conflict or Co-Existence: Where Do We Go?" We have two outstanding keynote speakers today and seven panelists and I hope that we will try to find an answer to important questions like what are the root causes of the current threats and how they can be most effectively dealt with. Is the current global campaign on terrorism effectively addressing the comprehensive challenges of modernization, human development and accountable governance? And the last one: What are the shared values of our future co-existence – human rights or human security, civil liberties, rule of law or religious codes and imperatives? Is there a universal standard for global accountability?

I am very happy to introduce the first keynote speaker, Ghassan Salamé, who is the former Lebanese Minister of Culture in 2000 and 2003. At the present time he is a professor of international relations at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris and a senior advisor to the United Nations Secretary General. He has been on the board of the International Crisis Group, L'Institut du Monde Arabe, the Arab Thought Forum, and The Bibliotheca Alexandrina.

• Ghassan Salamé:

As you can see from what the Chairman has just read, the list of questions is very long and the time is very short. So one has to be selective, and I will start immediately with the heart of the matter. I think that one of the least convincing answers to those who say there is a clash of civilizations or a clash of civilizations in the making, is to say well, let's try to have a "dialogue among civilizations" instead. Or let's have an "alliance of civilizations" so that they do not clash. I think this is a very unconvincing answer. The problem as I see it is that civilizations do not clash. I do not think that civilizations engage in a dialogue or ally amongst themselves either. I simply do not think that civilizations exist as political actors on the global scene. Civilizations are reservoirs where we pick our values, our ideas, our ideologies, and sometimes do not do that, and go to other civilizations to pick our ideas, our values, our ideologies. Or we try to be modern and forget about our civilizations and our traditions. But civilizations, as such, do not clash, do not enter into dialogue. They are just reservoirs for individuals and groups, where they can go from time to time and build their value system and renegotiate their identity.

What about religions then? Well, religions also have given a lot of thought recently to people and religions are like weapons: they are of dual use. Sometimes, they are used to legitimize autocracy and sometimes they inspire democratic movements, don't they, Mr Geremek? Sometimes they are the language in which conflicts start. And sometimes, on the contrary, they are leading voices of peace. Sometimes, religions do help in promoting social progress, and sometimes they are the cement upon which social traditionalism is built. So religions are of dual use, and depending on the time, depending on the way you may look at religions, you may make a case for them as a negative factor or, on the contrary, as a very positive one. Sometimes, the same religious institutions play roles that are somehow disputed. If you look at Pope John Paul II in the past twenty-five years, you may find things with which you agree, for example, his positions during the two Iraq conflicts, where he played a very crucial role in avoiding the very concept of a clash of civilizations, but you may look at his conservative agenda and do not like it. So, depending on the way you look at things, I would say the same about Ayatollah Sistani in present day Iraq. He is the one who, from day one, told me in June 2003 "I will never accept an Iraqi constitution unless it is written not only by Iraqis, but by elected Iraqis." He is the one who brought elections about and played a very crucial positive role. But later he put all his support behind one specific group of candidates in the general elections or at least did not protest against the use of his name as the sponsor of this group. So you may like his first position and dislike his second position. And all these are concrete examples of how religion and religious authorities can play different roles. And, by the way, there are extremely bloody conflicts nowadays that have nothing to do with religion. One conflict that has been well studied by the International Crisis Group, probably the worst case nowadays, and I am sure Gareth is going to say a few words about it, is the conflict in Darfur where Muslims are fighting against other Muslims. The longest war in the Middle East – eight years between Iran and Iraq – was among Muslims. And the conflict in Aceh, the conflict in Colombia, Latin America, these have nothing to do with religion. Even diplomatic alignments do not necessarily have to do with religion: when (Christian) Armenia was opposed to (Muslim) Azerbaïdjan, Iran, for geopolitical reasons, was closer to the Armenians.

I do believe that religion is made of three different things. Religion is first a faith, second, religion is an institution, and third, religion is a language. And I think that most of the confusion nowadays is due to the fact that we keep sort of moving between religion as a faith, religion as an institution and religion as a language. When it comes to religion as a faith, there is some kind of interfaith dialogue. I don't much believe in it. I do believe that any religion has a set of basic undisputable values and beliefs nobody is really ready to re-examine. That is why, although I have nothing against interfaith dialogue, I don't believe this is the best road for dialogue between people. Now, among institutions, we have a huge number of dialogue fora, but I am not sure that established churches in

Islam, in Christianity, in Hinduism and other religions are the best people to really conduct dialogue or interaction. Very often, it sounds like regular diplomacy. I have been to many of these sort of fora, and it looks like interstate diplomacy with no real substance.

So, what do we do? I do believe that we have three basic methods of approaching each other when you belong to a different civilization's sphere or different religion. One is tolerance. I don't like this method very much. I do believe that in the essence of tolerance as concept, you have a balance of power, where the strong, to a large extent, recognize the existence of the other – the otherness of the other as President Havel has just said – but in tolerance you have a balance of power, where the strong ones recognize the weak, but want to keep them weak and just accept that they survive in the relations with them. Who would feel great if he is just tolerated by the other? So why not mutual respect? Mutual respect is a bit better, but I feel that mutual respect sounds, looks and operates like a Cold War: You have your domain; you have your territory. You stay there. I have my territory, my domain. I stay there. There is no interaction. We respect each other, but you stay where you are, and I'll stay where I am. This is mutual respect. Dialogue is better. Of course it is better, but not dialogue among religions and civilizations because in my view neither religions nor civilizations are political actors to start a dialogue. The dialogue I speak of should be between individuals, groups or states. Why do I believe that religions and civilizations are not actors? Because nobody has an answer to the question: who represents whom in a civilization? It's a very undemocratic way of putting things. Why should I accept one Muslim and say "Of all 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, there is one guy who represents Islam just because he happens to be a Muslim." What is the democratic process through which he has been selected as spokesman for the whole of Islam? So it is very undemocratic to say civilizations talk to each other because nobody has ever given a mandate to anyone to speak in the name of hundreds of millions of people. And I certainly do not recognize neither George W Bush nor the Pope to speak in the name of the "West" if such a thing really exists. Dialogue between individuals, between groups, between states, this makes sense!

But we have to be careful. I never thought that dialogue was an alternative to a struggle or to a conflict. I do believe that, on the contrary, dialogue is not an alternative to a conflict but it's a form of a conflict. But in a conflict you are at war with the other, in a dialogue you are in conflict with yourself. Because in a dialogue you need to accept first "the otherness of the other," as President Havel has said, to consider that people are different in many ways and that it has been the case from time immemorial and will remain so until the end of times and that diversity is by the way what saves us all from boredom on earth. Second, you also have to accept that it is legitimate for the other to be different from you. So you not only need to accept the otherness of the others, but the legitimacy of the difference between you and the other, his fundamental right to be as he is, not to even try to resemble you, to remain confident in his values, attached to his own faith, or proud of his own language, the right not to be in admiration of you, of your values, of your institutions or of your God. And third, and this is the most difficult precondition for a true dialogue, you need to accept that through a dialogue you may be able to change the other, but also to be changed by him. Because if you enter into a dialogue in which you only want to change the other and not to let the other try to change you, you are a hypocrite. You are a liar. You are not entering into a dialogue. That is why I say a dialogue is not an alternative to conflict, it's a form of conflict with oneself and not with the other.

Let me turn very rapidly now at least to one question. If you don't have mutual respect, if you do not have dialogue, if you do not have tolerance, you may have violence. And one topic mentioned for us to address, and I will do it very rapidly, is of course a specific form of violence in the twenty-first century. That is terrorism and anti-terrorism, which is a form of violence, and let us be clear among ourselves, we have no idea yet how to conceptualize the phenomenon. I have been like many among you looking to the latest Millennium Summit of the United Nations to find a definition and a conceptualization of terrorism and you certainly know that we failed in doing that, like in many other topics.

Is terrorism an enemy or a method or a political instrument? If it's an enemy, then you should fight against it. If it's a method or a political instrument, then you should forbid it. It's a completely different thing. I tend to believe that terrorism is not an enemy. Terrorism is a political instrument that should be forbidden and we should all cooperate in order to somehow evict it, isolate it, abhor it. Second, is terrorism a war or is it a criminal activity that should be prosecuted like any other form of criminal activity? Confronted by this very basic question, I would tend to submit that many governments, including the most powerful among them nowadays, have given the following answer: "On Monday, it's a criminal activity; on Tuesday it's a war we are waging." I mean it is both, and we do not know. And, unless there is more conceptual clarity on this issue, ambiguity will not help in the fight against terror. Third, what is the relationship between terrorism and democracy? Is democracy an answer to terrorists? I am a democrat. I want one hundred and ninety one political units in the world to become democratic tomorrow. But let me be very frank, democracy is not the answer to terrorism. You need other answers to terrorism. And, by the way, all studies we have now clearly show – and as the London terrorist attacks recently clearly show – that most of the perpetrators of terrorist acts and most of the victims of terrorist acts do come from democratic constituencies, which tells us something very important: that there are more terrorist activities, for example, in democratic India – four hundred incidents last year – than in authoritarian China – only nineteen – last year. So let's face it. Democracy is a value in itself, and we should all fight for it, but it is too facile to say, "Well, if you have democracy, it's the end of terrorism." Terrorism needs a specific counter-terrorism strategy that probably could be helped in the long run by democratic institutions, but it is not a short-term answer to terrorism. So should we continue in that, or just start thinking about how to operate and define conceptually our counter-terrorist strategy?

I will end with a question: Does military intervention always help? And for this, I will, in a very telegraphic style, say "Rather no, than yes." Why? Because in order for a military intervention to succeed in fighting terrorism, you need to have at least seven preconditions. I will list them and then shut up: You first need a very good knowledge of the terrain, of the history, of the society you are intervening in. Second, you also need adequate planning. The easiest job is regime change. The most difficult job is regime replacement. Look at what happened in Iraq. The regime change took place in three weeks. But two and half years after that, regime replacement is still not there. Three, an adequate tempo and timeframe. Democratization is not a religious conversion that happens in a minute. It takes years. It sometimes takes generations. Four, you need to have a very clear set of priorities and not make preventive wars while you are fighting terrorism, because it diverts your funds, your energy and the alliance we need to fight terrorism. Five, do not overestimate military means, because in fighting terrorism, you need all kinds of means and military is only one of them, probably the least crucial. Six, keep an eye on the oil market, because it's a big, big constraint on your activity, especially when the barrel is at sixty or seventy. And finally, in order to fight such a war, you need to have a strong moral authority, which means a strong legitimacy, which means do not be unilateral in your approach but multilateral. To say that the present administration in Washington or the West in general are in a position to gather easily these seven conditions is to show a lot of naïveté or partisanship. The truth is that the highly disputable war on Iraq has negatively and substantially affected intervention even against terrorism.

• Boris Nemtsov

Our next speaker is Gareth Evans. Gareth Evans is a former foreign minister of Australia and since January 2000, he has been President of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group. He came to this group after twenty-one years in Australian politics, some of them as a cabinet minister. As a foreign minister from 1988 until 1996, he was best known internationally for his role in developing the United

Nations Peace Plan for Cambodia. He has written or edited eight books, including *Cooperating for Peace,* launched by the United Nations. He was co-chair of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. He's currently a member of the Zedillo International Taskforce on Global Public Goods and the Blix Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction.

• Gareth Evans:

Ladies and gentlemen, the world as we see around us doesn't immediately suggest that we've learnt very much about peaceful coexistence, whether it's Iraq, or Israel-Palestine, or Darfur or the eastern Congo, or London or Bali. Or wherever else in the world the golden media rule applies that if it bleeds it leads. We are assailed with a constant flow of news about war or potential war or violent extremism, which seems depressingly endless. But what I want to suggest today is that, for all that has gone wrong and all that continues to go wrong when it comes to war and civil war and mass violence and terrorism, conflict is not inevitable. For all that some political leaders are impenetrable to any form of education, we have, as an international community, learnt a great deal about how to prevent and resolve conflicts, particularly over the last decade. The record is rather better than it seems, at least in relation to war and civil war, if not terrorism. And we can do better still, if governments and intergovernmental organisations apply the right kind of policies and give, above all, the right kind of leadership.

The basic point about conflict and extremist violence is that it is always context-specific. Big overarching theories about conflict, whether cast in terms of the clash of civilizations or ancient tribal enmity or economic greed or economic grievance or anything else, may be very good for keynote speeches, and certainly very good for royalties. They might also be quite helpful in identifying particular explanatory factors that should be taken into account in trying to understand the dynamics of particular situations. But big theories never seem to work very well when you're trying to sort out between those situations which are combustible and those which are not. Because, after all, for every case we know of religious or ethnic or linguistic difference erupting in communal violence, there are innumerably more cases around the world of people and groups of different cultures and backgrounds still living harmoniously side-by-side. For every group economic grievance that erupts in catastrophic violence, there are innumerably more that don't. For every Muslim in the Arab-Islamic world whose feeling of grievance or humiliation against the US or the West takes a violent form, there are many millions more for whom it doesn't. For every alienated, second-generation immigrant not succeeding in the New World, but feeling adrift from the cultural moorings of his or her old world, for everyone who translates that rage or despair into indiscriminate terrorist violence, there are innumerably more for whom that action is inconceivable.

So all this simply means that there are no single causes or explanations. There are no single accompanying big fixes for any of the various continuing problems of conflict and violence that beset us. The problems are complex and multidimensional, so too have to be the solutions. But there are solutions and they do work. And we're getting better all the time at identifying and applying them. Let me give you, right at the outset, just a few figures to make this point. They come from the long-awaited *Human Security Report,* which is a Canadian initiative supported by five other governments that's to be published in a big volume next month by Oxford University Press. And among the findings in that report are these: There's been a dramatic decline in the number of armed conflicts since the early 1990s. A decline of some 80%, in fact, in the case of conflicts with a thousand or more battle deaths a year. Although there are still some sixty violent conflicts being waged around the world, war between states, as distinct from inside states, has almost completely disappeared – now less than 5% of conflicts, and the overall environment is

certainly one of major reduction. Second big finding: paralleling the number of conflicts, the number of battle deaths is also dramatically down, both in absolute numbers overall and in terms of the deadliness of each individual conflict. Whereas, back in the 1950s, and for years thereafter, the average number of deaths per conflict per year was 30,000 to 40,000, by the early 2000s, this number was down to around about 600, reflecting the shift from high-intensity to low-intensity conflicts and geographically a big shift from Asia back to Africa. Of course, violent battle deaths are only a small part of the whole story of the misery and horror of war. As many as 90% of war-related deaths are due to disease and malnutrition rather than to direct violence. But the trend decline in battle deaths is significant and it's highly encouraging.

And a final quick point, there's been a dramatic increase in the number of conflicts that have been actually resolved by active peacemaking efforts – diplomatic negotiations, international mediation, conciliation and the like. The high-level panel, which reported to the Secretary General before this year's UN summit, of which I was a member, came up with the startling but very well-researched statement that more civil conflicts have been resolved by negotiation in the last fifteen years than in the previous two hundred.

There are a number of reasons contributing to these various turnarounds, including, back a few years ago now, the end of the era of colonialism, which generated, in fact, around two-thirds or more of all the wars that occurred between the 1950s and 1980s. Much more important recently has been the end of the Cold War itself, which meant no more proxy wars being fuelled by Washington or Moscow, and it also meant the demise of a number of authoritarian governments generating internal resentment and violent resistance that each side had been propping up. But the best explanation is the one that really stares us in the face, although there are a great many people who don't want to acknowledge it, and that is the huge increase in the amount of formal activity, most of it sponsored by the United Nations, which has taken place since the end of the Cold War in the area of peacemaking – that's to say negotiation, conciliation mediation – peacekeeping and peace-building operations. The increase in that activity, depending on which area you are talking about, has been from four to twelve times over the last ten years and it has been reflected in results. All this in turn has been reinforced by the huge increase in the activity of other players, not least non-governmental organisations and other civil society actors, working alongside the UN system and governments, needling them into action, acting as partners in delivery, or playing critical support roles in institutional capacity building, community dialogue and confidence building, and actual peacemaking through mediation and conciliation. My own International Crisis Group, which didn't exist ten years ago, is a case in point. Now it is an organization of about 110 full-time people active in some 50 areas of actual conflict or potential conflict around the world, and with a strong advocacy voice in all the major capitals. What is it that we have learnt about what works and what doesn't when it comes to war and civil war? What are the things that governments and intergovernmental organisations have been doing right up to a point but could do a lot more of and do a lot more consistently?

Let me give you a few checklists of my own to add to those of Ghassan Salamé from my own experience of the major lessons we've learned or should have learned from each main stage of the conflict cycle, starting with conflict prevention. The first rule of preventing deadly conflict is of course not to start it; a message that the United States is certainly now pondering after its rush to war in Iraq. There are circumstances in which there will simply be no alternative to taking military action, but military action – I agree with Ghassan in this sense, not only in the context of terrorism, but in every other context – should only ever be undertaken in circumstances of last resort and in very serious cases where it will, on balance, do more good than harm. The second rule of conflict prevention is to understand the causes, the factors that are at work – political, economic, cultural, personal – in each particular risk situation. Don't be quick again to apply grand theories, or make assumptions on the basis of experience elsewhere: look at what is under your nose. The third rule is to fully understand, and be prepared to apply flexibly as circumstances change, the conflict prevention toolbox – the whole range of possible measures, both long-term structural and short-term operational, that

can be deployed to deal with high-risk situations: political and diplomatic tools; legal and constitutional tools; economic tools, including sanctions but also incentives; and military tools, security sector reform, preventive deployments and, in extreme cases, the threat of military force. The fourth rule is to be prepared to put in the necessary government and intergovernmental resources, when and where they are needed, and particularly at the early prevention stage, where it's manifestly extremely cost-effective. And the fifth rule is for governments to leverage their own resources by using all the extraordinary capability that is now available from non-governmental organizations and civil society generally in the ways I have already mentioned.

When prevention fails, and the task becomes that of conflict resolution, again, there are a number of lessons we have painfully learned about what makes a successful peace accord: First, it is not an event so much as a process, and signing the agreement is certainly not the end of it. The critical need is to generate commitment to, and ownership of the peace by the warring parties, so their commitments are not just formal, but in fact internalized and will stick. We need to constantly remember the awful examples of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, taking 800,000 lives as it did, which followed just after the Arusha peace deal consummated great acknowledgement and acclamation one year earlier. We need to remember the 1991 Bicesse Agreement to end the war in Angola, which was followed almost immediately by a relapse into bloody conflict for another decade with another million or more lives lost. So the peace accord is only the beginning of it, not the end. Second, any peace accord must deal with all the fundamentals of the dispute, all the issues which will have to be resolved if normality is to return. Sometimes that can be done in a sequential, one-step-at-a-time, stage-by-stage way, with confidence building measures now and deferring some of the key issues until later, that might be a way, for example, of dealing right now with the frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. But the failed Oslo process for Israel-Palestine shows just how risky that approach can be. Thirdly, any successful peace accord must get the balance right between peace and justice. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission model, with its amnesties for the perpetrators of even the most serious crimes, is very widely admired, but in other cases sustainable peace will not be possible without some visible trial and punishment occurring. What is clear is that the people of every country themselves, whether it's Cambodia or Rwanda or East Timor or Liberia, have to resolve what works for them. You can't have a single model being applied from outside. Fourthly, the terms of any accord, and the method of its enforcement and implementation, must be sufficiently resilient to deal with spoilers – those who come along after the event determined to undo it all, those who seek to undermine or overturn it. Fifthly – and this follows particularly from the last point – a peace accord, to be successful, must have the necessary degree of international support, with all the guarantees and commitment of resources that are necessary to make that stick.

When you come to post-conflict peacebuilding, there again is a checklist of issues that we've learned about through hard experience, particularly in the last decade, about what makes these missions successful, which are the ones that are and which are the ones that are not. The first lesson is to sort out who should do what and when - immediately, over a medium transition period and in the longer terms, allocate the roles and coordinate them effectively both at headquarters and on the ground. And this is, of course, at the high level at least, one of the crucial roles envisaged for the new Peacebuilding Commission, just approved at the UN Summit – if its detailed operating arrangements, that is, can ever now be agreed in that diplomatic piranha pool of New York where it's currently now being debated. Second lesson for post-conflict peacebuilding: commit the necessary resources, and sustain that commitment for as long as it takes. This again is envisaged as a critical role for the Peacebuilding Commission, given the long and lamentable history of ad hoc donors' conferences and rapidly waning attention once the immediate crisis is over. Third rule about peacebuilding: understand the local political dynamics and the limits of what outsiders can do. Iraq remains one of the unhappiest examples of how much can go wrong when that understanding is conspicuously lacking. Fourth, recognize that multiple objectives have to be pursued simultaneously: physical security may always be the first priority, but it cannot be the only one, rule of law and justice issues, as Kim Campbell was saying over breakfast this morning, and economic governance and anti-corruption measures certainly deserve much

higher priority than they have usually been given. And finally, in respect to peacebuilding, all intrusive peace operations really do need an exit strategy, if not an exit timetable, and one that is not just devoted to holding elections as soon as possible, as important as it obviously is to vest real authority and responsibility in the people of the country being rebuilt.

Moving finally from conflict to terrorism, the contemporary problem here is in a number of ways more intractable and more alarming than that of war between and within states. Positive news confirmed in the Human Security Report that I've mentioned is that, even with all the carnage since 9/11 that we're familiar with, the overall death toll from terrorist attacks is still very low by comparison with the numbers still to this day dying in battle, or from war-related disease and malnutrition. But of course that will be the case only so long as terrorist attacks are conducted with conventional weapons. The casualty rate will obviously soar dramatically if the so-called Big One, a major terrorist attack using, in particular, nuclear weapons, which is certainly still very thinkable. If the war on terrorism, as it's so far been conducted, has been an overall success, then that's a very well-kept secret. Terrorist attacks classified by the US government as significant more than trebled last year worldwide to 650. This was the highest number, actually, since Washington ever began to collect statistics. And nearly a third of those attacks – 198 of them – and nine times the number the year before, took place in Iraq, which is of course meant to be the central front in the war on terror. I believe that the struggle against violent extremism, and that's a much better terminology than war on terrorism, can be won but it's going to be neither quick nor easy, and it's going to require a lot of thought and application and persistence, a lot more balanced approach, a lot more attention to underlying causes and currents, as distinct from surface manifestations and comes easily to most of the world's policymakers. There have been a number of ways of identifying the different elements that are needed in an effective terrorism strategy, including by Kofi Annan at the Club of Madrid a few months ago. I'd characterize it – and this is my very last checklist – in terms of five P's. First of all, you need, obviously, a Protection Strategy – airline security, border protection and all the rest. It may not be very effective, but you can't not do it. Secondly, again you need, obviously no argument, a Policing Strategy. Police intelligence and ultimately, but only in very extreme and exceptional situations, military operations. The hardest issue here, of course, is getting the balance right between doing this and having possibly counter-productive and indefensible, in principle, intrusions on civil liberty. It's very hard to get that balance right, as we know. And that's an issue in its own right. The third element, on which I want to spend a little more time, is a Political Strategy. There are a variety of familiar political grievances, the occupation of Palestine and Iraq pre-eminent among them, along with foreign support for so-called apostate regimes, where these constitute a significant part of the motivations of some categories of terrorist. What you have to do is address those political grievances, not so much because it's necessarily going to impact the motivations of individual terrorists, but because it's crucial if you are going to deny oxygen in the communities in which they swim. In the case of governments, in countries where there is a strong street sentiment in favor of the political objectives in question, it's a strategy that's necessary – a political-grievance-remedying strategy – if you are to improve the will and capacity of those governments to cooperate effectively in the fight. Fourthly, you need a Peace-building Strategy. That sounds odd in this context, but it's really the same point that's been made before – all those things which are necessary to stop failed and failing states surfacing or continuing are very important in the struggle against extremism because of what we know about the capacity of those kinds of states to harbor terrorists and those who would support them. And finally, you need a Psychological Strategy designed to change the way in which people think and feel about terrorism and to remove any vestige of comfort zone around it. At the individual and group level, among those who are or would be terrorists, that psychological task is very specific: to find ways through community leadership and so on to influence their behavior. At a global level the psychological task is to get agreement once and for all, as Ghassan Salamé said, about what constitutes terrorism; to make attacks against civilians as indefensible, whatever the motivation, in the 21st century as piracy and slavery were in the 19th. The United Nations at the summit dropped the ball, unfortunately, on that issue, but it's critical to pick it up again, because the struggle against violent extremism starts with the battle of ideas. And of course it's with the battle of ideas that this Forum 2000 is overwhelmingly concerned. Over the last nine years, a great many ideas have been canvassed

around this table that have been fed into and have been influential in the evolving policy debate on conflict and violence and coexistence. We've come a long way in saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war, in that wonderful language of the United Nations. We've got a long way yet to go in saving people from the scourge of violent extremism, but that is a battle that can be won with the kind of ideas that have emerged over many years and will continue to emerge from this forum, provided of course that political leadership can be found to implement them.

• Boris Nemtsov:

Our next speaker is Mr James Woolsey. Mr Woolsey is a lawyer, a former director of the United States' Central Intelligence Agency and the Ambassador to the Negotiation of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in Vienna from 1989 to 1991. Currently, he is the Chairman of the Board of Freedom House, a trustee of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He also serves as a vice-chairman of the Advisory Board of Global Options LLC, and is a member of the board of directors of other private companies.

• James Woolsey:

In 1999, Elie Wiesel was on a panel very much like this one, which was discussing the challenges of the 21st century. And all the other panelists said, "Well, the challenges of the 21st century are going to be globalization and yadda, yadda…" Elie said, "No, the major challenge of the 21st century is going to be exactly the same as the principal challenge of the 20th century." Everyone paused, looked at him curiously. He said, "It will be 'How do we deal with fanaticism armed with power?' " He was, of course, right, as we are seeing today, and I think we should reflect – particularly along the lines of Gareth Evans's comments about the battle of ideas – on the nature of this fanaticism in the 21st century. In the 20th century, the world's democracies defeated four totalitarian movements, either entirely or largely secular in nature: Fascism, Nazism, Japanese Imperialism, and Communism. The fanaticism that we must deal with today is of a rather different character. There are three, I believe, totalitarian movements in the Middle East, and I'll focus here only on the Middle East for now. And one of them, Ba'athism, is essentially an Arab nationalist version of fascism, actually modeled after the fascist parties of the 1920s and 1930s. The other two are Islamist movements: one Shiite supporting the Velayat-e faqih in Tehran, the other Sunni. And I believe those are the reasons for this war we are in. I don't care whether one calls it a war against terrorism or extremism, but it is a long war. This war will, I believe, last for decades, not years. In Tehran, the regime is massively unpopular with the people of Iran, with the young people, with the women, with the reformers, and even with a substantial share of the Shiite clerics, because it stands at odds with the general Shiite tradition represented by Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq of quietism and separation of mosque from state. But the Sunni Islamist movement, particularly in its Jihadi form – Al Qaida and/or similar organisations, have unfortunately some roots in the history of Sunni Islam, particularly the notion of the Caliphate unifying mosque and state. That's the reason Bin Laden says 1923 was the darkest year in the history of Islam, because that was the year in which Kemal Atatürk brought down the Caliphate. But the real problem is that the terrorist movements, such as Al Qaida, share to an extraordinary degree the same intellectual – or ideological I should say –

heritage with the Wahabis of Saudi Arabia. Both the Wahabis and the Islamist Jihadis such as Al Qaida are fanatically anti-Shiite, anti-Sufi, anti-Jewish, anti-Christian, anti-female, anti-music, anti-democracy, and so on. One needs only to look at the way the Taliban's Afghanistan was governed with Al Qaida sitting close to the driver's seat and the way Saudi Arabia is governed today. So the billions of dollars, much of which we pay for by filling-up at the filling station – our small cars in Europe, large cars in the United States - much of those billions goes to Wahabi teachings in the madrassahs of Pakistan, in the textbooks being printed for Indonesian children, in the mosques of Europe and the mosques of the United States. We have here a movement which is essentially totalitarian and which represents itself as being true Islam. That is as accurate as saying that in the late 15th and early 16th century Torquemada and the Dominicans surrounding him serving Isabella and Ferdinand in that era of Spain, represented true Christianity. Torquemada burned Jews, Muslims and dissident Christians at the stake and stole their money. That is about as far from the Sermon on the Mount as it is possible to get. And I would say, similarly, the ideology of Al Qaida and the ideology of the Wahabis in Saudi Arabia is about as far from the generally just and decent teachings of Islam as it is possible to get.

Now, we have a problem here in the West and among the democracies, because we are used to struggling against totalitarian secular movements and we do not like to get into people's religions. If someone claims he is representing one of the world's great religions, we tend, at least in part, to defer. We need to stop doing that. We need to recognize the totalitarian Islamist movements, whether Jihadi such as Al Qaida, or Wahabi, for what they are, which are the underpinnings of long-term hostility, a long-term totalitarianism that must be defeated. We should probably not call this a war against terrorism. We did not call World War II in the Pacific a war against kamikazes. Kamikazes were a terrible Japanese tactic, but they were only a tactic. The underlying reality is the totalitarianism itself. Now, both Mr Salamé and Mr Evans spoke critically of the notion that the United States had intervened in Iraq. I believe there is a reasonable argument on both sides of the timing of that intervention, but the notion that one could wait for multilateralism in the form of the Security Council of the United Nations, given the close economic ties between France, Russia and to some extent China, and Saddam's Iraq, is fanciful. That support would never have come. I believe that we have to recognize the importance of what Mike Moore said last night in his remarks: Democracy is, in fact, on the march. We have moved from 20 democracies in 1945 to nearly 120 today. By Freedom House's numbers, 89 of those operate under the rule of law, another nearly 30, like say Indonesia, are electoral democracies in which there is free choice of leaders, and there are a number of other states such as Bahrain, which are governed fairly and reasonably with freedom of speech and the like even though they are not democratically elected. The number of real dictatorships in the world are down to around 40, whether those dictators portray themselves as kings or as lifetime presidents or whatever. Those dictatorships are, from an American perspective, I would say fundamentally illegitimate. This is not a new notion. It was not invented by George W. Bush. It is embodied in the Declaration of Independence. With God-given rights, we endow governments with authority in order to protect those rights. Those governments are legitimate as long as they are responsive to the people. When they become destructive of those ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish them, Jefferson wrote. We are most grateful to Beaumarchais and Lafayette for their assistance in freeing us from George III, but George III's tyranny was of very modest dimensions compared to the tyranny of Saddam Hussein.

I hope very much – we won't know for five days – that we will see, in the ratification of the Iraqi constitution, similar purple fingers held aloft as we saw on January 30th, as happy Iraqis finally, even after the bloodshed, begin to be able to govern themselves. I hope that that is what occurs. It may or it may not. But if it does occur, then all of those who have said how terrible it is that the United States and its allies have defeated Saddam Hussein and helped establish a road toward democracy and the rule of law in Iraq should at least be prepared to rethink their opposition.

• Boris Nemtsov:

Our next speaker is Anwar Ibrahim. Mr. Ibrahim is a former deputy prime minister of Malaysia. He founded the Malaysian Youth Movement in 1971 and was its president for ten years. While serving as a minister of education, Anwar Ibrahim was elected president of the UNESCO General Conference from 1989 to 1991. In 1998, Newsweek International named him Asian of the Year. He was sacked from the government on September 2, 1998, stripped of his party membership and incarcerated on 20 September on trumped-up charges. He regained his freedom in September, 2004, after acquittal by the Malaysian Federal Court. He is currently a senior associate member of St. Anthony's College, Oxford University and Georgetown University.

• Anwar Ibrahim:

I must digress a little just to express my profound gratitude to President Havel, not only for this invitation, but for his support and sympathy for all the six years I was in prison. And there are many, many other friends from the Czech Republic. I don't need to elaborate the circumstances nor the trial nor the meaning of freedom and the rule of law since you are all familiar with Kafka. But the only tragic point is that it resonates well in many countries and that should drive us with a greater sense of conviction and passion for freedom and democracy, particularly so in the Muslim world.

Now, we talk about dialogue. I think Ghassan Salamé made a legitimate point. It is not a question of a monopoly of the clerics, or ulema or the state or governments because whilst you may point out that the Muslim clerics, or ulema do not necessarily represent the Muslim masses, many of the so-called Muslim leaders, even the so-called democratically elected leaders do not necessarily represent the conscience of the masses either. So for a dialogue to be effective, it has to be at various levels. It has to be rooted in real understanding and the humility to learn. We have heard in session after session of "dialogue", but what we actually have is more of a monologue. People assume they understand and they appreciate and they tolerate, but they do not. So I think we must accept this notion. As a Muslim, living now in Washington, teaching in Georgetown, I of course have to face this sort of problem. I cannot serve and work and function freely in my country and I have, of course, to suffer in the process, particularly after 9/11, the problems and the prejudices towards Muslims generally. But still, given the option, I'm still a free man in America and not in a Muslim country. And this is the contradiction that Muslims have to address. That is why to my mind whilst we do accept the Islamophobia, the prejudices against Muslims generally, I think we need to, and probably the Honorable Prince Hassan can take the leadership, try to encourage Muslims to meet and address the single issue of governance and accountability, because our failure to do so, will be perceived then essentially as a dictate of the West. Why must we Muslims wait for Washington to espouse this agenda, when we know and we have reasons to question particularly some of the foreign policy decisions in Iraq or the issue of dispossessed Palestinians? But it is therefore paramount that we take the initiative. After all, democracy is not necessarily a Western construct. Why must we choose to be so defensive and apologetic when it comes to the need for reform, the need to ensure that we observe the rule of law and there is a serious concerted attempt to rid most of our societies of endemic corruption, abject poverty and denial of equal rights to our women? Now we need, of course, these sort of more meaningful dialogues and I think that history is a great lesson we can choose to portray the excesses, and Gareth, of course, has a masterly sort of way of comprehending and summarizing the issues and I don't intend to challenge him on that, because he has an

advantage – I was in jail for the six years when he was working, so my understanding, of course, is far more limited. But we have great histories. In my limited experience talking about just Jeffersonian ideals or quoting Tocqueville, many Muslims then ask necessarily, "Why must we choose to learn from the West and their civilization?" I have always maintained that a civilizational construct, as Ghassan has said, is not necessary to be expounded to the exclusion of others. I think we mature because we learn and respect and understand. And whatever views or values are useful there, need to be adopted. Our problem is when dealing and looking at the international scenario and the position on the War on Terror – I don't have any qualms about having to use frankly the War on Terror. I think, as a Muslim, I have to accept the fact that although there is some attempt to debunk the whole issue that this is not necessarily an issue confined to the Muslims. Yes. It is not necessarily emanating from authoritarian societies. Yes. But I think to cite an example of India is not very correct, primarily because in democratic India, you don't have this problem. It is a problem of most of the terrorist activities surrounding some of the more explosive issues, say in Kashmir, and that should not be used to counter the argument that we need to be more forceful in our agenda to promote democracy. The problem with terrorism and the mushrooming of terrorist cells is mainly due to tyrannical policies, the absence of a democratic space. You provide democratic space – this is not necessarily a total guarantee or answer to terror. I think Gareth made the point very clearly that it is more complex. It needs all possible solutions, mechanisms to be put in place, but it is the safest bet against the mushrooming of terrorist cells. I come from a region – from Southeast Asia – that doesn't have the same sort of millstone of greatness in the Arab world and I find with great difficulty that when people talk about Islam it is mainly confined to the experience of the Arab world. We are Muslims, but we are very multiracial, multireligious. The most Islamist of parties in Malaysia or Indonesia has always talked about democracy and has always opted for a democratic process. So you cannot then compare this to the experience in some other parts of the Muslim world. But what we require is, of course, a more definite, concerted effort in confining the issue of terrorism not as Islamic terrorists or Jihadis because, you know, the term used here is seen differently. Muslims in Malaysia or Indonesia who are generally peaceful do not have serious objections to the term Jihad. We talk about Jihad in education, Jihad in economic development and so there is also a problem to redefine, reconstruct the narratives and the terms used, because otherwise we will alienate and antagonize more people in the process. That is why I believe to ensure an effective battle against terror we need to confine just the terrorist cells and work on them and do not allow issues or new areas – whilst resolving the conflict in Aceh, for example – don't allow the conflict in southern Thailand to just be ignored and allow it to become a community sort of struggle. Right now, it is a small group of criminals or terrorists, but you allow an authoritarian leader or purely a security solution to a problem, you then expand it to become a community struggle. And once that happens, like in Iraq, I don't believe you are able to contain it even with the greatest military power on earth. Thank you very much.

• Boris Nemtsov:

It's a great pleasure for me to introduce our next speaker from Belorussia – Aliaksandr Milinkievich. Ten days ago, Aliaksandr was nominated as the united candidate of the opposition in the upcoming presidential elections in Belorussia. I think that this is a real hope for this country. And he is a real hope of this country. And everybody has to be very strong and brave to fight against a dictator, especially the last dictator in Europe. Aliaksandr, thank you for your brave decision and welcome to our conference.

• Aliaksandr Milinkievich:

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my pleasure to be invited to this Forum. We are talking about conflicts; we are talking about conflicts between civilizations; we are talking about conflicts between religions; we talk about nationalist conflicts. However, for hundreds of years these conflicts have not been in existence. We are historically one of the most tolerant nations; however, different conflicts emerge: conflicts between democracy and dictatorship, between freedom and dictatorship. Unfortunately, we are not able to continue with our brilliant history, because if we do not have a conflict then the dictator finds the conflict and finds the enemy. His aim is to provoke a conflict and to find the enemy. We do not have much time, so let me just illustrate what I am saying with two examples. Two months ago the European media were dealing with the issue of the Polish minority in Belarus; however, this is a conflict that has not been in existence for a long time. Why? Because the Polish minority is the most powerful minority and it is more democratic than any. The dictatorship finds the existence of the Polish minority as an excuse to provoke and to raise a conflict. Another example of a religious conflict also from my country: we have a law in Belarus that stipulates that we have a single church, one church, which is the Orthodox Church that is in fact supporting the dictator. We wanted to change this and adopt a new act on churches, the purpose of which would be to make all churches in Belarus equal. And then it results in very difficult conditions for other churches to survive. The Protestants have a major problem, or are facing a major challenge: they are losing their legitimacy and they become outlaws. They are almost illegal, or illegitimate. Based on this example, it is clear that dictatorship is provoking both internal and external conflicts. There is only one remedy for that, and this is democracy. Our struggle against our dictator for freedom and democracy is the struggle against artificially provoked conflicts.

• Boris Nemtsov:

Our next speaker is John O'Sullivan. He is an editor-at-large of the National Review, a conservative, political commentator and journalist in the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1970, he stood as conservative candidate for MP, later served as aide to Prime Minister Baroness Thatcher. He has held additional positions at the Daily Telegraph, The Times Policy Review, United Press International, and the Canadian National Post. In May 1996, he founded the New Atlantic Initiative Group. In 1991 Mr O'Sullivan was honored as a Commander of the British Empire (CBE).

• John O'Sullivan:

I'd like to join other speakers in thanking President Havel for offering me the privilege of coming here and also for setting such an example in his public life of the co-existence that we need. I should also say that I haven't myself been to prison, and for the first time I've felt – round this table – this to be a social disadvantage, but I shall endeavor to make up for it.

Let me begin by making a point that conflict and co-existence are presented in the programme, so to speak, as opposites. And yet, are they opposed categories? They certainly are if conflict is seen as violent conflict or war. But conflict, less sharply defined, is

endemic in human life. It results from the fact that there are differences between people – differences of interest, differences of belief, differences of values, of understanding, of religion, of civilization and so on. We have until recent years forgotten about these differences of religion in Europe, but they have recently come back very dramatically to remind us. Conflict becomes war and violence when it is either unrestrained or when it is suppressed. We move towards coexistence when conflict is accommodated and when it is debated and discussed. Democracy, for example, is itself an expression of conflict. It is in a sense almost the ritualisation of conflict. We see that in the House of Commons, for example. We see the attempt to accommodate differences in the new Iraqi constitution, though not perhaps sufficiently. We shall see. So, properly considered, conflict is in a way the first step to coexistence, if we handle it sensibly. What we need are the institutions and the structures in which conflict can be examined, debated and hopefully resolved. For that reason, I differ with the first keynote speaker slightly in what I took to be his rejection of tolerance. Tolerance, it seems to me, is valuable precisely because it does not depend upon mutual respect. In fact, it incorporates mutual dislike and mutual distrust. The person who is, let us say, merely tolerant is saying, "I strongly and bitterly disagree with you, but nonetheless I accept that you have a right to say the things you say and believe the things you believe." And, in a world where there are very considerable differences, I think tolerance is therefore a great unifying value. Unifying is perhaps too strong but it is a great value that prevents the emergence of violent conflict. It is the first step towards mutual respect and towards deeper forms of regard and cooperation. But it is a very necessary first step. Now, even if we accept the limited role of civilization as outlined by the first speaker as, so to speak, a reservoir on which we draw, I think it does follow from even that limited definition of civilization that conflicts will be more easily resolved and that cooperation will be more easily established within civilizations rather than between them.

So I'd like to just, in the remainder of my remarks, discuss conflict resolution within civilizations within the West, in fact. And then secondly, very briefly, discuss it between them. Obviously, there is, at the moment, a very sharp difference growing up between the two halves of the West – the United States and Europe – over certain questions. They have been, most sharply, Iraq. Secondly, the war on terror, where there's a good deal of agreement but also quite different attitudes as to how it should be developed and fought. And finally, in general, there are different attitudes to law and force between Europe and the US. As both Robert Kagan and Robert Cooper have pointed out, the United States tends to stand for a Hobbesian attitude towards force – although recently a Hobbes scholar, Noel Malcolm, reminded us that Hobbes was not, in fact, a realist in international affairs – and Europe, which stands for a more law-based approach. Now, I would like to argue briefly that the debate is not really between unilateralism and force on the part of the United States and multilateralism on the part of Europe. This is the usual formulation, but I believe it to be slightly wrong. It is an argument about the character of multilateralism. Can multilateralism work without the necessary commitment of resources, including force and the threat of force if necessary? The advocates of law and of what is called soft power, it seems to me, have to accept the words of Frederick the Great: "Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments." Their influence will be very limited indeed unless there is some military capacity behind that influence. At the same time, advocates of hard power and military force have to accept that Napoleon was right when he said that you can do everything with bayonets except sit upon them. You need both the political and peacekeeping skills to secure any peace that force may have temporarily gained. In other words, if multilateralism is to work, it must be muscular multilateralism in the final analysis. Some of the remarkable list of successes cited by Gareth Evans, it seems to me, depended precisely upon the fact that ultimately the UN was able to call upon military force as a backing for its diplomatic skills. So soft power and hard power – Europe and America – rely on each other and reinforce each other. If that is so, then Europe and the US are pursuing complementary rather than conflicting strategies in world politics, but I don't think the division of labor between the two halves of the West can be quite that stark. America can't be fighting the wars and Europe coming in afterwards to keep the subsequent peace. I think that would, in fact, create too much resentment even under a UN umbrella if the two sides were to do exactly that. Resentment would build up on both sides, and we already see anyway a very strong anti-Americanism

developing in Europe and a somewhat less strong, but to my eyes, worrying beginnings of a very sharp anti-Europeanism in the United States. So what we need here, it seems to me, is for the US to devote more resources and respect to soft power strategies. This would be, of course, in my view, in their own interests, both in this continent and also – as the recent trip of Karen Hughes in the Middle East has shown – in the Middle East as well, since the distrust of the United States there, which seems to me to be largely unfounded, nonetheless is a factor that American policy must take account of. And Europe, on its part, must be prepared to add in NATO, and not I think in separate forces, but in NATO, the additional military power and military spending that would enable it to play a bigger role in fighting the war on terror and the concomitant wars that go with it. And, by the way, we are reminded by the terrible natural disasters over the weekend, and before that by the tsunami, that military forces can save lives as well as take them and that there is more than one role for them in world politics. So I would hope that the US and Europe would move together more. And for reasons that are bad as well as good I think that there are grounds for believing that they will. I think that Iraq, which like James Woolsey, I supported and support, has nonetheless pushed the United States into accepting a larger role for the UN and for other forces in attempting to secure and stabilize Iraqi democracy, and I think that lesson has been well and truly learnt and Europeans should take account of it. Secondly, I'm afraid that continuing terrorist outrages, on this continent but not solely on this continent – we saw the recent terrible attack in Bali – will push the Europeans to take a more realistic view of how to fight the war on terror and to see that military force is a necessary element in it and an important one. So I myself think that we are going to see a movement towards greater understanding between Europe and America in how to deal with the war on terror and in general how to deal with international organisations.

Now, I'm going to try and keep my time short so I will say relatively little about the question of institutions and structures to resolve conflicts between civilizations and religions, partly also because Gareth Evans has given us chapter and verse on how international institutions have been progressively more successful in settling these kinds of problems. I think we would all agree that these institutions are imperfect and inadequate. I would add that we have to find ways of making them in a sense more democratic whilst still keeping them comprehensive, which I think is an important American point, which the Europeans don't sufficiently take account of. But having said that, they exist. They are working better than they used to and we must try to make them work better in future. But that leaves a problem, which I think we have only begun to touch upon. And that is the clash of civilizations within societies, particularly within Western Europe, as a result, in recent years of mass migration and of course of the colonial links. What is the problem here? We thought that we had begun to solve that problem by policies of multiculturalism. By making our societies welcoming to other cultures so that anybody who came here – who came to Britain, who came to Holland – would not be made to feel too foreign, would find that their cultures were given equal respect and so on and so forth. It seems to me that the events in London and Holland have disproved that approach. That is not to say that I think that different cultures should not be accorded great respect. I certainly do believe that. That element, it seems to me, is a fixed part now of Western political culture. I don't believe we are going to retreat from that, but I do think one of the great problems is that we have ceased to really believe in our own societies with any great force. The national identity of the Dutch in Holland is an extremely weak one. The national identity of the British is slightly stronger, but it is nonetheless something which has been significantly eroded in recent years and it certainly does not have the strong and emblematic quality it had, let us say, forty years ago. The United States, which I think is having more success here, is in fact a society in which the concept of being an American is still one of which people are extremely proud in the way that they used to be proud of being British or Dutch. Now, until we find a way of giving our own citizens pride in their own societies and a belief that those societies are worth defending and fighting for, and indeed in performing much lesser services for them, I don't see why we should expect people who come to those societies with strong identities of other kinds to want to become citizens in the full sense of the societies in which they have arrived. So we have to put our own psychological house in order in order for us to truly welcome others and to accept them into a national identity, which will be broad – it is now – but deep as well. Thank you very much.

• **Boris Nemtsov:**

The next speaker is from France – André Glucksmann. André is one of France's most renowned philosophers, who supported the 1960s' protest movement and opposed the communist regimes of Eastern Europe.

• **André Glucksmann**:
(speaking in French)

I will speak in French; it will benefit from the interpreting. So first the topic: what is the topic? Is it conflict or co-existence? I believe that there is some mistake here, because if we are talking about conflict, if we are talking about clash, then we are talking about hard core meetings, so to say, and I believe that "between clashes and co-existence" would be a topic for Forum 2000. I believe that we should talk about clashes and co-existence. We have to co-exist and we have to keep conflicts under control, because we must not believe that one can exist without the other. Perhaps in the next 1000 years – but now we have to bear with the conflicts and keep them silent and illuminate them to the degree possible. I would now like to leave the space for the Czech dissidents who have been thinking and talking about the issue. I believe that these are the dissidents who can help us to understand better what the current times are all about. I would like to refer to Jan Patočka, a Czech philosopher, who shows us how to treat a conflict, how to capture it. To understand a conflict you first have to understand where the front line lies; you have to have experience with the front line; you have to have experience with violence. And this was most of all the experience of the First World War: it was a major experience with conflict where killing was done on a great scale. The United Kingdom in those days was a great country, a big country, together with Germany, and we have taken the lesson that even large nations and civilizations can die in a conflict. Of course this was mostly the experience of a men in the front line, the simple soldiers. And then we had the Second World War, and that was another experience with conflict, and in this conflict everybody was involved. While in the First World War eighty per cent of the victims were soldiers, in the Second World War these were the civilians — eighty per cent of all casualties of war were civilians. And what we have in current conflicts or what we had in the Second World War is that the front line is merged with the back line, and what we see after September 11 is that everybody is involved, including the nations who possess nuclear weaponry. We were originally talking about nuclear weapons, and now we see that even people can be used as weapons. These are people who are willing to cause disasters such as was the Hiroshima bombing; it is just that they fortunately do not have the weapons yet, not in their hands. All you have to do is to blend the fanaticism that we know and that led to Auschwitz with the weapons that can be made available to them. This is the experience we should learn from when talking about combating terrorism. What we need to talk about now is how to combat deliberate aggression of people who possess weapons and who are recruited from helpless nations. I believe this is the current definition of what we are talking about, and for us to face the challenges of what the future might bring is to understand that the helpless become terrorists and the majority of their victims are civilians. That means we are not fighting army to army – these are not armies fighting against each other. This is a war against civilians.

And saying that, we must not forget the dirtiest of all disgusting wars currently running, and this is the war in Chechnya. It has been going on for the last ten years. There are not many Chechens, but if you kill one out of five you can liquidate the whole nation in a while. If you liquidate a capital that originally had four hundred thousand inhabitants, this is a disaster. It is horrible and awful. This is something that can be compared to the destruction of Warsaw in World War II. This is a morally unbearable situation. It is unbearable even in terms of political realism. I would like to greet most cordially Mr. Nemcov, who was the Lord

Mayor of Novgorod, and he was among those who protested against the launching of this war. People like him have to get all the support, because if somebody is courageous enough to speak loud and say "no", it has its weight. We must understand that we are talking about an aggressor who possesses a lot of weaponry. Chechnya is a country where oil is found, and we have to understand the war in Chechnya to understand what war on terrorism is about. Patočka, the Czech philosopher, had another concept. This is the "solidarity of the shaken". Remember the scenario in Afghanistan: the army was devastating the territory of Afghanistan, and because we did not support moderate Islamists like the commander Massood, it turned out that the Islamic extremists took power. Now the Russian army is devastating the North Caucasus and it is destroying those who are moderate, just like Aslan Maskhadov was. And all of a sudden we have people like Shamil Basayev rising from the front line. If we want another 9/11, if we want to face a disaster of Chernobyl proportions caused deliberately, then just let Putin do what he does or has been doing already. However, if we think of the future of our children, the future of the world, we have to support not the Chechen terrorists – because we have those, too – but we have to support, and we have to become passionate with the Chechen civilians back in Grozny. It is the second time in the last fifty, last one hundred years: it was Stalin who was the first to send them to the gulag camps in Siberia, and now they are being devastated for another time. This is not a lesson to be learned in Russia only. We have forgotten many other lessons that we should have learned from. In three months a million Tutsis were killed in Rwanda, and we all knew about it, and nobody did anything against it. All we needed to do was send five thousand Blue Helmets, and one million people would have been saved. I would like to remind you of another issue that will make us see that we are not talking only about the conflicts that are involving Muslims. The population that caused genocide – both those who were the perpetrators and those who were the victims, both of the parties – were Catholics, and this is something that we should not be proud of. Our government produced the resolution but took a wrong side.

I believe we should face the reality, and admit that the clashes are the end of humanity. We have withdrawn from hydrogen bombs and we have shifted to human bombs, and this is not an exclusively Muslim issue. I believe everybody can do something against it. Let me mention an example: a handful of French students organized a reception and they invited a handful of Chechen students. They invited them and they asked them to stay, to learn to be journalists. This is a very simple initiative – you just ask people to come, you offer them lodging, and you help them in this way. Of course I am talking really about a handful of people, but this is just an example of a possible small but efficient activity. If you educate people, you at the same time build a tool against terrorism. And now the people in Grozny know that elsewhere there is someone who knows about them dying, because it must be horrible to die silently, without anybody knowing that you are even dying, just like the people were dying in Rwanda, just like the people who were dying in the Second World War.

• Boris Nemtsov:

Thank you very much, Mr Glucksmann. I hope that we will discuss Chechen problems and Russian problems maybe in the future sessions. For us it's very, very painful, and I don't think that we will find a very easy and quick solution. Our next speaker is from Taiwan – Mr Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao. He directs the Centre for Asia Pacific Area Studies and he has been a presidential policy advisor since 1996. He's one of Taiwan's leading sociologists and has written widely during the 1980s on the transformation of Taiwan's social structure and political democratization, particularly the position of the middle classes. During the course of the last decade, his work has focused on environmental protest movements and civil society development.

• Dr. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao:

Thank you, Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. I don't want to add more pain on you all when someone comes from Taiwan, you probably would expect him/her to focus on something about the complex and difficult cross-strait relations and that may be a pain. Rather, I would like to use the five minutes I am allowed to spend to give you four observations on a more broader issue of the global co-existence in the context of Asia, in which the cross-strait relations is a part.

My four observations are of ironies. The first one: the conflict or tension could occur within one civilization, not necessarily only between civilizations. Look at Taiwan and China, both belong to the generally Confucian tradition. So it's not the civilization that could cause a cultural clash, rather it is the modern way of life, the philosophy of democracy and the people's choice that creates cultural and political conflict. So the conflict is not necessarily an inter-civilization one.

The second observation I'd like to propose is: conflict could also occur when one side decided to cease conflict, say, civil war. When Taiwan decides to stop the "civil war" with China, China, on other hand, determines to continue. So when one side wants to stop the long-lasting civil war, it could cause further unexpected and different kinds of tension.

The third observation is: democracy could also bring about conflict. Taiwan has gone through 20 to 30 years of democratization through the collective effort of the Taiwanese people since the 1980s, by means of social movements and political and constitutional reforms, and new democracy was finally created. And because of such new democracy, citizens can freely make their choices of their nation's future and that again caused new conflicts across the Strait.

And finally my fourth observation: the tension between Taiwan and China could exist in one aspect, yet coexistence can exist in the other aspect. The former is the political tension. Taiwan is facing a nearly 800 missile threat from China. That's a very real threat. On the other hand, the trade volume across the Strait has been increasing. So capitalist logic can work in economic relations – that means co-existence, the capitalist form of co-existence. But in the political and military relations, the tension is still there without realistic compromise in sight.

After the above ironies, I would like to share my one hope, that is, two parties should began to engage in dialogue. That's a bilateral dialogue. Unfortunately, both sides lack mutual trust and confidence and therefore there is no way the bilateral dialogue could begin soon. As Kim Campbell mentioned this morning, you cannot have a predetermined outcome in a dialogue. If one side predetermines only one option then the other side surely cannot accept. Democracy in Taiwan means people can have a collective consensus or develop a collective decision on what the future will be like and it should be an open-ended process, open to all viable options.

Taiwan therefore welcomes multilateralism to pay attention and even to engage in the cross-straits issues. We understand perfectly that the world has great interest in the market of China. We also understand that there is a realism in the geopolitical interest in Asia, in which China has played an important role. But we want to remind the world not to forget about the values of human rights and democracy in dealing with China and the relations between Taiwan and China. Certainly, we know we cannot force our friends in the international community to ignore the market interest or the geopolitical considerations, but we only humbly request not to sacrifice the universal values of human rights and democracy which Taiwan, for the last three decades, has worked so hard to achieve. Therefore, we do welcome multilateral intervention to resolve the cross-strait tension, as long as in the meanwhile such intervention can preserve the values of democracy and human rights that Taiwan has long stood for.

• Boris Nemtsov:

Our last speaker in this morning session is Prince Hassan. He's a member of the oldest Hashemite royal dynasty and a writer, philosopher and economist. Prince Hassan is President of the Club of Rome and is a member and chair of many international organisations. He's an advocate of tolerant co-existence of Islam, Judaism and Christianity and the active dialogue between these religions. His Royal Highness supports democratic processes in the Islamic world and plays a prominent role in the Middle East peace process. He's an author of several books about the Middle East.

• HRH El Hassan bin Talal:

Ladies and gentlemen, I think you've heard enough monologue about the need for dialogue. I am also a Marxist of the Groucho kind. Groucho Marx said, "military intelligence is a contradiction in terms," and with all due respect to the military – I just came from Washington where I addressed the Eisenhower Foundation and the National Defence College – I was delighted to see generals standing and saying, "We have to address the issue of conflict intelligently in recognizing the totality of the risks we are facing." So let me touch on soft power for a moment. In 1924, the eastern province of today's Saudi Arabia entered Mecca after unbroken legitimacy in a city, which is the address of Islam. Kissinger once asked, "What is the address of Europe?" Well, the address of Islam is Mecca. This line of Sharifian rule, the concept of monarchy, only entered in this century. Before that it was honor enough and it is honor enough to be a Sharif – a member of the lineage of the prophet's house. The concept of Sharifian rule was broken. Why? Because in 1918 at the Versailles peace conference – I was once told by a Turkish friend, "When there is an end to a war and there is a peace conference, it is better to be at the table than on the menu." Well my great-grandfather was on the menu. Why? Because the stubborn old man refused to allow oil concessions to British and American companies, which were conveniently offered by others, and he refused because he wanted to see a United States of Arabia.

Having said that, we Arabs comprise only 22% of the Muslim world. And yet, at prayer, a different Imam from the four schools of orthodoxy, stretching from the Shafi'iyyah in East Asia to the Malikiyyah in Northwest Africa, led the faithful in prayer. When I met Ayatollah Khamenei in 1997, he said to me through an interpreter initially, "You are the first Jordanian official I have met." I said to him in Arabic, which he then responded in, "If the black turban that you are wearing denotes your pertinence – you are a pertinent to the line of the prophet's family – then we have met over centuries of Islamic history." I am a Muslim. I am not an Islamicist. I received a degree at Queen's University in Belfast, with a Jewish chancellor in a non-denominational university and I was a Muslim recipient. And I asked my Irish friends, "Is there such a thing as Christianist terror?" I'm the only Muslim member of the Centre for Hebrew Studies at Oxford University. And in conversations with nine faith groups, – incidentally, Ghassan, I am elected as the moderator of the World Conference for Religions and Peace; a contradiction in terms, a prince who was elected, a prince who promotes civil society… I have always emphasized that the separation of church and state, of mosque and state can only come with the elevation of religious values above day-to-day politics. The Hajj is not only a pilgrimage; it is also a conference, a consultation. A consultation that should give us answers on issues ranging from stem-cell research to the war on terror and the exploration of space. Today, we have forsaken that right to the privatisers of religions – Abu-this and Abu-that, the new acronyms. The President of the United States from his high office refers to Zarqawi, who was really a street thug

in the streets of Zartar, his hometown in Jordan, and who now has gained notoriety of recognition by the President of the United States. In a region of West Asia where 35 million job opportunities have to be created in ten years, where the gap between rich and poor is so obvious – 42 billion dollars spent on weapons – with the majority of the population – 70% – under the age of 25 and effectively a Middle East region, which is described in Washington as from Marrakech to Bangladesh, we have a problem. The problem is we are the poorest, the most populous and the most dangerous region in the world. And I would like to make it clear that there is no regional responsibility, i.e. there are no regional commons. And this is why I am happy to be here today to talk about the regional community of water and energy for the human environment. To quote Shimon Peres: "With water you can make politics; with land you can make wars." And it is interesting to observe today, that some Israelis are more interested in the land than they are in the state, whereas Palestinians are more interested in the state than they appear to be in the land. Jordanians are interested in demography, first and foremost. And the individual concerns are minimalist as they stretch through Iraq. We are told by CNN that there are Sunni and Shiite Muslims in Iraq. I don't know whether I'm a Sunni Muslim or a Cloudy Muslim but I would like to make it clear that it is time that we spoke about Arab Muslims, or about the Muslims of Iraq. After all, Kurdishness, with all due respect, is an ethnicity. It is not a religion, so we are actually talking about apples and oranges.

I think the time has come to speak about the region with an institutional responsibility. There is no institutional responsibility. Prime ministers from this region do not meet. I am, according to the United Nations, an Asian Arab. Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd is an African Arab. My Israeli friend over there, according to the United Nations, is not a part of any region. He's whatever he wants to be every morning he wakes up. Although Shimon Peres tells us he would like to see a Greater Middle East or a New Middle East, I think the word that is missing in this equation is a partnership in achieving a more important goal than the promotion of nationalism. Aldous Huxley described nationalism as "a common misunderstanding of history and a common hatred for your neighbor." So what is that goal? If we are talking about religion – Ghassan, I am not talking about dialogue between religions – I am talking about dialogue in partnership for our common humanity. And that includes liberal fundamentalists, secular fundamentalists and co-religionists. Incidentally, André Glucksmann, before you feel that you are alone in speaking of the Chechen question, I am also the head of the Chechen-Jordanian Friendship Society. So when Mr Putin invites me to St. Petersburg to speak about tolerance, I say, "Only if you recognize my credentials. I want to speak about 20 million Muslims in the former Soviet space." And I think it is important to express your views and your anger, but at the same time I think it is important to engage in promoting the noble art of conversation, which is not a martial art. So our identity as Muslims today is jeopardized. Our identity as Semites is jeopardized. My friend Greville Janner and I head an organization of Muslims and Jews, who recognized the importance of working against Semiticophobia, working against Islamophobia, but at one and the same time, we and many others like us – the late Yehudi Menuhin, Walter Sisulu in South Africa, people from different worlds – recognized the importance of working for something. So I am glad to say that we have created a Parliament of Cultures in Turkey, which, with the newfound status of Turkey as a discussant with Europe, I hope will be an asset in promoting the other side of the story, not only Karen Hughes's education engagement, empowerment and exchange, but a two-way exercise. And I think that this conversation is possibly something that the Prague Forum should consider: How do we develop a communication strategy. In this room, and in similar rooms for the past several meetings, we have the nucleus of the silenced majority, not the silent, but the silenced majority. I remember the great act that attached me to this Forum when Václav Havel opened the doors and let the students in. And they told us what they thought of us. Of course, being a prince, I was a natural target. So was the head of the World Bank and the IMF and so on and so forth. However, several years later, it is wonderful to be sitting with the students, not talking down to each other or talking up to each other, but talking directly to each other.

Similarly, let us recognize that in our world, in the world of religion, which we were addressing earlier, let us invite a situation where religious authority, moral authority is re-established in holy cities – in Mecca, in Najaf and in Jerusalem. The politicization of religion for reasons of nationalism, for reasons of political opportunism is tearing us apart, and I believe that the time has come to see religious institutions reaching out – to leprosy, which was mentioned by Yohei Sasakawa. We worked in Sudan in 1985 with lepers. The "we" being Muslims and Christians together. As Gareth Evans said in one of his reports of the ICG, there are three types of extremists: proselytizers – those who try to convert, anarchists – those who try to create explosions all over the world and, according to a study of Chicago University, they are not a majority of Muslims, as it happens, or Islamicists, and the third category – those who have entered government as in the case of Turkey. But I am talking about the moral authority which is separate from all of this, which promotes initiatives which are not just 500 million dollars to the survivors of Louisiana and nothing for the survivors of the tsunami to be remembered. Not for political reasons, but for the right reasons. In this way, I think that through altruism we can mobilize the silenced majority. By empowerment, by stakeholding, by creating a true campaign against legal illiteracy, social illiteracy, political illiteracy we create citizenship from the bottom up and build democracy in the face of – as Jim Woolsey said it, and I'll say it even more directly – presidential monarchy and hereditary presidency, which incidentally is not limited to our part of the world, nor, for that matter is fanaticism limited to our part of the world, either to state actors or non-state actors. You see why I'll never join the United Nations. I want to say very clearly that the time has come to recognize, as I did the other day, standing at the Royal Court Theatre with 500 people in the theatre with the sign up "Talking to terrorists." Yes, we were talking to the representatives of what in 1981 we called the liberation movements of the world. And the purpose was? To address a racial equality index, to address the fundamental rights of humanity, to address human security – the Canadian initiative you mentioned, to address what the Dutch foreign minister raised the other day – an initiative for a Human Rights Council. To put some spirit into the Millennium Development Goals, to put anthro-policy not petro-policy at the centre of the Millennium Development Goals. And I think in this context we can talk about promoting security. I hope that you recognize the importance of the role of women. Iraq today is 62% women – 62% women – and women who are raped need to talk to women. We need to see this involvement. I thank you, Chairman, for giving me this opportunity to say a few things about how we can reverse the process of bloody co-existence and bloody conflict. In Tallburg, the question was in Sweden only a few weeks ago – the Tallberg Forum "How the hell can we live together?" And the question today is: "How can we prioritize this marketplace of ideas and egos, including my own, and come out with some practical suggestions, putting religion where it should be, putting regions where they should be, putting vested interests where they should be, and rediscovering the public good. Remember the Byzantine sophist who had written on his epitaph in the sixth century: "Il a été touché par lęamour du bien-źtre publique". As though it was the reason for his death – he was touched by the love of the public good. How many of us here are prepared to die for the love of the public good? Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

• **Boris Nemtsov:**

Thank you very much to everybody who took part in our very exciting and very important morning discussion. Fortunately, we listened to very different views on very bloody and serious subjects like terrorism, co-existence and wars. I hope that we will continue our discussions with the second and third panels.

PANEL 2: CONCEPTS OF CO-EXISTENCE AND COMMUNITY

• Mike Moore:

Free speech is a great thing, a noble thing, but even that can be abused. So I will try and be an immoderate moderator and keep folks to the time limits. I know that the contributions are printed off and distributed, if that's any comfort to you. If I speak any longer, those who are here will want to leave, so I think I should hand it over to James Zogby for his contribution on Concepts of Co-Existence and Community.

• James J. Zogby:

I actually want to begin by thanking the organizers for an invitation to participate in what I think is a critical conversation. Especially after the bombings in London the issue became very clear to us that there are problems within our societies in the West that need to be addressed and, I think, need to be understood. I was engaged in a number of discussions about the differences between the situation of Arabs and Muslims in America and what lessons there are available from that experience to the situation in Europe. And I want to address them. I speak to you – and I should say this from the outset – I speak to you in two capacities: One, I'm a scholar and a student of the history of my community. I know its history. I've polled the community. I know its demographics and I am, after all, an Arab-American. But I also speak to you as a practitioner and an activist. For more than 30 years, I've led the fight in America against exclusion – we were politically excluded – against discrimination and against threats to our civil liberties. My lifework has been gaining political empowerment for Arab-Americans.

I'm a critic of American policy, but I also know what my country does right. And that's what I want to speak to you about today. Because I believe that there are fundamental differences between the Arab and broader Muslim immigrant experience in Europe and that of the Arab-American and Muslim communities in the United States. First and foremost, America itself is different, both in concept and reality. Becoming American is a process that has brought countless immigrant groupings into the US mainstream. Becoming American is not the possession of a single ethnic group nor does any ethnic group define America. Within a generation, diverse ethnic and religious communities from every corner of the globe have been transformed into what we call Americans. Now, problems remain to be sure, and intolerant bigots periodically rear their heads, but, as American history demonstrates, the pressures of incorporation and absorption are decisive. Becoming American means more than obtaining a passport and a set of legal rights. It means adopting a new identity and absorbing a shared sense of history. This is important to understand because, while problems remain with the generation that is immigrant, first generation and second generation born in America assimilate. They intermarry and they are Americans. I am not an Arab in America. I am an Arab-American. By a strange alchemy of sorts I become transformed in the process. I'm not an exile. I'm not a separate community tolerated in America. It's my country dammit, and I am part of it. And I insist on the rights inherent in that American identity. At the same time that every new group becomes part of America, America itself and the concept of American becomes expanded and transformed. And this is important to understand. It's the way we teach our history. When I was a child in school learning about the pioneers, I was one of them. When I was a child learning about George Washington in the War of Independence, I was part of that war. And it goes to the extent whereby each ethnic immigrant and religious community then seeks a way to incorporate itself into the origins and the story of the origins of the county

so that, for example, we now know of early Arab immigrants who were part of the Revolutionary War experience or Muslims who were part of the Civil War fighting on either side, etc. I'm recalling an experience where I sat in the Oval Office at the White House with President Clinton and other ethnic leaders as he was talking about his One America effort to heal America's racial divide. Each of us were telling the story of our communities in very emotional ways – discrimination we'd encountered or exclusion or even lynchings of Italians in the South – people didn't know it – or the persecution of Italians and Germans in World War II – people didn't know the story. But at the end of it all, we became American. And as President Clinton reflected on it, he said, "You know, this collective story is the American story. It's the flaws, the blemishes, it's also the greatness of the country that we incorporate, transform and become better in the process.

Because of this unique experience, America, I think, has to be understood in a different way. The country, by absorbing these immigrants, becomes transformed, as I noted, and the complex mosaic of America becomes even more complex. Religions and ethnic organisations abound and, as each new group comes in, it finds the table set, if you will, by groups that have come earlier that create the conditions for greater diversity and greater acceptance into the country. Historically, two pressures are at work in America. There is nativism, to be sure. There is exclusion, to be sure. We've seen it across the board. Some fail to recognize the Statue of Liberty faces out welcoming new people and they want to close the door. But at the end of the day, in each period of our history when nativists have reared their head, ultimately popular majorities swing back and push the country in the direction of acceptance and tolerance. After 9/11 for example, Arab-Americans and American Muslims felt threatened by a backlash. My life was threatened a number of times, but there are people in jail today for having threatened my life, because support was immediately forthcoming. The president spoke. A huge majority of Americans spoke out as well. Coalitions were formed defending our rights. Even when law enforcement overextended itself, other factors in law enforcement came forward and said, "You cannot do this. It's not our way." Today, I believe Arab-Americans and American Muslims are better respected, better protected and in many ways better recognized as communities. It became the measure of patriotism to defend Arab-Americans and American Muslims after 9/11. On the same note, its important recognizing the earlier contribution made by Arab-Americans to the newer immigrants who are coming to the country. We have formed strong organisations. We have provided social services. We have paved the way for the more recent immigrants, many of whom are Muslim, so that they find their way in America. Now, there is a notion among some that there is a kind of Muslim exceptionalism that Christian Arabs could find their way in America but Muslims can't. It's simply not true. Our polling data does not indicate that at all. Muslim Americans born in America have the same intermarriage rate as Christian Arab-Americans. 97% of Muslim adults contribute to charities that are non-Muslim, would vote for candidates who are non-Muslim and live in neighborhoods that are mixed. We don't live in ghettoes. The tragic reality of America is that ghettoes do exist, but the ghettoes that exist and the underclass that exists pre-exists, predates our immigration to America. Tragically, America has a problem of an underclass. It's black, it's Hispanic, and our immigrants from the Middle East and South Asia have come to America and, like every other immigrant group that's come – and I say tragically and unfortunately – ends up skipping in line ahead of that pre-existing underclass of African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans. And so the road to economic progress in America is simply paved with the hard work of ethnic immigrants who have come and succeeded.

There are those who suggest, for example, that the reason why Arab and Muslim Americans do better than their counterparts in Europe is because it was poorer immigrants who came to Europe than those who came to America. Simply not true. I give you the example of the Yemenis, who came as farm workers in California only 25 years ago. They were working in the dirtiest and poorest paid jobs in the country and today they dominate the small business market in California and several other communities around the country. They have been able to use their entrepreneurial skills to rise very quickly, in less than 20 years, out of the farm fields and into small business enterprise and their kids are now in universities across the country. We do not remain in the lower socio-economic strata

because we find that opportunities for enterprise abound. Within a few decades every one of the immigrant communities that have come have worked their way into that kind of process toward incorporation into America. None of this should suggest that we don't face discrimination, that we don't share deep frustrations with American foreign policy and have real concerns with threats to our civil liberties. The difference is that, because we're Americans, we voice concern with these policies as citizens not as aliens. I was in a debate after 7/7 with some young Muslims in Britain and was struck by the fact that they kept referring to the "Blair regime." I don't like George Bush. I didn't vote for George Bush. He's not my president and I don't agree with him on much, but he is *my* president. He is the president of the American people and I will oppose his policies, but as a citizen of America I oppose his policies.

And I think that therein lies some of the difference. Our generation born in America sees themselves and knows themselves to be participants in a democracy. We don't see ourselves as alien outsiders to the process and therefore talk about the government as if it were some foreign government. Our generation born in America assimilate and wear American clothes. They don't go in the other direction. After 7/7, for example, it was amazing how the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice reached out and brought us in to regular meetings that we have been having since 9/11, but we continued then even more intensively on how could we work more closely together. The Democratic Party leadership invited us in. The Republican Party leadership invited us in. The Senate invited us in to a meeting with the Senate and then included more senators than usually gather on the floor to have a debate on an issue. They wanted to talk. They wanted to learn. The FBI has formed a committee of Arab-Americans and Muslim Americans to advise it on working with the community. There is an association of Arab-Americans in the military. There is an association of Arab-Americans and Muslim Americans in police departments across the country. The fact is that we are not on the margins. The extremists in our country are on the margins. Arab-Americans and American Muslims are not. We've learned to deal with the extremists. We've learned to ostracize their elements from our community. 9/11 simply made our resolve all the more intense. We've done this. We've done it and not been silenced as political constituencies, sharply critical of the policies of our government, but nevertheless we do it as citizens. It's tribute, I think, to the viability and self-confidence and openness of the American process. And I think that therein lies the difference. Thank you.

• Mike Moore:

Well, thank you very much. The most difficult thing in politics is to make a short speech of five minutes. It takes a real professional to hone an argument up to capture it in five minutes. So, I am turning to a real professional – a former prime minister of Canada, who will show us how it's done. Kim, in five minutes…

• Kim Campbell:

You'll notice how Michael has manipulated the inherent competitiveness among politicians, setting a standard that I hope I don't fail to meet. I'll be very brief if I can. Simply picking up from Jim's excellent address, Canada has a slightly different model. Canada and the United States as well as the Dominions, particularly Canada and the United States, are countries built on immigration, so

we have had to think a lot about the concepts of community and of co-existence within our own countries. Canada, in fact, per capita takes many more immigrants than the United States. We take about 1% of our population every year. When I was a young girl, many of the immigrants were from Western Europe. In fact, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, 80% of the people living in Canada had, in fact, been born in Britain. Three of those were grandparents of mine. So the origins of Canadian immigrants has changed dramatically, particularly since World War II, and therefore the challenge of integrating immigrants has grown great since one can't even assume that there will be Western European languages that perhaps have a greater affinity to English, and there are color bars, etc. that rear their heads.

But let me just say that the Canadian model of co-existence and creating community has been a little different from the American. We talk about the "Canadian mosaic" rather than the "melting pot." I think in 1985 or 1981, Nathan Glaser and Daniel Moynihan edited a book called *Ethnicity*, in which, in their opening essay, they speculated on why ethnicity had remained such a salient factor in both Western and at that time Communist Bloc politics notwithstanding, that both ideological foundations anticipated the disappearance of ethnic identities. And their argument was that, certainly in the United States, ethnic groups were very useful in countries that were dispensing goodies, because they were large enough to have some impact on public policy but small enough so that each member could get some portion of the benefit. Classes, they argued were too big for this, but that was why ethnic groups made good lobbying groups. But also they pointed out that, even in the concept of a melting society, not everybody is equally meltable. If you came to a society that was dominated by White Anglo-Saxon Protestants, it was easier to melt as a Polish Catholic than to melt as somebody of color or as somebody of a much different religion. And so they argued that the idea of the melting pot was good, but that not everyone is equally meltable, depending on how different they are from the dominant standard.

The Canadian constitution also has, as an interpretative principle, the recognition of the multi-cultural heritage of Canadians and that, for example, was the provision that was used to strike down laws prohibiting Sunday shopping. In other words, where the court argued that the laws had to be interpreted in the light of the fact that not all Canadians were White Anglo-Saxon Protestants, as was the majority of the group that, in fact, founded English-speaking Canada or white, French-speaking Catholics, as was the other founding group, not to mention our aboriginal people. Canada has done some interesting and creative things to try and draw our diverse immigrants into the mainstream. Canada is a constitutional monarchy. The Queen's powers are exercised by the Governor General, who is a distinguished Canadian appointed for a term of five years. And each province has a Lieutenant Governor, who serves the same purposes at the provincial government level. Canadian governments have for some time now used that role as a way of broadening the mainstream. The Governor General who was my Governor General when I was Prime Minister was the first Canadian of Ukrainian origin to be Governor General of Canada. Recently, the Governor General who just retired was a woman born in Hong Kong. There was a Hong-Kong-born Lieutenant Governor in British Colombia. There was a black Lieutenant Governor in Ontario. There have been a number of women. There have been native Indians. There have been Métis. So that position, which is one of great distinction and which embodies the ceremonial representative quality of our state, has been invested in people of different backgrounds in order to paint the picture of a Canada that is, in fact, a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, many-hued country.

It is also interesting, I think, in comparison with the United States that in Canada, and I think we are more like New Zealand in this way, that a major national ceremony without significant representation and participation of first nations, of native Canadians, would be unthinkable. That is an integral part of how we publicly manifest who we are as Canadians. Now does that mean we don't have racism and discrimination? No it doesn't. We are a society that deals with these challenges like any other. But it is a slightly different approach from the melting pot approach taken in the United States. I would argue that much of the racism is found in cities. Certainly,

the public-opinion research in Canada shows that Vancouver and Toronto have a fair amount of racism because they are the cities, they are the major centers for receiving immigrant communities. Racism is very much linked to perceptions of crime. And again, where you have groups who come into a society and have a difficult time adjusting and do meet discrimination, you often get a vicious circle in that they are young people who become alienated. They gravitate towards crime or social unruliness, and this reinforces the sense of others that these are people not playing by the rules. And I would argue that the sense of playing by the rules is one of the most important factors that leads the broader Canadian population to be welcoming of new immigrants.

Finally, I would say one of the interesting things about Canada and the United States is that Canada is a much less religious country than the United States. It used to be just the opposite. Canadians were more church-going. But it is very much reversed –Canadians are much less formally religious. But I would argue that there is a very powerful public ethic in Canada. I, as a product of the Scottish Enlightenment, reject wholeheartedly the view that religion is the foundation of morality. I think you are often hard pressed to have morality in the face of religion, because I think religion is very much based on power. And, although there are many wonderful teachings in organized religions, I think it is quite wrong to say that they are the basis of morality. I believe, as the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, that the foundation of morality is fellow feeling. Somebody was speaking last night – Mr Sasakawa – was talking about the golden rule: "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you" and the version of that that appeared in President Havel's Christmas card. I think that capacity for empathy and fellow feeling is by far the more important foundation of morality, and I think you find that in Canada. I think Canadians have a public healthcare system because they believe it is absolutely unconscionable for anyone to be impoverished by illness. It is not your fault. Whatever problems we have with this system, it is a part of what I would call the Canadian ethical value. What that means also is that, because we are a less formally religious country, I think we find it easier to tolerate religious diversity. And this is a change in our history because it used to be a very Christian country, dramatically Catholic in Quebec, dramatically Protestant in most parts of English-speaking Canada. That is much less the case. And I think that is both an effect of immigration, an effect of modernization, and also a cause of making it possible for us to integrate more people into our society. And I think I will end at that, which is simply to say that the countries of North America, particularly the two that I know well – Canada and the United States – have two quite different approaches to integrating very diverse populations and perhaps the difference that we find most from Europe, which is facing big struggles now, and I don't want to paint us in too fair a color – but by mid - 20th century it was always assumed that those who landed on our shore would become citizens, would become part of our country. The notion of guest workers or people who were just passing through was not part of our concept. Therefore, whether we liked it or not, we had to force ourselves to overcome the fear of the other and begin to define our national identity, as I said, as many-hued, many-faced and of many different origins.

• Mike Moore:

Thank you very much for that contribution. I've served on a commission on migration that gave a report to the UN last week and the Canadian example is very interesting. Canada is one of the few countries in the world where the minister of immigration can be under pressure in the parliament and under pressure from public opinion because he or she failed to get enough migrants. In most of our societies, the minister is under pressure for bringing too many people in. So, as much as I hate to say it, there's a lot we can learn from Canada. Now we have a contribution from the Deputy Minister who serves in the Prime Minister's office in Israel – Michael, your five minutes, please

• Michael Melchior:

Thank you very much. As I was until this morning under the impression that I was speaking on the first panel, I'll try to combine the two without the five minutes becoming ten minutes. First, I would like to say something on the issue very much combined with what Ms Campbell said about the mosaic. We created an organization in Israel called Mozaika, which is exactly this concept, and I think it's also relevant for Israeli society. As you know it's a society of immigrants from many countries and also a society with a considerable Israeli-Palestinian, mostly Muslim, population. I'm talking about inside the borders of 1967, where we have a population of 20% Israeli-Palestinian Arabs, out of whom 16.5% are Muslim and the rest are Christian or Druze. We have very intensive civil society working on integration and fighting any kind of discrimination, which exist in our society, and redefining the kind of what I believe should be, the model of a debate on what exactly should be the Israeli model. I believe it should be a model of autonomous communities with not only full personal rights and liberties but also with cultural and religious rights and liberties which will, I hope, create a kind of model mosaic, which – especially in the day when we will have peace with our neighbors and have borders, which both we and our neighbors need. It will have that kind of respect. It will be, of course, much easier to build on this inside Israeli society.

One of the conflicts, which is coming up and which is today very central in our society in Israel, is again the religious-secular split, which is not only a cultural identity conflict, but also has to do with the issues of foreign policy and internal policy and relations with our neighbors. And it's becoming more and more dominant in these years. It's interesting that some of us participated a couple of weeks ago in the Clinton Global Forum. I was there and had the honor of being on the panel with Madeleine Albright. She said all the things which I thought I was going to say, which was quite interesting. She said that she had been wrong all the eight years as Secretary of State, when she thought that religion belonged only to the private realm or to the realm of communities and not to the public realm. The issue, of course is as I have been trying to say for many years, that the force of religion, the manipulation of religion, the dark forces, which are in religions – and I say this as an orthodox rabbi – the potential of the slippery slope down to hell – is there in all religions. And they are there. Those forces are there. And if, as policymakers, both inside our community and also in our societies, we don't become inclusive towards the moderate elements, which I believe are the dominant elements in all the big religions, if we don't include them, if we don't take them as part of the peacemaking process, of the legitimacy of the other, of the civilizations, of the dialogue, education first of all, culture, if we don't become inclusive, then the chances that the totalitarian forces – the terrorist who says I'm a terrorist therefore I am – will be the dominant forces, which we again, through media and other ways, reinforce and empower and all the moderate forces will be put aside. I'm saying this after a long experience, not only conducting intensive dialogue, but working intensely on finding new methods together with Muslim leaders all over the Middle East – combined Jewish, Christian and Muslim leaders – not only going to international conferences and saying niceties about how our religion is all about peace and then going back home and killing each other, but putting up practical programmes and goals for how we can change our reality, and it can only be changed if there is an inclusiveness towards the cultural religious element. This is, for my part from my analysis, the main failure of the Oslo process – that it was not inclusive towards this element, that the people-to-people work was all people who were talking to the converted – the left-wing of Israeli society with the left-wing of Palestinian society. It was icing – nice and beautiful. I participated in much of it and you always feel good – but it made no impact and no change whatsoever. And nobody in the international community or amongst many of our own opinion makers really wants to touch this issue. Because it's complicated, it's multifaceted, there are no guaranteed results and therefore we just ignore it, but things don't always disappear just because you ignore them.

We have to realize that we are today in a situation where those who want to turn the Israeli-Arab conflict, both inside our societies and between our societies, into an aspect of the overall clash between civilizations, they are working on a very fruitful ground, because there is no serious investment, thought, work, human investment in creating the alternative. The good news is that there are people there that we have created together with leaders in many of the Arab countries, together with the Palestinian religious leadership and the Jewish Israeli leadership. We have created some new models of dialogue and education in working with schools and reinterpreting or finding the real interpretations of holy texts. There is a beginning of a will to do something serious about this. And, as most of the people in the Middle East define themselves as people who are religious and traditional and look towards religion as their main source of identification and legitimization, you cannot keep on going and think that you can ignore this. So Madeleine Albright's new book, which I hope you will all be reading when it comes out, called *The Mighty and the Almighty*, will be a model for what I hope will be a new kind of inclusiveness so that we don't have the totalitarian elements in all of our civilizations - and these totalitarian elements exist inside everyone of us – but that we can reinforce and invest and really think about how not only a dialogue can be created, which is important for two people who live so close and know absolutely nothing about each other, which is a major flaw because it provides a good breeding ground to all the misconceptions and stereotypes. And we can create, not only a dialogue, but a joint cooperation on the major issues which are on our table and I know of nowhere better than to begin with this in an atmosphere of what we started in the Alexandria summit meeting, which we had three years ago, where all the top leaders of the Holy Land came together in a total commitment that we will not let religion anymore be manipulated to the purpose of destructing what God has created: first of all, human beings. And with this joint commitment I think that we have a basis for doing our work and creating a much better century.

• Mike Moore:

Very good, thank you. We're lucky now to have a senator from the Czech Republic, Karel Schwarzenberg.

• Karel Schwarzenberg:

Ladies and gentlemen, we were just introduced to the situation in the New World, which of course, with a few exceptions, is characterized by a society created by immigrants. In Europe, the problem is another one. If you look at Europe as a continent, one could say it's a continent composed of minorities. Whatever your name is, we are all minor nations, different religions spread around the continent, and hardly anyone can say he's a definitive majority. Of course, there are two aspects. One is the traditional spectrum of living together between different ethnic groups, religious groups and so on. And, of course, then we face the problem which has risen after World War II, especially in the last 30 years when we have quite different minorities; migrants from the Caribbean, from North Africa, from Turkey and so on, which are of course a bit differently structured and that is the cause of many problems. Not that the European nations would have been so perfect in the past to live really well with the minorities. Especially the history of the 19th and 20th century is more or less a proof how after centuries of living together, one more or less successfully tries to kill, exterminate or chase away the minority you have living inside your own nation.

Nevertheless, if we look at it with a cool eye, from a historical point of view, we have to consider one thing. A nation like a state, too, is nothing eternal. Like everything human, it comes and goes. And only in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century did people start to think that the nation is an eternal God-given thing. It isn't. It's a human work, which develops, rises, fades, dies out, disappears or sometimes appears again. And that is what we should have in mind looking at this problem. And of course in Europe there were places of tolerance and respect, and places where it was always very difficult.

A very interesting proof I had a fortnight ago when I was in Afghanistan. There were elections there and we duly watched how they went, which was very interesting. Among the eight of us was a very efficient girl, a lady from Poland. And some of my colleagues approached her, the Pole, presuming that she naturally was Catholic. She said, "No, no, I'm a Muslim." And I had to explain to all my colleagues that for centuries, actually for many centuries, there is a Muslim minority in Poland, which has always considered itself Polish, has always been Muslim and has been respected by the surroundings and they have lived together and one of them is now – thanks to her double experience of living in Poland and Europe for centuries, and being a Muslim – bringing her experience to Afghanistan.

If we look at the history of minorities in Europe, we have to realize one thing: As a rule just the difference of ethnic origin, just the difference of religion, just the difference of language isn't reason enough to become explosive. It may have caused problems in history, in the past and even in the last decades, but these problems were possible to be solved. Really, a kind of nitro-glycerine in the inter-relationship came only when there was a national or religious conflict, or both of them or different, or a social dimension was added. Whenever you see especially bloody conflict, the worst in the world, you realize that one of the groups considered itself, by right or not, – it's not the theme of this panel – to be the underdogs and the others considered themselves naturally superior. And, if the material conditions worsened, that led to the worst conflict. So, if it's a social problem alone, you can somehow work with it. If it's a national or religious problem alone, one can work with it. A combination of the two or three, as it was, for instance in Bosnia, that is a really terrible situation and is very hard to solve.

We had of course ghettoes in Europe too. But it was not a rule. The word ghetto itself, as you know, comes from Venice and it was a Jewish quarter of Venice, which first had a wall around it. And then this expression, together with a wall around the Jewish quarters, spread in the Middle Ages throughout Europe. But that was more a specialty of the Jewish minority in different European nations. There were European nations who in the past expelled their Jewish minorities, sometimes killed them too. But these ghettoes existed in many places all over Europe. Then, there were numberless minorities where ghettoes never really did exist, but we have to realize they are appearing in a new appearance, not in the strict way of the old ghetto – behind a wall or in a town of its own – but in more or less the New World sense and that is – again especially throughout Central-Eastern Europe – the ghettoisation of Roma minorities. In the 20th century different regimes, if they didn't try to kill them, they at least tried to force them to give up their nomadic way of life and to force them to become part of the modern industrial process. It led exactly to the same result as the black and Puerto Rican communities of the United States. The ghettoes with exactly the same problems and results developed out of it. That means that again the prejudices of our dear phobias is not in the ethnicum, it's in the way a minority is treated, which leads to a ghetto, and with the same results of a ghetto which are, as a rule, tragic as for those inside as well as for those outside the ghetto. I do think that some of the experience of Europe with our old minorities should be applied to the experience with new minorities. One tends to see them in Europe in a different way, but basically they are very similar social problems and the only solution to it is something that was mentioned already in the morning: mutual respect. Not tolerance, but real mutual

respect. That respect requires two things: One, we shouldn't force and ask for assimilation. A more or less homogenous group has a right to live more or less according to their own ideas and lifestyle, according to the traditional way if they wish to. And, on the other side, the liberty of assimilation. That means that we must give the new minorities as to the old, whenever they wish to assimilate – in various ways and in various grades – this way has to be open to them. That's the only way we can prevent producing, at least, new conflicts. Because only if we respect people as they are and not respect them in the way we wish they would be – but if we respect them in the way they are, they feel respected, too. And so I emphasize, we shouldn't enforce by different laws and rules, how they should be dressed or behave and so on, – enforce the assimilation and on the way to prevent the ghettoisation, when the group itself forces its own member out of the majority society. So it's respect – which means, of course, liberty on both ways.

• Mike Moore:

Thank you, Senator. You remind us that we're all each other's neighbors. I was just thinking of a quote – I think from 1938 – of Neville Chamberlain, who said, "Czechoslovakia is a distant land of which we know very little." Now we're blessed to have the viewpoint of an Egyptian friend, Professor Abu-Zayd.

• Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd:

I would like to start with some aspect which I think is absent from the discussion. People co-exist, but they are unable to co-live together and part of the problem is the problem of identity. When identity is a crisis, people are unable to live together. When identity is constructed in a way of looking at the other as another – absolutely another identity – then we have a problem. And I think we are dealing with this problem of identity in the whole world. It's not a crisis of Muslims; it's a crisis of the old nations. There are so many questions about the European identity. Well, if there is a unified European culture with its multiplicity of languages, what of the European identity? Is the European identity open to Turkey, for example? Why yes and why no, if the answer is yes or the answer is no? So we have to deconstruct the concept of exclusive identity. Who I am and who you are. Well who am I if I ask myself this question? I am an Egyptian, yes. I am an Arab, yes. I am a Muslim, yes. But as Hassan reminded me I am an African, which is true. But in what sense am I a Muslim? In what sense am I an Egyptian? In what sense am I an Arab? So should we look for something like the hyphenated identity like the American identity – Arab-American, Italian-American, Japanese-American? There is a definition that brings together so many elements of identity. This is very, very important, because I was about to talk to you about people who were happily living together – well, not happily 100% – but almost happily living together in Spain, in Andalusia, from the 8th century to the 15th century. People from Judaism, Christianity and Islam and people from no religion – pagan religion – who were living together and they produced a very, very rich culture in terms of philosophy, theology and literature. This culture was handed down to Europe in the Dark Ages of Europe. This was an example where identity at that time was not a very important demand. The Arabs identified themselves as Arabs, not as Muslims.

Well, whatever the reasons for this identity crisis are, I'll just give you an anecdote. A Dutch boy in a Dutch school returned back to his family in the month of Ramadan. And he just announced to the family that he made a decision to observe Ramadan. And they asked him why. He said, "Because I'm a Muslim." And they asked him, "Why are you a Muslim?" He said, "Because I'm an Egyptian." His father is Egyptian, but not a Muslim, a Copt Egyptian – a Christian Egyptian. Where did this child get this identity? From the school. Because he is from inter-marriage, he was treated in the school as a Muslim. Therefore he internalized this identity and tried to act according to this identity. Identity, nowadays, is a crisis, a problem. I would say that it is a poison. And we need to reconstruct or deconstruct this identity in order to open up. What is the problem of young Muslims in Europe? And let me answer from my observations and from my discussions with some young Muslims. I am a teacher. I do nothing but teach, and do research and publish books. The discussion is this: Moroccans, for example, young Moroccans don't belong to Morocco any more. This is the third generation. They know about Morocco, they visit Morocco, but they don't feel they belong there. This is not the country they would like to live in. They don't belong to Holland as well, although they have been in Dutch schools. So the feeling of belonging is absent. And, when you lose this feeling of belonging, you have to hold on to something that is untouchable and invulnerable. And here comes religion. Here comes Islam as an identity. And this is the story of the boy who killed van Gogh. We have to be very aware of this crisis of identity. How it has now become a crisis for the third generation in Europe. It is not only Islam, as we would understand it or as scholars would understand Islam, but Islam as it is presented – the Islam of power. And the Islam of power is the Islam of terrorism. So, some of them at least can identify themselves with the heroes, and with the discussion. One occasion was very, very remarkable. It was November and the Erasmus Foundation had decided to give three prizes to three Muslim scholars. The celebration was in Amsterdam two days after the assassination of van Gogh. So this again, Europe – the enlightened Europe – is preparing to celebrate three Muslim thinkers: one from Iran, one from Syria and one from Morocco. And, in the meantime, a Moroccan-background Dutch boy killed a Dutch artist. The question of identity as it became a crisis should be in the heart of our concerns nowadays… I myself feel I am a citizen of the world. I'm an Egyptian. I still hold an Egyptian passport. I'm living in Holland. I spent five years in Japan. So I cannot really identify myself in a very simple way. But anyway, considering myself a citizen of the world, I belong to this world and I feel deeply, emotionally and sentimentally hurt when I hear someone anywhere saying "our values," "our cultures," talking about the Muslim world, "They would like to destroy our values." And I question them: "These are not your values. These are the human values. The human values that accumulated from very early, from the Spartacus revolution until Nelson Mandela." So all cultures have contributed to what we think of now as the Western values. They are the human values and we need to readdress these values as human values.

• **Mike Moore:**

Thank you… extremely good. We now have the ambassador of the Netherlands to the Czech Republic.

• **Ida van Veldhuizen-Rothenbücher**:

Thank you very much, Mr Chairman. I would also like to thank Professor Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd for his thoughts about the identity. As Professor Hamid Abu-Zayd already said, in the Netherlands it is now nearly a year since Theo van Gogh was assassinated and everybody in the Netherlands, but also outside the Netherlands, is asking himself or herself "Why in the

Netherlands?" – a country so much known for its tolerance and freedom of religion. Since then, we have started a discussion. We have already devised some programmes, and I would like to share with you the basic points of the discussion. There are three elements, all of them connected with each other.

The first element is freedom. The freedom to express your opinion, a cornerstone not only for the Netherlands society, but I think, for all democracies and legal order. In the Netherlands it is one of the fundamental human rights embedded in the constitution. The protection of this freedom in the Netherlands means no tolerance for any kind of threat by persons or groups directed towards those fundamental rights. In our society, although it may sound like "an open door", there should be room for persons with different opinions, different views, different religions and different lifestyles. In the Netherlands we are very much aware of that. A difference since the day of the assassination of Van Gogh is, I think, that before that time, we took all those elements for granted. But now, afterwards, we are aware of the fact that we have to discuss it, to talk about it. Especially about tolerance.

The second point is security. To be able to implement and to enjoy freedom, measures have to be taken in case the secure environment of peaceful living together will be threatened. Measures for threats of terrorism as well as for intolerant reactions to that. "Protecting tolerance from intolerance" as we call it. This is not only a national problem, but a border-crossing problem. Asking for more European and international cooperation, which sometimes means – and I think this is an element which up till to now did not come into the discussion here today – that we have to endure limitations in the field of our personal privacy and we should be aware of that. At the moment this is a very vivid topic in the discussion in the Netherlands.

Finally the third and last element: the permanent dialogue. A dialogue amongst the citizens – and I stress the citizens – on respect for human rights and the necessity to integrate. Also on taking care – another important point – that young people don't turn to radicalism. And it has already been mentioned by James Zogby, that citizenship is more than holding a passport only. True citizenship calls for a positive participation in the society one is part of, again based on respect and tolerance for other persons. An exchange of views via such a dialogue is necessary and – it has been mentioned by Mr Ghassan Salamé this morning – also the willingness and readiness to have your own opinion or part of it sometimes changed, if necessary. To maintain the dialogue a careful choice of words is also important, I think, even if you have the full freedom of expression. We should not talk about each other but with each other. We must try to find and maintain the right balance between this freedom of expression on the one hand and the responsibility on the other hand. In a permanent dialogue based on respect and tolerance there should be room "to agree to disagree" without violent acts and threats of terrorism. That dialogue is now in the Netherlands introduced by new programmes for immigrants already living in the Netherlands and new persons coming from abroad. More places will be created where people with different backgrounds can start dialogues and learn from each other and - very important - about each other.

My last, very personal remark, Mr Chairman, is, that we don't have to forget to integrate the youth in this important discussion. Because some of them will be the leaders of tomorrow, but certainly all of them will have to be responsible citizens.

• Mike Moore:

Finally, we have Mai Yamani from the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

• Mai Yamani:

Ladies and gentlemen, Islam has changed. What it means to be an Arab also has changed, swept by Islamism and globalization. There is a real struggle going on over defining people's identities, as Professor Abu-Zayd has just said. Islam has undergone turbulent fragmentation and self-questioning. So Arabs almost naturally feel themselves besieged and look for ways of escape. But to quote Einstein, "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them." Arab or Islamic identity is in reality, suffocated and inflamed by incompetent dictators who have cloaked themselves in the veil of Islam to cover their fear and lack of legitimacy.

I would like to offer my experience as an Arab Muslim on an intellectual mission to reveal and defend the idea of vibrant diversity within the Arab world, a diversity that is under constant threat of suppression. Perhaps it will be illuminating if I offer myself as a case study. I see my identity as an Arab Muslim, Saudi-Iraqi woman of Yemeni origin, born in Cairo and brought up in Mecca, the capital of the Hijaz, which is today Saudi Arabia. My life was changed, as I began my studies in social anthropology at Oxford University 30 years ago. Although I originate from Mecca, once the melting pot of the Muslim world, the ethnic and sectarian diversity has been increasingly suppressed by the Saudi Wahabi rulers. This repression of Mecca stood in stark contrast with my Oxford experience. At Oxford, and in the world of ideas, I encountered a deeper awareness and understanding of cosmopolitan cultures. As intellectuals, we celebrate our differences. As I began my scholarly career, Saudi Arabia intensified its religious dogma in the late 1970s. School curricula became heavily Islamic. Radio and television programmes carried more Wahabi Islamic messages and members of the official committee of the ordering of the good and the forbidding of the evil – the Matawah a sort of a KGB – were unleashed on citizens with renewed vigor. They patrolled the streets of the kingdom searching for sin. Sins were never hard to find. Ideas of Arab renaissance were waning and in their place a new wave of Islamic assertiveness and defensiveness was not only growing in Arab countries but spilling dangerously to the outside world. At King Abdul Aziz University, I was the first Saudi Arabian woman to lecture, of course to women, in the women's section of the university. I arrived with overflowing enthusiasm to introduce ideas of respect and cultural diversity. I provided the books myself. Although so many of my female students responded to these exciting, exotic concepts, official censorship was stifling and the compulsory veil became heavier and heavier, both physically and emotionally. So I returned to Oxford in search of academic freedom and the opportunity to study my own background without fear of censorship. After completing my D.Phil., I continued research in Saudi Arabia. The more I researched, the more I established connections with the country's minorities – the Shia in the Eastern Province, who are alienated and discriminated against, the Hijazis whose cultural identity is suppressed. The books that I wrote – *Changed Identities: the Challenge of the New Generation in Saudi Arabia,* and *Cradle of Islam: the Hijazi Quest for an Arabian Identity* – breached the official lines of censorship. My books became banned and so was I.

So I'm an example of how academics and politics came into confrontation, but the study and search goes on. My mission of defending cultural dignity and freedom of expression continues. Only when Arab communities adopt this as their mission will it stop feeling besieged and gain the self-confidence to participate as full members of our globalized world. That is our choice. That is our only hope.

• Mike Moore:

Don't you get the feeling that we are just beginning a useful conversation and dialogue? And now we have to stop. I'm enormously disappointed. I think the contributions are extremely good and we were just beginning to get there, to raise the questions of what do you do with a society, where you have new family members of your country, who despise the very societies they live in. This is the problem of some of our European friends. And then, of course, what do we do in the ancient societies that seem to have allowed history to bypass them and are regressing. And, as they regress, there is always compounding regression and aggression. And I do want to pay tribute to the panelists. I do want to recommend to the organizers that we should do this again, but find a way of allowing more conversation and more dialogue, which means next time they need to get a better chairperson. Having said that, we're on time to finish. Thank you very much colleagues.

SPECIAL SESSION ON AFRICA

• Oldřich Černý:

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure for me now to introduce to you the Chairman of the next panel which is the panel on Africa. Mr Sasakawa is the Chairman of the Board of the Nippon Foundation, he is a renowned Japanese philanthropist and as some of you know, together with Elie Wiesel and Václav Havel, he is one of the founding fathers of the Forum 2000. Mr Sasakawa has been very involved in Africa for over 20 years. He was involved in many projects dealing with food, hunger and public health. One of his major concerns was - and still is - the eradication of leprosy. He was recently appointed WHO Goodwill Ambassador for Leprosy Elimination. He has visited Africa countless times and he was involved in Africa many, many years before it became such a hot topic as it is today. Mr Sasakawa, I am glad that you are here with us today and that you are willing to share your vast experience in this particular field.

Yohei Sasakawa: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for joining us today for this special session on Africa. Through my work at the foundation tackling such issues as agriculture and the public health, I have visited more than 20 countries in Africa in the past 20 years. I have gained opportunities to observe actual situations. Africa has become a special and a most intimate place for me. Since the second half of the 20th century, the international community and especially aid organisations have made exhaustive efforts to support the development of African nations. Their work has been conducted under such banners as "The Dawning of the African Age." People engaged in African aid have always worked out new strategies and worked diligently toward a new day. I believe that the efforts of these people, built up over time, have proven to be a great asset to the solving of Africa's problems. In spite of the continued effort, however, Africa today is still grappling with many problems such as poverty, hunger, illness, a lack of infrastructure and civil wars. It will remain difficult for some time for Africa to solve these problems alone. Africa still requires aid and the international community is constructing plans to deal with this need.

At present, we are witnessing a positive new trend in the efforts made by developed countries and international organisations such as debt reduction and an increase in the Official Development Assistance toward developing nations. There is no doubt

that these measures will become a tailwind to enhance development and the poverty alleviation efforts by African nations. However, frankly I'd like to ask one question to those of you who are directly involved in African support. Do you sometimes feel, no matter how much you do, that Africa will never change or that there is no hope for Africa? To those who feel this way, I only have to say that if we take such a pessimistic attitude, we will never be able to truly support Africa effectively. But I am optimistic about the future of Africa. I find my hope in the strong will and eagerness on the part of the African people to improve their situation by their own efforts. This is something that I felt again and again during my association with the African people. For the past twenty years, I have worked in African agriculture in many Sub-Saharan countries. I have tried to help those who produce food at the subsistence level to achieve self-sufficiency. The majority of people living in African farming villages simply work to produce enough food for day-to-day subsistence. It is amazing how much farmers can increase food production by adding a little modern knowledge and technology to traditional small-scale farming methods. With such knowledge and technology, farmers can stand on their own feet with confidence. Without exception, all people who participated in our programme have been able to achieve small success through their own efforts. Africa has sometimes been depicted negatively as a land of hunger, poverty, war and disease. But this is only one aspect of the continent. African people have their own dreams and work hard to realize them. They have joyful smiles on their faces. Those of us working in the African department in both the public and the private sectors must think seriously about how we can help these people achieve their dreams. In order to help these people realize their dreams, we must use new approaches to deal with many problems that Africa is encountering. If things did not work as we expected, we must ask ourselves what we have done wrong. First, we are working for Africa in the international organisations, governments, and NGOs. They seriously review why things did not work successfully. Secondly, we must build partnerships among international organisations, respective governments and NGOs. For this, the important things are the sharing of knowledge and information based on mutual trust and respect, and mutual collaboration and integrated efforts. Unfortunately, to date, this kind of collaboration among different actors has not functioned sufficiently. It is crucial to create the new framework or mechanism in which these actors share knowledge and experiences in order to achieve common goals. Today, African people recognize the need for self-help and have a strong will to realize it. It is our responsibility to exercise the solidarity necessary to fully build on this will.

Now, without further delay, I'd like to introduce our guest speakers. First on our list is Professor Hiroyuki Ishi, professor of Hokkaido University in Japan. Professor Ishi most recently served as Japanese Ambassador to Zambia. Following Professor Ishi, we will hear from Mr Mats Karlsson. Mr Karlsson is an economist and Country Director for Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone at the World Bank. Mr Petr Kolář is the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. He served as director of the third territorial department, ambassador to Sweden and ambassador to Ireland. Our last speaker is Mr Akyaaba Addai-Sebo, an independent Consultant on Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Transformation from Ghana. Following their comments, if we have time, I'll open the floor for questions. Now I would like to ask Professor Ishi to begin his address.

• Hiroyuki Ishi:

Thank you, Chairman and all participants to adopt the Africa issue on today's agenda. This I believe is one of the most serious issues of global co-existence. Simply because there is some part of the world now in a crisis of its existence. The discussion of Sub-Saharan African aid at the G8 summit meeting held in July at Gleneagles clearly underscores the growing interest among the international community on how to provide support to Africa.

I have been involved in African aid and several relief projects for over 30 years. Speaking from my personal experience, I would like to share my thoughts with you on African aid. In those 30 years vast allotments of the budget advance as well as countless exports were sent to Africa, but the aid programme had a poor performance rate. From my own comparisons, I would say that, of all our international projects that were turned over to local government, the chance of a project being viable after five years was less than half. Some countries, none. A textbook case is the digging of wells. When the well required repairs, the spare parts were not easily available. The majority of wells were not repaired and were left idle. The main reason for this failure was lack of budget funds and human resources. The African countries are like a fragile instrument forced to perform on too many aid projects running the gamut from infrastructure to healthcare to education. Strung too tight, the programs meant to bolster Africa failed to realize their intended objectives. The United Nations Human Development Index that grades countries on their national wealth, civic stability and general quality of life has shown that despite 40 years of African aid efforts, the African continent may contain the largest number of the lowest achieving nations with the lowest incomes, and the highest level of poverty and disease on earth. There are not enough words to convey that the most urgent aid to give Africa is to save its children. These children, the very future of Africa, are disappearing before our eyes from the face of Africa. AIDS has hit African children harder than on any other place on earth. At the end of 2003, 25 million Africans were HIV-infected. This means that two-thirds of all those infected with HIV in the whole world are in Africa. Every day in Africa, 8000 people become infected with HIV. Every day 6000 perish from AIDS. In the last 20 years, more than 20 million died from HIV/AIDS. The picture becomes worse. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS - this is UNAIDS - states that there are 11 million African children under the age of 15 who have lost at least one parent from AIDS. I'll repeat it - 11 million orphans in Africa. 80% of the orphans in the world are now in Sub-Saharan Africa. Please imagine if the entire population of the Czech Republic were populated by AIDS orphans. The suffering of AIDS does not end with the deaths of the parents, but it is passed on to their orphaned children. Losing a parent means either insufficient food or not enough money to attend school. Underlying this tragedy, is the fact that the largest segment of AIDS patients makes up the key working force of their society. Unabated, it is estimated that there will be more than 20 million AIDS orphans by the year 2010. The United Nations estimates that in the 12 African nations seriously affected by HIV epidemics, 15% of all children will become AIDS orphans by 2010. Put simply, in less than a generation, Africa will become a continent of orphans. I have visited many hostels in Africa, but the most heartbreaking scene I experienced was in the HIV baby ward. African mothers spread the deadly virus to their babies during pregnancy, childbirth and lactation. The babies lie in the bed alone waiting to die with no one to care for them because their mothers have already died. When these babies die, too often the mortuary has no space for them and the tiny corpses are just left to decompose. Parents infected with HIV/AIDS become weak, unable to work with the medical costs driving them further into poverty. Their children are helpless–forced to bear the loss of their parents, the disintegration of family life, forced to leave school and bid farewell to any remnant of a normal childhood. Traditionally, it was the role of the grandparents and the family kin to raise orphans. With the onslaught of AIDS, this extended family system has become overburdened and the family simply is unable to take them in. Now they have nowhere to go and they become homeless street children. UNICEF estimates that there are more than 10 million street children in Africa. AIDS is destroying the African society in the south of Africa. Many young farmers are dying from AIDS, agricultural yields plummet, spawning famine. School teachers have not been spared and, with fewer teachers, the school system is failing. In Zambia, where I used to work, 2000 teachers, or 5% of their teaching force, die every year from AIDS. Armies have not been spared by AIDS either.

The International Labor Organization estimated that in Africa 48 million children between the ages of 5 and 14 are forced to work full-time. This means that 30% of all the children in Africa are working fulltime. Of the children, two million are engaged at work in the worst form of child labor, which I would define as slaves, child soldiers, in the sex trafficking industry, sold by parents or family as bonded labor to pay off debts. Homeless children as well as refugee children are abducted from the streets. These children work in hazardous conditions; they work in mines, working with chemicals, pesticides, work with dangerous machinery or are forced into debt bondage or other forms of slavery, prostitution or are abducted to serve in the armies. I met in Africa the youngest

prostitute - we now say a sex worker - she was an eight-year-old girl. Child labor is cheap and expendable and often the child laborers are horrified into obedience. Thousands of children die from exposure to agricultural chemicals or hard labor under severe conditions. Unable to go to school, they are left with few alternatives to eke out an existence, let alone escape poverty. A child soldier is exposed to the worst danger and the most horrific suffering, both physical and psychological. According to the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, in 13 African countries some 10,000 children under the age of 18 are actively fighting. The child soldier is a relatively new phenomenon born after the end of the Cold War when civil conflicts intensified all over Africa. As guerrilla wars become prolonged, both sides use children to replenish their ranks, often recruited or abducted to join their armies - some under 10 years of age. They are placed in the line of fire, witnessing and taking part in unbelievable acts of violence. Not properly trained, physically immature, not resistant to disease and the terrible living conditions, they suffer higher casualty rates than their adult counterparts. But armies have learned that children are cheap and expendable and they are easily brutalized into fearless killing and unquestionable obedience. They are physically vulnerable and easily intimidated, making them easy targets for brainwashing. Only a child soldier would agree to serve as a human detector! You understand, "a human detector"? The tragedy of the child soldier is that the child soldier is left physically disabled, psychologically traumatized, frequently denied an education or opportunity to learn civilian job skills. Or, he or she may never find a way to join peaceful society.

We have a duty to foster the global society that will nurture the safeguards of African children. We must make a society that can contribute to rebuilding their society. For example, when I was ambassador to Zambia, I created a day-care centre where orphans and street children could go and receive training. Children grew maize in the backyard, and they learned how to sew, do carpentry, pottery and saw that they could make a living. With the cooperation of local NGOs, this project had a positive result. Up to now, amid famine, poverty, civil wars and AIDS epidemics, solving the plight of the African children has not been tenable. But we must rekindle the fires of humankind to create a living ethical and modern code of behavior so that these children are given the seed of a future to create a new and healthier society. Unless we do it, there will be no new life to sustain Africa and with it no children and no future in Africa. Thank you for your attention.

• **Yohei Sasakawa:**

Thank you, Professor Ishi. Mr Karlsson.

• **Mats Karlsson:**

We must pay attention to Africa. And I would like to thank you, Mr Chairman, and Forum 2000, and all of you who are here for the attention you pay to Africa. We must listen most of all to what Africans are telling us. We are not good at listening to what Africans are telling us. We most of the time hear the stories about what is bad in Africa and how Africans are victims. Those stories are very often true, but the most important thing is to listen to the Africans who want to change their own environment.

I've worked for 20 years professionally with Africa and, as true as I am sitting in this room, I have gotten more from them than I can possibly ever in my profession have contributed. We have to turn the tables on our relationships with Africa. We can never help Africa by looking at Africans as victims. We do not need to give them ethical codes. They know what is right and wrong. We need a much better dialogue with Africa and to come together and do with Africans exactly that which we know is right in our own countries and elsewhere. Africa will not develop differently and beat poverty differently than did my own country Sweden, when we were a dirt-poor country a hundred years ago. Or than did Asia when it was dirt-poor. This is no mystery. We just need to do it. We need to get together and do it concertedly with high volumes and big scale for 20 years and Africa will be a different partner to all of us. In the few roundtable minutes at my disposal, let me do a very quick "Where are we, where do we want to go, and how shall we get there?" Everyone gets through media the troubles in Africa, and I would highlight that a third of the African population lives in countries directly or indirectly affected by conflict. But the most important message is that Africa is transforming. Some 16 countries in Africa have growth rates of around 5% or more and have had it for 10 years. That's enough of a growth rate to transform a country in a generation. In 1960 Africa had the same per capita income as perhaps Korea and other countries in Asia. Within a generation or two, they transformed. We know a lot of why this did not happen in Africa. But the positive side of that story is that it can happen in Africa in a generation or two, if we just engage in the proper way. And I would put it to you that it is happening in a number of countries. Not everywhere and not necessarily sustainable yet, but things are changing. In the country I happen to live in now - Ghana - telecommunications telephony has reached 12% of the population within three years because they did some basic things right. That's up from 3% just three years ago. Can you imagine the transformational power of a tripling of the availability of mobile telephones in a country in three years? The access to each other, the quality of dialogue you can create? The country has had four elections on the basis of democracy. The openness and accountability and leadership that can come out of that is very different from the past. And even on conflict, though we are very well aware of the eruption of conflicts in Africa, if we look back at the last 10-20 years with all the tragedies that have been playing out there, we have put the Apartheid struggle behind us in South Africa, and the huge wars of central Africa that erupted then have been put under control. And now just recently in Sudan, we had an agreement after 40 years of conflict. It is possible there to change things as well, even though we know by history that half of the conflicts in Africa come back to haunt us if we don't do it right. So can we put a strategy in place? Do we know where to go? Well, this year has actually been an extraordinary year vis-à-vis Africa, because the attention to it has risen.

Wherever you want to start, I want to put the point of departure when the African Union was formed and the NEPAD programme - the New Partnership for African Development - was put in place a few years ago. Now, recently we've seen the Commission for Africa come out with its report, the Millennium Review, which focused a lot on Africa, the G8 summit in Gleneagles and, of course, the UN Summit in New York just a few weeks ago, and the World Bank/IMF meetings in Washington. They are all basically aligned. This is not a mystery. We know what we want to do; the strategy is there. But most importantly we need not the global strategies but the national strategies. The strategies within countries born out of dialogue internally, reflecting choices on what's more important, what's less important. Such national development strategies are now commonplace in Africa. And they can be put to work. And even on conflict, which is the biggest risk. I would put it to you that we know what to do. Gareth Evans this morning was as explicit and as clear as anyone I've ever heard - that dealing with conflict is no mystery and not a losing game. The instruments are there and we need to apply them. The only thing that I'd perhaps like to augment what Gareth said this morning is that we need an extra focus on economic governance - the core economic management tools in a government. Because we know that conflict is perpetuated by two things: huge inequalities and corruption. Corruption is rooted in the mismanagement of natural resources. These are the things that lead to the constant exploitation of Africa and we need much

stronger tools to prevent these resources being misused by African elites and by international elites. That's why anti-corruption and economic governance tools at the very centre of public management are perhaps the most neglected elements of conflict prevention and conflict management.

• Yohei Sasakawa:

Thank you, Mr Karlsson. Mr Kolář, please.

• Petr Kolář:

Thank you very much. I'm afraid that Mats Karlsson has already said everything important, but I'll try to give you an idea of the Czech approach towards Africa and our possible cooperation with others to help and to cooperate there. I would start with saying that, for the Czech Republic, our commitments, which are linked to our membership in the European Union, something which we take seriously despite the fact that our neighborhood is very important for us - I mean the EU neighborhood here. Something that is also part of our foreign policy and for us the priority is the Balkans and Eastern Europe. This is, of course, very important but at the same time we take very seriously the fact that in Africa the situation is not pleasant and we understand that not all countries are in one shape, but we want to really help there. The question is how and actually why? We need to explain it to our public. We are living in the heart of Europe and our people need to know why they should, as taxpayers, support Africa and what it means for Europe if Africa is underdeveloped even in the future. So these are a few topics which I would like to touch upon during my brief remarks.

First, explaining the reasons, it is, of course, first of all a moral imperative and our solidarity with countries which are suffering because of different diseases and because of poverty. We never - the Czech Republic or Czechoslovakia or Bohemia as it was before - we never colonized anyone, but at the same time we feel that we should help because we lived in oppression and we know how important it is to support freedom, democracy and the prosperity of countries even if they are far away from us. By the way, that's another argument which we have to take seriously. In today's globalized world, Africa is the closest continent to Europe. Africa is on the doorstep of Europe and the European Union. We need to take it seriously and our responsibility not only towards Africa but also towards our own citizens is to explain to them the imperative that, in the global development, poverty is something that produces instability and if it is on our doorstep it could seriously influence the situation in Europe. Illnesses and pandemics don't respect any borders and they could very seriously affect life in Europe. So we have to take it seriously even from this selfish point of view. If we don't first take the moral imperative seriously then we have to take our own situational interests seriously. We quite often hear some arguments that for Africa, the best way to help is not to provide aid but trade. I would argue a little bit with that. I can share this idea very much, but it is only half of the truth. If we want to do trade with Africa, we need to help them first to produce something that could be able to compete on our market. And then we have to realistically admit that here in the European Union there is probably protectionism regarding some products, which are agricultural products, which may exist even in the future. We have strong

lobbies among our farmers in some EU countries and I can't seriously imagine that those lobbies and very powerful groups would suddenly change their mind and allow the market to open for agricultural products from Africa. So this is half of the truth. I am saying we need to cooperate with African countries and we need to help them build their own capacities, build their own skills to produce something which is then possible to be sold abroad and which would be able to succeed on Europe's competitive market.

I would like to make another remark to strengthen the previous one. For example, debt: if you want to cooperate you need a partner. And who could be the partner in African countries? For our government it must be the local government. This is the best way to do it. But then you need to have a responsible government. You need to have someone who - as Mats Karlsson says - is really striving for good governance, so that there is control of the use of natural resources, there is control of how aid from abroad is used and how the administration works with that in terms of whether it is not abused, but really used as it should be. So this is quite an important factor in our strategic thinking about Africa and about cooperation and it is one of the reasons why we still don't follow some other EU countries, which decided to go down the way of so-called direct budget support and other things. We still prefer concrete projects with Czech participation on the ground. But this doesn't mean that in the future we wouldn't support local budgets directly.

So I would conclude that for us it is very important to somehow interlink our activities abroad in Africa and our public support. I'm pleased to say that for our public it is quite natural that the Czech Republic is in the first place among the new EU countries in terms of development cooperation. I'm pleased that we now have 19 projects in Africa in 10 countries. Of course, we have only two priority countries - Zambia and Angola - but we also have other projects there. And we want to continue in the future. What is very important for Czech development cooperation is that we very much rely on cooperation between government and NGOs and this is something we also want to do in the future. We know that our public sector and NGOs are very effective on the ground. And speaking about subjects where we think it is most important for us to help, it is to focus on education, capacity building, investment in human resources and the health sector as well. We learnt in the past how great a help it could be to give education to someone and to first of all help them to build the self-confidence that they could do some things by themselves.

• Yohei Sasakawa:

Thank you, Mr Kolář. Mr Addai-Sebo, please.

• Akyaaba Addai-Sebo:

I am here representing myself, and I know a lot has been said about Africa. I think all ears are now on me. A lot has been said also about the validity of tolerance and respect. But where I am concerned and where Africa is concerned, we would like to reinforce respect with tolerance and reinforce tolerance with respect. We are gathered here in the hope of a new world order of peaceful


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

co-existence. We see no reason why we cannot create paradise on earth. Our concerns for the state of our world today are a deep reflection of our fears for tomorrow. We are here because we do not like what we are witnesses to. We do not like what we see in the global crystal ball. Disasters that confront us have become two-dimensional, natural and human. But what is more disastrous is the disaster of not accepting the consequences of some human actions on natural order. If, as humans, we still consider ourselves as the highest form of life, why do we not take responsibility for environmental changes brought about by our own hands and brains? Growing up, I saw my grandparents offer prayers in solemn tribute to their surroundings. Before they killed for meat or felled a tree they would first propitiate the spirits by pouring libation. They linked their existence to the sanctity of all that is of creation - the environment that they saw themselves as an embodiment of. The sense of spirituality and religious sanctity of my grandparents and their ancestors have been ridiculed and stereotyped as animistic. They held the earth as their sacred mother.

In two years' time, 2007, some parts of the world will be marking 200 years since the abolition of the slave trade, when my ancestors were goods and chattel - personal properties. By the consequences of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and globalization in a unipolar world have consigned the values and wisdom of my grandparents and ancestors to anthropological footnotes. What we witness today are human and natural disasters from weapons of mass destruction in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan or Colombia to quakes and hurricanes from the bowels of the oceans in Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India or the United States. Natural disasters like nuclear fallout don't respect frontiers. Global co-existence rests on the foundations of tolerance and respect - tolerance and respect between the natural and human order of things, tolerance and respect between individuals, families, clans, ethnic groups, societies and communities of nations and their relations with one another and their environment in an abiding faith. Our world cannot be created in the image and values of any superpower of the day. The validity of creation lies in the strength of its diversity for variety is the spice of life. Our purpose as the highest form of life is therefore to constantly affirm each other by holding and respecting each other as sacred, for life is sacred. Above all else, we are humans first in all our abiding faiths. Conflict and strife continue to tear Africa apart. Earth at its centre cannot hold. Africa has become a television spectacle that makes children in the developed world cringe. But with the benefit of hindsight and informed reflection, I can see a future in the present. There exists now a veritable opportunity for war-torn countries in Africa to reorganize their own societies in their collective self-interest with the benefit of hindsight. With the support of the international community, there is a growing desire for an inclusive peace process that will encourage a national sense of hope, confidence, and the essential feel-good factor.

The challenge facing the African Union and its associated sub-regional groupings now is how to establish an all-inclusive transitional power-sharing arrangement in the war-torn countries that will immediately reverse the current state of insecurity and political tension, restore full human and political rights and ensure equal opportunity and access in the exercise of state power. The future of Africa is therefore hanging on the question of transition. The answer must be found in a healing process that will ensure a root and branch restructuring of society in order to restore that collective national pride, identity, and sense of industry. There is the need, therefore, for a conceptual framework to address the core of the African peace problem; democratic control and exercise of state power in relation to equitable distribution of resources. The future can be assured in the present only if the ruling elite of Africa will stop mimicking Western values and way of life, and instead have confidence in themselves as Africans who have given birth to great civilizations in the past. And therefore it is within them to change Africa for the better so that the conscience of the world can be stimulated by Africa's rebirth. As I cast my eyes across Africa, from Sudan to Nigeria, Cote D'Ivoire, I sit here and want to appeal to the Judaeo-Christian and Muslim worlds to respect my identity as African. Thank you.

• Yohei Sasakawa:

Thank you very much Addai-Sebo, and I'd like to speak in Japanese from now. It's OK?

(Speaking in Japanese) With great interest to Africa, the panelists examined the question of Africa from different angles and they reflected on what can they do for Africa, how can they help and with regard to this theme today, the co-existence, they examined how we and Africa can work together. This is a very important issue, there are many problems facing Africa. This is a reality and although there may not be that many, there are some countries, in which we can be really hopeful about the future of Africa. Moreover, the African people on their own, they want to take a stand. They have very strong will to bring about change, to bring about positive changes. I hope that all of you will understand that will on the part of African people. Both governments and international organizations are trying to strengthen their assistance they provide to Africa. I believe in Africa's potential and in order to realize this potential, I think that everyone of us must recognize once again that there is this very large continent on the global map. We have to take note of Africa's existence and work towards improving the lives of the African people. Thank you very much.

TRANSCRIPTION OF PANEL 3: COMMUNICATING BETWEEN COMMUNITIES: THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA ON CONFLICT OF PERCEPTIONS

• Bronislaw Geremek:

It's my pleasure to begin the third panel of the session. The third panel should discuss questions of communicating between the communities and the role of the media. We know how important the media were in the fight for freedom. We also know how important the freedom of media was for the establishment of the rule of law and democracy and respect for human rights. But the media sometimes are creating problems for democracy. Media sometimes are creating problems for the communication between cultural communities. Finally discussing the media, we are discussing the main problems of globalization and also questions of the cooperation in the era of globalization. We have also some questions, which are a part of this debate. In this question, the relationship between hard power and soft power and the question of the role of diplomacy is at the very centre of our debate. We now have the privilege to ask Mr Robert Cooper to take the floor as keynote speaker and to present this issue to us. Mr Robert Cooper is a senior British diplomat, active for many years in the European Union, one of the main thinkers in the European Union establishment and also a teacher in different universities and author of important books on Europe and the world.

• **Robert Cooper:**

There's so much one can say about the media. You're only going to get one small slice of it from me. When I wake up in the morning, the first thing I do is I switch on the radio. Before I go to bed at night the last thing I do is listen to the radio. During the day, I look at the newspapers. Maybe I get some of the news agency reports over the Internet. If I am lazy in the evening, I may even look at the television. We live in a kind of sea of information, more and more of it all the time. Maybe we are drowning in it. If you are a politician, then you probably live in a sea of journalists wherever you go. It was not always so. A hundred years ago, hardly any of this existed. A little more than a hundred years ago, in 1896, the Daily Mail, the first mass-market newspaper appeared in Britain. 50 years ago, politicians lived different lives. Mr Atlee, the British Prime Minister was finally persuaded to install a Reuters tickertape machine in Downing Street because someone told him he could get the cricket scores that way. Maybe those were happier days.

Somewhere there is a link between the word community and the word communication. Communities are groups who communicate with each other – a common language probably expressing common assumptions and common values. And there can sometimes be real difficulty in those who don't share that language. We call people fanatics, because they are people with whom we don't communicate, whose language we don't understand. And they probably call us something similar. Print media played an important part in the creation of nations – I think of Luther and *The Bible* – by creating a common language. Mass media, national media were a part of the creation of national societies, of the mass cultures. But they were not the creators of national societies. The creators of national societies were not the media. The media played a role in this, but the creation of national societies was a political act. It was done by political leadership and, as a matter of fact, by ministries of education. Actually, states have never been quite sure that they like the media. In England, the government tried initially to control the print media and finally gave up in, I think, in 1695. And you find that this is the story of most other media. The broadcast media started as a state monopoly and that also has been broken down. In practice, national media have, on the whole, served national causes and more than that. They are an essential part of political life, of democratic life. They are a part of the political system. Sometimes, the media can play a more sinister role. We think of Rwanda and Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines more often known as Hate Radio, which played an indispensable part in the Rwandan genocide. It couldn't have take place without the organization and the propaganda through the radio. But it was not organized by the radio. The radio was a medium and that's what the media are. It was organized and practised by the state. The Canadian general in charge of the tiny UN force at the time did his best to bring in international media and to give international publicity to what was happening. But he had very little success indeed until it was too late. News media need news. They like drama. They like conflict. They like tragedy. They like violence. Not too much violence, actually. Conflict is good for media. Too much violence and the advertisers decide that it's not such a good thing. So you can get small doses of conflict, but conflict gets attention, violence gets attention. Violence gets reported but not progress. In Iraq, for example, the images that we see on the television are mostly of violence, and that's for good reason, because Iraq has major security problems. But there are other stories in Iraq that you hardly see at all. There are stories about the increase in oil production, there are stories about the improvements in everyday life, waste water disposal has gone up remarkably, but this doesn't make very good television, and so one is unlikely ever to see it.

I work for the European Union. The normal media story you get on the European Union is failure to agree on something. And that's usually true, because we usually fail to agree. In fact, we can fail to agree for several months about something, but then eventually we agree, because that's how the process works, and you get that story too, but you've had six months of failure, and then you get one story of success. Actually, the success cancels out all of the failure, but it doesn't seem like that, the way it's reported. But

the media have played a vital role in recent years in drawing attention to things happening abroad—to famine in Ethiopia, to conflict in the Balkans, to violence in Somalia, or you can go back further and you can look at the Vietnam War, where some of the media images, actually the press more than the television, had an important political impact. I came across a quotation from a general who said, "The outcome of wars are not determined by the media. They're determined by battle." I'm not sure if that's true. Clausewitz describes war as a trial of strength and a clash of wills. Well, the battle represents the trial of strength, but the clash of wills may very much be determined by how wars are seen, and how they're reported. And the media are a factor in that. Until now, the media have been national media. But globalization has brought us international media. And they've brought us international media as an important point. Because, at the end of the Cold War, governments who had been used to an international situation in which there was a division between East and West and everything was very simple, you knew who the good guys were and who the bad guys were. At the end of the Cold War, governments didn't know very much what to do. There was a state of confusion about foreign policy, and how the conflicts of the 1990s were reported was extremely important. We very much needed clear analysis of the new wars in Somalia, in Bosnia, and in Rwanda. Actually, we didn't get it. What we got instead was talk about centuries-old ethnic conflicts. It was not only the media who talked like this. There were academics who used these terminologies as well. This is actually a ridiculous explanation of conflict. If you like, you could see World War II, you could describe World War II as an ethnic conflict. It was a conflict, if you like, between Germany and Russia principally. But that doesn't explain World War II. Why, at that time, by those particular people, why that particular conflict? To say this is an ethnic conflict doesn't tell you anything at all.

So we may live in a sea of information, but the sea is quite a shallow sea. And we get more information than we get analysis or understanding. That may be connected to the commercial nature of much of the news that we get these days. There is pressure on journalists to produce for ever-shorter deadlines. Twenty-four hour news, breaking news, that doesn't give you time for analysis. And there are fewer and fewer foreign correspondents. Twenty, thirty years ago, there were twenty British newspapers that had correspondents in Africa. Today, there are four. If you suddenly find there's a story in Africa, then you fly a team of people out there to tell you what's going on. There is no chance of understanding what is going on if you have just flown out to a country, particularly to a country in conflict. What you see is, of course, chaos and anarchy, because that's what conflict looks like. But that's not what conflict is. To explain a conflict, you need somebody who knows the country and knows the place, and the old foreign correspondents who could be seen in bars around any capital city in Africa are something that we all miss. Once, national media focused on victories; now, we have international media, which focuses on victims. The response to this kind of apolitical news is humanitarian aid. You've seen the victims, you see something terrible is happening, you must help, but you don't really know what's happening, and the humanitarian aid response, although it is a good response, from good motives, and it may sometimes do good, is inadequate, because these conflicts are political, and what is required is a real political analysis of what is going on. And I don't think that we're getting it much from the international media. I contrast this with the position in my own country, where national and local media for years reported on the conflict in Northern Ireland from a position of deep knowledge and with a great sense of responsibility. And with your national media, of course, you have a reality check. You know if they're telling the truth or not. The trouble with international media is that you don't know. You see it in a flash, and then it's gone. It seems to be extremely important, but you don't really understand it because perhaps they don't either. The public good requires serious analysis based on knowledge and understanding. I'm not sure if we can rely on the state for this, I'm not sure if we can rely on the purely commercial media either. We need somewhere, something in between. My advice is that if you hear people talking about irrational fanatics, you should draw the conclusion that they don't know very much about them. If they describe them as irrational, it's because they haven't taken the trouble to understand them. So I would stop listening at that point. When people tell you about chaos and anarchy or about centuries-old ethnic conflict, then stop listening, because the person who's talking to you hasn't really understood the situation. We have international media, but that doesn't give us an international community. Peace comes from

the construction of wider communities. I don't think we can look, I don't think we should look to the media to create such communities. Such communities are created by politics, by education, by political leadership. Those are the things that we need. The media is there, but it's media. It doesn't govern our work. Thank you.

• Bronislaw Geremek:

Thank you very much, Robert Cooper, for this introduction. Now, we have a list of panelists, and I hope that we also have some time for a discussion on this fascinating subject. I will give the floor first to Professor Ujjwal Chowdhury, who is a media adviser to the government of India; advisor to The Nippon Foundation; founder and director of India's leading media school, Symbiosis, and a journalist in several newspapers.

• Prof. Ujjwal K. Chowdhury:

I'm the only Indian speaker in Forum 2000 this year. As this is a meeting on peace and co-existence, and I consider our country a land of peace, let me also bring the best wishes from our country to the people here. Let me remind all of us here of our Father of the Nation, Mahatma Gandhi's very famous statement, "Peace has no way. Peace is the only way".

Indeed, it's important to understand that media has a major role in peace building in conflicting relationships, or in conflict situations among communities. To this let me also add a conceptual dimension at the outset. We are talking of peace-building, we're talking of co-existence, and of conflict management. I consider this to be phase one. Between two communities, whenever there is a conflict situation, the management of conflict is just phase one, where we at least avoid any all-out direct war. But the point is, how do we move beyond conflict management?

We move to the second phase, conflict resolution, through treaties, through ties, bi-lateral and multi-lateral, but still I consider that to be limited. So it must be moving qualitatively to a third state, and I will call that conflict transformation, where the need of the hour becomes: turn the conflict into an advantage, into a situation where communities, and not just governments, can actually come together and transform their relationship to a fuller and complete bond or complete relationship. And here, people-to-people ties become very significant.

The role of the media is very crucial in this particular third stage of conflict transformation, because editors and journalists can actually try to keep themselves aloof from a situation of conflict and look at developing people-to-people situations. It is important to understand that in a conflict situation, or particularly to transform a conflict into a fuller relationship, there is the need for people-to-people contact. Media has a role in bringing these stories of non-state actors' relationships on the pages of the newspapers or through television. Usually, focus on media has always been on state actors, on governments. But the non-state actors, the voluntary organizations, events like this program of Forum 2000 and several other NGOs and people-to-people initiatives, academic initiatives, have usually been ignored. Hence, in conflict situations, or in situations where conflicts can be transformed, people-to-people initiatives should be highlighted in the media much more than what is usually done.

The second thing is the use of the language, the semiotics of media. What we often find is that the same person, organization, and incident, are referred to by different words or terminologies in different media. Like media very loosely uses words like "terrorist", "hard-liner", "militant", and even "freedom fighter" for someone using arms to realize certain ends. Now, these terms are highly opinionated and highly prejudiced at times. Media in one country would be using "terrorist" for someone who will be called "freedom fighter" on the other side of the border. So these are issues that we also need to talk about.

Also, should media fall prey to the government language? For example, when after 9/11, I saw several newspapers in India and abroad with different headlines. "War on USA". "Terror Strikes USA". "USA Attacked". "Clash of Civilization Turns Bloody", I did not understand whether all those titles justify what actually had happened. Yes, "Terror Struck USA" would have been correct. But "Clash of Civilizations Turning Bloody", or "War on USA"?

Even serious students of media have been told, "Bad news is good news", because bad news makes good copy. Bad news makes good stories. But it is important to understand, in conflict situations, bad news is genuinely bad news. Can we really find good news from the human-interest issues of the society and highlight them more? This the leading media in all conflict situations have not been doing often. Often these certain words are used in media in such a manner and pictures are used in such a manner that incites violence further. Rather, can we look at this with a different perspective as a media opportunity to actually mitigate violence, not excite violence further? Media, in the developed and developing worlds, both, have favorite stereotypes whether it's violence, whether it's conflict, there are favorite stereotypes every time. A particular political belief, a particular political process or a party would always be referred to by certain languages.

We have an example of media stereotype in a different context, not of violence and conflict, but of leprosy care and cure. World-wide, media about leprosy had three stereotypes. One, people affected by leprosy have always been called lepers, and even when they're cured. In India we often have a common cold, we may have several other diseases. After being treated, are we ever called ex-patients? Are we known throughout life by the name of the disease? But that isn't the case in leprosy. And media has been using this word, "lepers", over and over again. It is a pejorative word. We are identifying the whole person because of a small deformity of the finger, or because of a disease that he has suffered from for a couple of years, sometime in the past.

Now, for example, the second stereotype in the media, that leprosy is contagious. This is totally wrong. Leprosy never spreads by touch. The third, leprosy is incurable. Again, that is wrong. Multi-drug therapy (MDT) has made it totally curable.

So there are certain stereotypes whether in leprosy cases, or in violence cases, or in conflict situations, and stereotypes have been increasingly used and overused over the period almost in all media.

The last point that I would like to bring forth is that media has been often called as the fourth estate. Legislature, executive and judiciary are the three estates, or the three arms of the government, and the fourth estate being media. Unfortunately, the other three, legislature, executive and judiciary will work in tandem or will be part of the government. Understandably so. But media, a fourth estate, was supposed to be independent of the interpretation of national interests by the ruling party. But unfortunately, in most countries, and in more cases, it has actually been the repetition, reflection of the national interests as interpreted by the rulers or by the ruling party which have been assiduously reflected by most of the media.

Now, for example, we all know that there was no free media under communism. But let us also look at the media in the USA, before, during, and immediately after the Iraq war. The entire media, before and during the war, sang the same song that the rulers in US sang. That is: WMD (weapons of mass destruction) is the justification for the war. To date, in more than three years,

there have been no weapons of mass destruction found. And today, as my academic friends in the USA say, the media have low credibility because of this, that during the war it actually ceased to have its independent role. Now, that is true in several cases around the world. Even in our country, even in internal situations, whenever we had internal situations of Hindu-Muslim conflict, we found certain newspapers taking stands, communal stands. Communal, fundamentalist stands, either pro-Muslim or pro-Hindu. Now, this is where the media loses its position as the fourth estate, and it's important that the people who run media understand that it is crucial to maintain the fourth estate status.

Often, it is said that the media has dual markets. The primary market is the reader, the viewer, the listener and the secondary market is the advertisers and sponsors. After all, newspapers cannot do well financially at the price at which they sell each copy. Then, the developing world in our part of Asia has many free-to-air channels. They cannot survive without advertisers. Understandably so. But, the media managers must remember that the advertisers come because of the readers and viewers. Compromising the interest of the readers and viewers and safeguarding the commercial interests of the advertisers, cannot justify the existence and growth of the media. Now, this is one thing that has been missed out by media world-wide. In the situation of dual markets, the secondary market has taken the precedence over the primary market many a time, and that's true even in most of the developing countries. It is important to note that the media has to actually blend the interests of the dual markets and safeguard that of the primary market.

I would also bring forth one other new aspect which is fast emerging, that is of the convergence in the media. Increasingly, technologies of media are coming on one platform. The ownership, even the marketing of media, also are coming in one platform and in the same hands. Increasingly people like Rupert Murdoch are controlling both print, electronic and cyber media, and through them influencing nations, not just in one or two countries, but across more and more nations.

Now, convergence is a threat to free expression of will or the freedom of media due to increased monopolization and regimentation. But it is also an opportunity. It's a threat, because the commercial interests of advertisers and centralization of media control in a few hands is a threat. Anywhere in the world, more and more media in fewer and fewer hands will always be a threat. So that's a problem. That's a problem, but on the other side, there is also a positive side. Due to convergence, we have the digital media. We have the old, traditional filmmaking changed, being replaced increasingly by digital cinema, which is a more cost-effective, democratic and open-ended filmmaking. Digital filmmaking is less than ten percent of the cost of the traditional filmmaking of cinematography. We have also independent and alternative media, small radio stations and a plethora of web-based, cost-effective media coming up. We have also independent media consultants providing content across media channels. The same consultant is providing content to radio, newspapers, television, and also making documentaries. Now, these are the positive areas, positive sides which we can concentrate more in making convergence a positive force in peace building.

We now need to make convergence in media a positive force in mediating social change.

I would end up with this observation: yesterday, when we were making a small documentary, we had also interviewed the former Czech president Mr. Václav Havel, and at the end of it, I just casually asked, "How come a writer like you, who did not belong necessarily to one political party, became president of a nation?" He just said, "Strange times make strange errors." Let us understand that we are in strange times. We are in strange times where rulers expect media to take sides. "Either you are with us, or you are with them", the infamous words of famous George Bush Jr. to the American media just before the Iraq war. How can the media be either with the terrorists or with the ruling party? It has a third position, and an independent one. Now, this third position has to be protected. This third position of being the Fourth Estate has to be assiduously and religiously preserved. We

should not make strange errors in these strange times! We must understand that media mediates social change. That has been the traditional sociological school of media which have been forgotten in the era of commercialism and consumerism. Can we, once again, bring that identity to the forefront?

I suggest you consider a "Peace Media Summit", similar to this forum, either in Europe or in Asia somewhere; a congregation of all media focused on peace building. There are films, there are writers, there are newspaper series of articles, there are television stories focusing on peace. Can there be a sort of coming together of peace media or peace media initiatives? This is important because, while conflicts in media are represented strongly and known well, the peace initiatives in the media are known less, and it's important that they come together. With this hope, with this appeal, let me say goodbye. Thank you very much.

• Bronislaw Geremek:

Professor, thank you very much for this outstanding presentation of the problem. I will not defend the media, but as a historian of the Middle Ages, I have to say that the hatred which European societies formed against the lepers had a quite different source. So that's a question of stereotypes in different civilizations, different cultures and one could see the creation of such stereotypes even without mass media. Now I will ask Mr Ghassan Salamé to take the floor; once more, I will present him in a few words. We know Minister Salamé very well. Formerly Lebanese Minister of Culture, he is now Professor of International Relations at the Institut d'Études Politiques in Paris and Senior Adviser to the UN Secretary General. Minister Salamé, the floor is yours.

• Ghassan Salamé:

I think that blaming the media is such a facile sport and I will not indulge in it for many reasons. One is instrumental; we all need the media. How do we operate in the modern world without the media? But also for a political reason. Whenever I hear somebody blaming the media, more often than not, it has a huge populist undertone, anti-democratic undertone. Blaming the media is normally done by undemocratic actors. But there is a third reason, and this reason is absolutely positive. Through the media, thanks to the media, democratization is progressing all over the world. Democracy is made of three things, in my view. One aspect is freedom. The second aspect is institution. And the third aspect is culture. When it comes to the first, freedom, the revolution in the new media, internet, satellite TV and other forms of media, has done to freedom much more than any freedom fighter has ever accomplished. Thanks to this revolution, basically one profession has disappeared. That is the profession of censor. When I was young, I used to have my books censored or banned. Now, whoever wants to read my books can go to the internet and find them, or order them through Amazon and get them in less than twenty-four hours. And whatever kind of info or opinion, you cannot keep it in the closet for more than a few hours. In fact, there is no excuse for anybody anymore to say that, "I was not aware." If you want to know about anything, you can, wherever you live, get to the internet or satellite TV. So, let us thank this revolution. Let us be proud to live in a world where this revolution took place, especially since this is leading to a new market place of media that is every day more competitive, that is every day better financed, that is every day more and more professional, where more and more journalists are clearly aware of the fact that they also, like the stock exchange, need some regulation of their profession. So, let us not somehow easily take the facile position of blaming the media. It is playing a very positive role.

However, the dangers are also before our eyes, and I would like to address few of them, especially in the situation of conflict. First, if info is available as Joe Nye wrote about it already many years ago, the whole power is not in having the info, it is in framing it. Therefore, info is available, but how you frame it is the essence. And the examples given by our Indian colleague on this panel to tell us that the way you frame the info is becoming of the essence, especially for vulnerable populations. So, who is framing? According to what criteria is framing? How do you choose the title the next day, on the twelfth of September, for example? The whole thing is not to know about what happened on the eleventh of September. Everybody knows about it. How you frame it the next day, is the essence. So, we need regulation of the framing, not of the diffusion of info, but of its framing.

Second, and this is another danger we should keep in mind, is the concentration of media in the same hands. This is happening very much in the West. This is happening in the United States in a way that is absolutely, extremely rapid. It's happening in Europe. It's happening in France. And it's also happening elsewhere. In the Arab world, for example, this concentration is being done right now to the benefit of oil countries and to the disadvantage of the non-oil producing countries, because oil countries have more means to invest than non-oil countries. And this is also a new danger.

Three, media can be instruments of conflict. The radio Les Mille Collines has already been mentioned in the Great Lakes genocide. Other cases could be mentioned all over the world. In fact, the most dangerous media in this case are proximity media. Media that are clearly in the hands of armed groups and used in order to mobilize. And unfortunately, although as Mr Glucksmann this morning said, Rwanda passed like nothing, although it was a real genocide. Well, one lesson that has been learned is that one should be very careful with proximity media.

Now, the fourth danger has to do with embedded media in war situations. And this has been the case in the Iraq war with no precedent. What this leads to is the following: Basically, American media are better aligned with their government, and they have more audience in America, but to a large extent, audiences in the Middle East have refused to see the American media during the conflict. Basically, you win in your country and you lose in other countries because of embedding your media people in your war machine. That is why we are in a situation that is somehow worrying, and this is the situation: Technique is becoming more and more universal. Access to war zones is becoming more and more universal. But the content of the info you are giving is more and more national, in my view. And the contrast is becoming more worrying by the day, as we can see right now. I do believe that Americans who thought that they knew more because their reporters were embedded with their soldiers were fundamentally mistaken, because those reporters became spokesmen for the units transporting, feeding, protecting them. Unfortunately, back home in America, many journalists were also embedded with the Administration, the neo-conservative thinks tanks and exile Iraqis.

Two other dangers I see. One is too much discrimination between war zone and war conflict. In fact, you have sometimes very small conflicts where you have easy access that are well covered by the media, and sometimes areas with difficult access and you have silence. The London case is a textbook example of that. But even in a country like Iraq in 1991, in the same time the regime was killing Kurds in the north it was also killing Shia in the south. But the access was easy to the Kurds in the north. And the access was extremely difficult to the Shia in the south. So he kept killing in the south, and he had to stop killing in the north, because the media played their role. I think that there is a real moral issue, that you cannot discriminate just based on access to the war zone, because this would be extremely dangerous. Nobody would go to Rwanda, then, if something happens there.

Finally, I would say that we have so much info that each of us has to discriminate. And when we discriminate, I think we are more and more inclined to give priority to things that are closer to us. That is why the world is much more accessible, but the interest is more and more domestic. I believe that one of the main jobs of media in the years to come is not only to cover this orgy of information which is available to any one of us, but to really incite curiosity, because what I am afraid of is not the death of the media. They are thriving more than ever. It is the death of curiosity, which could lead to the end of democracy. If you want accountable leaders, you need curious voters. But the offer of news is so huge that the appetite is somehow killed by a supply-side dynamics that basically tells you what you should be caring about. A democracy revival cannot go without more appetite for investigation, without a more consistent curiosity. Thank you.

• Bronislaw Geremek:

Now I will give the floor to Jacques Rupnik. He is an outstanding political scientist from Paris, also the author of different books and studies, citizen of the world, but in Prague or in Warsaw and Budapest, he is considered first of all a citizen of Central Europe. Jacques, the floor is yours.

• Jacques Rupnik:

Thank you very much, Professor Geremek, for this kind introduction. I really feel, as a Prague-born Frenchman, to be Central European above all. A couple of words: I'm not a mediologist, unlike our Indian colleague, and therefore I will not inflict on you any theory on the role of the media. Perhaps a few observations from a period when I actually worked with Professor Geremek on the international commission on the Balkans and later on the commission on the Kosovo.

I will try to reflect on the role of the media in a conflict situation such as we have witnessed in the Balkans, on the way local media become protagonists in a conflict, and of course, how the international media helped to shape the response to those events. There was a saying, fairly wide-spread among journalists in former Yugoslavia: "Every person shot by a bullet in the battle was first shot by words in the media". Now, this morning, someone quoted Aldous Huxley's definition of nationalism as a common misunderstanding of history and a common hatred of your neighbors. Well, it can be argued that in the early 1990s, in the former Yugoslavia, the media have made a significant contribution to both, particularly the electronic media have played a central role in establishing the dominance of ethnicity, as a key organizing principle of society. That idea has developed, supported by number of nationalist myths legitimizing the use of force by the key political and military protagonists. As an example, on Belgrade television 1991, you would have, the same evening, a documentary about 1941, the genocide, the massacre of the Serbs under the Ustashi regime in Croatia, and then it would be followed by the news, where you would see leading politicians and journalists, using loosely the word "genocide" as the imminent threat looming upon the Serbian minority in Croatia. Or the Serbian minority in Bosnia. And you have there, first of all, the historical connection, 1941 – 1991. You have the slip from the documentary to the news, and the use of words. You introduce the word "genocide", and I remember Simone Weil, who was with Bronislaw Geremek and myself on this international commission in the Balkans, discussing precisely this issue, the use of words, and of the word "genocide" in Sarajevo, and it has raised a very important discussion. She observed something, that in all our discussions in the Balkans, whether we were in Belgrade, in Kosovo, in Sarajevo, or in Zagreb,

everybody was using the word "genocide". The media were using the word "genocide", the politicians, everybody was a victim of genocide or a potential victim of genocide. And she observed, she didn't want to say in what case the use of the word was correct or not, she simply said, "Well, what this means, you use the word 'genocide' when you don't want to talk to somebody." You don't talk to people who commit genocide. You fight them. And if you don't fight them, you at least sometimes do a preventive attack in order to prevent a genocide. So, the media have been crucially important. They were perhaps the first victims of the war in the Balkans. We all remember that the first target of the bombing in Sarajevo was Yugoslav Television. So they were the first target but also the first accomplice in the preparation and the carrying out of the war.

The second dimension I want to briefly mention is the way the international media is shaping the perception of and sometimes the response to conflict. This has been known loosely as the "CNN effect", and the way it has, in a major way, shaped the international public opinion, perception and response to the events and eventually contributed in a not insignificant manner to the intervention in Bosnia or in Kosovo. You could say, in this case, the media had played a contribution in actually helping to put an end to conflict, the opposite of what I was discussing in the first case in the Balkans. Of course, the contrast is very striking with what has already been referred to by some as the silence of the media on Rwanda, or Chechnya. André Glucksmann has mentioned it this morning. You can see the double standards applying. Gareth Evans this morning quoted the *Human Security Report* which is to be published. There were more conflicts and more casualties from conflicts in the 1950s and in the 1960s than now, yet our perception is that conflict has been growing in an exponential manner since the end of the Cold War. So we have there this phenomenon of the media shaping the international perception of conflicts, and the CNN effect is one way it has played. The other, of course, is what has just been referred to by Ghassan Salamé, that is the way international media have appeared in Iraq or in Afghanistan, embedded with the military. Journalists accompanying, in a way, the military. So the media have greater access in times of conflict, but there is also a greater risk of being co-opted or used. John Simpson, one of my favorite BBC journalists, entered Kabul and said, "We have liberated Kabul." Well, who exactly is the "we"? That is the key question, that sometimes the media are not just reflecting, but the media are becoming an actor, sometimes blurring the distinction between reporting and commentary, shaping the perception in this or that way, and that has been seen in the recent conflicts, particularly through the paradox between private and public broadcasting. On the whole, you could argue that the public broadcasting in Britain, the BBC, has been much more independent from the government policy than private broadcasting, such as Fox News has been from the American government in the United States. So this role of public broadcasting as keeping an independence or some sort of distance vis-à-vis certain types of conflict in crucial situations, is very important. The second case for the importance of public broadcasting concerns not just war situations in faraway countries of which we know little, but concerns our own societies and the tensions and conflicts there. What we see now, the recent trend, has been the fragmentation, the segmentation of the media space. There is a proliferation of channels, each community in our society now has its own channel. You can have a Muslim channel, Jewish channel, Catholic channel, gay channel, women's channel, everybody has their own channel. Each community. And this fragmentation of the media space corresponds to the fragmentation and dissolution of the public space. The role of public broadcasting in those situations is crucially important for keeping the sense of community. So these are at least two reasons to reflect on the important roles of public media broadcasting. I'm stressing this in this country in particular, because this is a somewhat topical debate, but it concerns the region as a whole. In fact, it concerns Europe as a whole. There is a crucial importance of public broadcasting in the shaping of the perceptions we have of the conflicts and in dividing, internally, our societies or shaping the response of our societies to external conflicts.

• Bronislaw Geremek

I will give the floor now to Mr Pál Csáky, Deputy Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, who is in charge in the Slovak Cabinet of the European Affairs, Human Rights and Minorities. He's also Deputy Chairperson of the Hungarian Coalition in Slovakia. From 1990, he served as a member of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. He has a long and outstanding political career behind him.

• Pál Csáky:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to add that I'm really a representative of the Hungarian community in Slovakia. That's ten per cent of all inhabitants of Slovakia. It's the reason why I'm a very specific member of the Slovakian government, and Slovak-Hungarian relations are extremely important for me. So, ladies and gentlemen, from all people who are present here, my situation seems to be the most difficult one. I'm an active politician, and I have written quite a lot of newspaper articles. That's why I've made the effort to look at the communication issue from both points of view. In his book, *Profiles in Courage*, John F. Kennedy divides politicians into opinion leaders and those who just forego the attitude of the public and profess populist opinions. I would add to both, as far as dividing journalists into the same two categories. However, it's clear to all of us that a group of general leaders includes the smaller part of politicians and journalists, too. The co-existence of these two groups is very peculiar. Journalists are co-creators of their public opinion, while, at the same time, they monitor and control the activities of the representatives of public powers. Without the media, however, even the most tolerant and most important voice is very limited.

In principle, it's only natural that people expect politicians to come up with the initiative to solve problems, and to a certain extent, this is a true role that politicians ought to play in society. Nonetheless, it's also true that journalists can be not only helpful, but can also do a lot of damage. Our world is very complicated, too far from black and white. I've been Deputy Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic since 1998. My own personal experience has taught me how one incorrectly written, inappropriately placed article has the power to obliterate the results of several months or even years of hard work done by my team. Three or four overly strong statements, for example, about the Roma community in Slovakia, can cast doubt over the results of honest activities aimed at superseding various forms of intolerance in our society. I could show you at least one hundred cases when newspapers, radio or TV stations have released, evidently untrue, semi-true or degrading information, which they took back, or had to take back, that's in a week, a month, a year or two, this time in a less striking and less visible spot. I could give you many examples of how the media clearly attempted to influence political decisions. And only time showed that the influence was not always for the good. In Slovakia, media pressure forces a government member to resign at least once every year. Do the majority step down due to legitimate reasons? It is not always so.

Journalists know not only how to clean up the personal side of public life, but also how to manipulate people and the public opinion. Václav Havel and Adam Michnik are believed to have discussed this issue once. My counselor, Professor Kusý, claims that Havel was of the opinion that journalists are not responsible to the same extent as ex-politicians, because they are not elected. Michnik presented an opposing argument: while politicians are elected once in every four years, journalists are elected by their readers every day when they make the decision to buy a particular newspaper. Although I have great respect for Mr Adam Michnik, I would like to give two points to Mr Havel and one to Mr Michnik, for the following reasons. I know only very few cases when a serious mistake made by a journalist had serious consequences for society and maybe also for himself. But serious mistakes made by politicians almost always affect the lives of the people. At the same time, I do think that it's good to view politicians and journalists as natural

opposites. It's, at any rate, a peculiar symbiosis which includes elements of mutual monitoring and control on the one hand, and elements of partnership on the other. Journalists, as well as politicians, are co-responsible for creating our future. Good journalist leaders and good political leaders should not take the line of least resistance. Those who are granted this special privilege must choose to make a way to the unknown. It cannot always be done, and not everyone feels like doing it. However, it's becoming increasingly clear that both journalists and politicians have a common responsibility for the future of others. As a challenge, it's far from small. Thank you very much.

• Bronislaw Geremek:

Thank you very much, Deputy Prime Minister. I would like to defend my friend Adam Michnik, and to add one point. I think that Adam Michnik thought in terms of a definition given once to the very concept of nation. Renan said once that the nation, cęest les plebiscits de tous les jours. It's a every day plebiscit in a sense, the journalist is facing such a situation every day. Ladies and gentlemen, I will ask now Mr Martin Walker to take the floor. Mr Walker is an outstanding journalist with an extremely rich experience. He is editor of United Press International. He is also a senior fellow of the very well-known Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. He's a senior fellow of the Global Business Policy Council and of the World Policy Institute of the New School. For twenty-five years, he was a journalist with Britain's The Guardian, he served as bureau chief in Moscow and the US, as European editor and assistant editor and was awarded Britain's Reporter of the Year. His books include *Waking Giant: Gorbachev and Perestroika; The Cold War; Clinton: the President they Deserve;* and *America Reborn.*

• Martin Walker:

Thank you, Professor Geremek, and thank you also to Forum 2000 and the Sasakawa Foundation for organizing and presenting these excellent meetings. Well, as you've heard, I've got a confession to make. I'm a journalist. I'm part of the media. I'm one of the bad guys. I'm the messenger that you're meant to shoot. Worse than that, I've been the embedded reporter in wars. I've been embedded and not embedded, and I can tell you, it's better being embedded. I was embedded in the Iraq war for a while. I was actually embedded on the Soviet side of the Afghan war, and I was not embedded on the Afghan side of the Afghan war, and it's much, much safer to have somebody else's armour in front of you. And I'm sorry that that's a fairly human, cowardly point to make, but that is part of the reality. We in the media, we're not different. We're not saints, although some of the remarks today seemed to suggest, seemed to expect that we should be saints. No. We are pretty much flawed flesh and blood like the rest of you. We're pretty much average people. We sometimes have our wives and children in train and have to look after them, we're sometimes terrified for our lives, we sometimes haven't eaten for two or three days, we sometimes have very bad cases of diarrhoea or dysentery, and we've still got to try and get the story back. And all too often, I'm afraid, we have to follow the old Fleet Street rule, "Don't necessarily get it right, get it written. There's a hole in the paper tomorrow you've got to fill." We are part of what Fleet Street's always called "the daily miracle". We never get it entirely right. We sometimes get it as much as eighty, eighty-five per cent right, and that's not bad. But often, and to a great extent, it's not our fault. We are the prisoners of our sources. When I hear politicians or diplomats criticizing the media for not being analytical enough, well, that normally means we're not presenting their particular point of view. When they tell us that we've got the story wrong, it's probably because we've been listening to another diplomat, or another politician, and following their point of view.

Now, I was going to use my five minutes to try and wax lyrical about what I think of as the extraordinary miracle we're going through in the media today. Certainly, in my lifetime, in the last twenty years, I was based in Moscow at the time of the Gorbachev perestroika, I witnessed, I indeed was part of, the glasnost revolution. I was writing for some of the Soviet glasnost publications. It was a hugely exciting time. And since then, I've seen the same kind of glasnost starting to come to the Middle East, to the Arab world, with Al-Arabia, with Middle East Television, with Al-Jazeera, and I wanted to take part in programmes in them. I think it's absolutely wonderful that the old dead hand of censorship is being lifted from newspapers all around the world. This is all terrific, and it's wonderful also that we've got the internet, not just because it makes it easier to do research and to monitor what other newspapers are saying, but also because I think my profession is starting to learn, as the generals did when Clemenceau said, "War is too important to be left to the generals", and as diplomats realized when the NGOs began to prove to them that diplomacy was too important to be left to just the diplomats, so we in journalism, with the coming of the internet, with the coming of bloggers, with the coming of the levelling of access to the global media, we journalists are learning that for you, the public, journalism is too important to be left to us professional journalists. And I, for one, welcome that. And I'm trying to use more and more bloggers, trying to use more and more independent voices on the UPI wire at the moment.

But at the same time, there is another kind of revolution underway, which I want briefly to mention, and that is the horrendous financial revolution that's hitting all journalism. You probably heard last month that the New York Times is laying off five hundred people. The Los Angeles Times is laying off a hundred and eighty people. The BBC, two months ago, announced it was laying off thousands of people. Agence France Press in France continues to exist thanks to a bail-out from the French government. The Washington Post is losing five per cent of its circulation per year, because of the competition of free sheets. The old national news networks of the USA, of ABC, of NBC, of CBS, no longer command an audience of ninety per cent of the American public; they're getting less than fifty per cent these days. Something is fundamentally transforming the nature of the media, and the way we're financing the media, and all of us in this business are living through a highly exciting phase, but also a very challenging phase, in which we're trying to re-invent this business from the ground up, and having said that, because time is so short, it's a process that's being driven, not just, as some speaker said here, by the concentration of the media. It's also being driven by an extraordinary diffusion of the media, an extraordinary explosion of new, different, often unreliable, but often unignorable sources.

However, given all that change, given that revolution, for good, for ill, that we're trying to live with and trying to cope with, I want to make a point about something that deeply worries me. When I hear people talk about the need to regulate media, whether it's our analysis or our news reporting, I get very alarmed. When I hear people saying that the media are so important, they have to come under some kind of public control, I get even more worried. I want to go back to some of the earlier sessions that we had earlier today, about co-existence, about living together, about working together, and I want to find out, I want to put on the table in front of all of you, a really fundamental question. Whether we're talking as citizens, whether we're talking as members of a religion, members of a country, whether we're talking simply as human beings, or as members of our profession. What is it that are our red lines? What is it that we will not compromise on? Now, I would imagine that for some of my colleagues, like Mr Zogby or like Mai Yamani, or like Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd, they're scholars, they will not compromise upon the commitment to scholarship, the commitment to seek objective truth, the scientific process. I know that from our inspirer here today, Václav Havel, indeed from Elie Wiesel, his old colleague, that there were last ditches in which they were prepared to die. There were issues that they would not compromise on. There were certain fundamentals of freedom on which they would not compromise. Now, I've got my last ditch in which I'm prepared to die. I've got my no-compromise position, and that is freedom of the press. Freedom of inquiry. Freedom of speech. Without those, none of the other freedoms are going to matter.

Benjamin Franklin once said, if you have to choose between a government of elected politicians and a government of newspapers, it would have to be one without the other, he would choose a government of newspapers, and frankly, folks, so would I. And I'd like all of you to consider, after all we've heard today, about what we do as members of religion, of nations, of civilizations, professions, what are you not prepared to compromise on? For me, it's the freedom to do my job in as flawed a way as I have to, but in as good a way as I can. Thank you.

• Bronislaw Geremek:

Thank you very much for this magnificent defense of this profession of journalist. I think that all of us were impressed by that. Now I will ask Dominique Moïsi. Professor Moïsi is Deputy Director of the French Institute of International Affairs, and chief editor of Politique Étrangère, its quarterly publication, and Professor of the Institute d'Etudes Politiques de Paris. He's a columnist for the Financial Times, Ouest France and other European newspapers, and also member of the Board of the Aspen Institute Berlin, and other academic and political bodies.

• Dominique Moïsi:

Thank you, thank you very much, Professor Geremek. I think there is a great advantage in being nearly the last speaker in the last session, and that is that you can say more or less what you want and try to make your own summary, and I will do so, all the more so, that I was supposed to speak in the first session, but since I was the obstacle between you and lunch, I gave up at that moment.

And what I want to say could be summarized in two formulas. The first one is that self-confidence is a precondition to accept the otherness of others. And the second is that over-confidence is a recipe for disaster when dealing with others. The first one, self-confidence, cannot exist when you do not know who you are and when you are deeply afraid of the future. And I think this is where Europe is today. Europe is in the midst of an identity and legitimacy crisis. It has no longer an answer to the "Who are we?" question. It does not know where it ends in the geographic sense, and I would say that since the last enlargement, there is a sense of alienation, particularly among the old members of the European Union. We have lost a sense of familiarity with the Union. I think, vis-à-vis Turkey, there are deep divisions which are ultimately of an emotional nature, and that are coming down to the question, "Who are we?" If you are used to a commonwealth in the British sense of the term, Turkey should be in. But if it is to remain a closed-in political project, the question remains deeply open. You have to accept the emotion of European citizens, and for many Europeans, by the end of the day, Europe may be summarized as the combination between democracy and – and this is a Jewish person who expresses it – also the sound of church bells. Church bells not in a religious sense, but in a cultural sense of the terms. And I think you have to understand that if you go beyond the sensitivity of your citizens, if you neglect them completely, you will create a legitimacy problem between citizens and their governments.

All the more so, that Europe today is not only in the midst of an identity crisis, but also in the midst of a crisis of confidence in the future. Europeans are torn between three types of fears which, like archaeological layers, tend to pile on each other. There is the fear to be invaded by the poorest, and what a symbol for Europeans, to witness the images that we've seen coming from the enclave of Spain, in Morocco, and to simply compare them with the images of the East Germans trying to escape in the '60s and '70s. Today, we are witnessing people who are trying to penetrate Europe because they have no other alternative, and they are shot at

because they want to enter. Yesterday, the people were shot at by the people who didn't want them to leave for the cause of freedom. The second fear which Europe is experiencing is the fear of being left behind by more dynamic, younger, more energetic continents. Countries that work harder, countries that are hungry to regain their stance in the political arena, and of course, they do come from Asia, mostly. The third fear is to be blown away by fanatics, who may happen to be European citizens, for, since London, we do know that Europe is not only a target of terrorists, but it is also, possibly, a base for terrorists, which gives us a great sense of modesty. To the American question, "Why do they hate us?" we have to give another question: "Why do we fail so badly to integrate our European citizens?"

Let me come quickly to my second point, which is that over-confidence is a recipe for disaster when dealing with others. I believe that what is taking place in Iraq is, unfortunately, a very good illustration of that point. Former traditional colonial powers have learned the lesson the hard way, and what they have learned, and in particular, in my own country, France, is that you cannot do good to others without involving them in that process. Over-confidence leads you to make the wrong historical analogies. Iraq could not, and will not, become the equivalent of Germany or Japan after World War II. It may, by contrast, become the equivalent for America of what the Boer War was for the British Empire in 1905: a dangerous distraction.

To conclude, I will simply say two things to reflect this panel. First is that the media are essential, because thanks to them, and thanks to the revolution of communication that has taken place, we have globally lost the privilege of ignorance. We may choose to act or choose to abstain, but we cannot say any longer, we did not know. But I think there is also a danger in media over-representation, twenty-four hours a day, and that is that ignorance, which is sometimes the case when you send journalists underground, can lead to emotional intolerance. Journalists have to be prudent, because they are a true power pointing on the emotions on people. Thank you very much. This has been my summary.

• **Bronislav Geremek:**

Thank you very much, Mr Dominique Moïsi. The last panelist will be Sergei Kovalyov. Sergei Kovalyov is a biologist and a fighter for human rights in Russia. He spent some ten years in jail in the Soviet Union. Later Sergei Kovalyov was a member of the Russian Duma, former head of the Human Rights Committee of the Russian Parliament, and was the first Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation. He was, and still is, the voice of truth on the Chechen war, and it's important that it is a Russian voice.

• **Sergei Kovalyov**
(speaking in Russian):

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is me who is going to conclude today's debate. It seems that I am already starting with a twenty-minute delay, and this is why I am going to limit myself to very short comments. In my country, very often you can hear that the power of the Kremlin has no potential, that they are good for nothing, that they don't know how to work, they are not able to succeed in whatever they start to work with. And this is not precise.

Please believe me that I am the last one who would be in favor of today's establishment, and I have to confess with bitterness that they are more than efficient in what they are doing. And because the efficiency of exercising power, at least in my opinion, needs to be appreciated, and it has to be evaluated based on what extent it is able to reach its goals – independently of what the goals may be. In other words, this success depends on what kind of priorities you have, so it is possible that in this table of priorities of the Kremlin there might be a point of agenda of a national welfare and economic success, or something of this nature. And if there are such priorities, they may be of the twentieth rank of this table because there is a first priority and this is very different from the rest. And the first priority is power itself. It's keeping the power. It is the limitlessness of absolute potential of power. And to stress this even more, you can demonstrate this issue of maintaining power on the example of media. Today here we were talking about our era that can be proud of at least one democratic achievement: there is no censorship anymore. You cannot exercise censorship in the era of the internet and in the era of personal computers available in any part of the world. Unfortunately, this is not the case. There is a country where censorship dominates everything, and the name of this country is Russia. The censorship is constructed in a very wise way. It is used in a very opportunistic way. Our governors in the Kremlin are smart enough to know that there are things that you cannot re-make. For example, it is not possible to return to the gulags. You cannot re-establish national institutes of censorship. Unfortunately enough, they are smart enough to know that they don't even need to do it. They know that there is an internal censorship in the very heart of every author, no matter if he writes or speaks independently on what he or she is writing about. You cannot fool the internal censor, and even our journalists remember the days when they had to think what, when, and in what way they could spell out things. I'm not going to tell these stories again.

I will just remind you how, with the help of our jurisdiction, all independent TV and other channels were disassembled, and how all these channels have become the property of the state. But this campaign was not aimed originally at NTV or the Sixth channel or any other small independent channel. This campaign was aimed against all journalism, against journalism in its own right. Censorship was renewed; the censorship of a Stalinist nature and even of an older nature, and this was a lesson for the independent media to learn from. The current state is not unlike the Stalinist or even older days. I was staying in a Rustel and I was invited to the TV, and we were talking in front of the camera with the journalists from the Rustel TV, and this discussion ended up with a very typical picture. My partner told me, "Sergei, you are a very interesting partner for discussion. Unfortunately enough, our discussion will never be broadcast" And truly, the discussion was not broadcast, so that nobody would be blaming Rustel TV for not paying debts, and nobody could raise any other questions. Simply, they understood very well what happened and what was the lesson to be learned from what happened with NTV. I would now like to mention an example of a technical predecessor of today's censorship, and in what way today's censorship overcomes the achievements of Stalinist censorship. When Stalin was still alive, a well-known playwright Yevgeny Schwartz issued a small book containing his works. He was using fairytale topics, and he was a playwright just like Václav Havel. Everybody who was reading these fairy tales written by Schwartz understood very well what they were all about. Everybody understood that this was a satire aimed at the Soviet Union, and they also understood that the greatest monster, the dragon in the story, was Stalin. Stalin was still alive in those days, and of course a certain censor – and I can't envy him – signed the paper that allowed this book to be published. Now how should we understand this? There is a very simple explanation: Schwartz sort of laid a trap for the censor. There is a certain joke which says that Stalin is told that one of his colleagues was supposed to have said, "Oh, I'm fed up with that guy with the moustache" and Stalin asked, "Who do you have in mind?" and of course "Hitler!" was the answer. So Stalin turned around and said, "Well, Mr. Pospelov, who did you have in mind?" and of course the censor I spoke about didn't want to be put in a similar kind of situation like Pospelov. And so it was sort of understood or interpreted that the dragon was

in fact Hitler. Stalin, of course, was Sir Lancelot. Of course, with an internal censor, a personal censor, this wouldn't pass, and that is proof that it's understood that in today's Kremlin government the press and the media are very important. The press is the only tool of the civic society through which it can pose questions, questions like "who is master in the country? Is it state power, or the source of power, that is, the people?" And the last thing I want to say is a plea. When you take Novaya Gazieta, the Moscow Newspaper, or Novaya Vremya into your hand, do not let yourself be beguiled. Very often we hear that in the West you say that there is freedom of the press in Russia. But have a look at what they are writing. You shouldn't exaggerate. Ladies and gentlemen, these periodicals are surviving thanks to you. They are published in this way for you in the West, the Western intellectuals, to say "Yes, there is freedom of the press in Moscow". These periodicals are not read by more than 100,000 people, not more than that. And this is an important guideline for the Kremlin, a very cynical principle. If it's 100,000, then the Kremlin doesn't care, because on the other hand, millions of TV viewers are watching TV every day and they receive enormous doses of lies, and this, of course, plays into the hands of people in power.

• Bronislav Geremek:

Ladies and gentlemen, we are at the end of the Forum 2000 conference. This forum conference tried to approach our global co-existence, challenges and hopes of the twenty-first century. We had valuable debates and we tried to identify fundamental problems of the present time. We had the feeling that the notion of the international community should not belong only to political rhetoric, but that it is something important. If we don't have it, we want it – a community of human beings. Such a community should have its principles as a reference, certainly the respect of national sovereignty, as it was in the UN charter, but also the respect of human rights, the rule of law, and the open-society principle. Root causes of current threats were discussed as well as counter-terrorism strategy. The accountability of government was also approached. Horizons of our future co-existence were being debated. The concepts of society and community were discussed. The question of immigrants was also discussed, models of co-existence were criticized, some new ones suggested. Religion was approached, and we had the feeling that it is an important factor in the international community, and that freedom of religion and freedom from religion, as it was told, is one of principles of political institutions. But we need a presence of religion in our debates on the future. I think that we can say that the idea of the clash of civilizations has very few defenders among us. We do believe that civilization can and should co-exist in a peaceful way and having the feeling to enrich each other. Media were considered in this debate as important tools of action in this cultural co-operation and also in democracy, having the feeling that without media, we couldn't have the participation of the citizen in politics. A new kind of globalization was suggested. It was said, I believe by Mr Yohei Sasakawa, that we can return and create a new kind of globalization based on humanity. I think that our conclusion is that we need to base our co-existence on dialogue, on communication and on partnership. This morning, Václav Havel said that what is important, is to find and to look for, to find this spiritual principle which is organizing civilizations, communities, and which should be present also in politics. I think that I can say, on behalf of all of us, that we came to Prague, to the Czech Republic, invited by, one could say, a philosopher king. Václav Havel is a king of sorts. Václav Havel is a philosopher of human condition, but first of all, Václav Havel is a human being, warm, sensitive to human suffering, thinking about human hopes, and I think that we came to Prague because we know that Václav Havel is asking good questions, and we are grateful to Václav Havel for it. The floor is yours.

• **Václav Havel**
(speaking in Czech):

Ladies and gentlemen,

If I seem to be at a loss for words, it is due to the emotion caused by Mr Geremek's words just now.

A short while ago I had a telephone conversation with Oswaldo Paya in Cuba, and I told him that all of us here are thinking of the political prisoners in Cuba, that we sympathize with their fight for freedom in Cuba and that we will support those who strive for freedom.

The ninth Forum turned out very well. Information that I have received confirms that. If it had a drawback, it was the fact that all the wise people who gathered here could not speak to such an extent as they deserved to. The panel debates on Belarus, water in the Middle East, Africa, and the last one on media, were very important and interesting.

All speeches and discussions will be published as a conference report and will not be forgotten. In closing I would like to emphasize two points. Being here among you, I again and again realize that one of the most important things for a good future for the world is to stand up with quiet, humble and modest determination against all kinds of obsessions, against nationalistic, ideological obsessions and against obsessions with wealth. Globalization needs to acquire its spiritual, cultural, moral and human dimensions, respectively, and it needs to deepen these dimensions; otherwise we will end in a bad way.

Thank you for attending the ninth conference. I firmly believe that we will live and meet next year at the tenth anniversary conference.

Thank you.


2000
HIROYUKU ISHI
SKRIVANEK
language solutions

ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES

WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT OR COOPERATION

10. 10. 2005
"Knights' Hall" of the Žofín Palace, Slovanský ostrov, Praha 1

• *GUESTS*

HRH El Hassan bin Talal
President, Club of Rome; The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Uzi Arad
Head of the Institute for Policy and Strategy, former Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel

Bedřich Moldan
Chairman, Scientific Board of the European Environmental Agency, the Czech Republic

Hillel Shuval
Professor of Environmental Sciences, Hebrew University, Israel

• *MODERATOR*

Jan Urban
Journalist, Professor at the New York University in Prague, the Czech Republic

• *TOPICS OT THE ROUDTABLE*

To what extent does modernization influence water consumption patterns and vice versa?

If the current alarming trends in demography, economic development and water consumption hold on, is the Middle East going to face even more serious crises soon again?

Could a Community of Water and Environment be envisaged, having a value-added effect of mutual trust-building?

• *ORGANIZER*

Forum 2000 Foundation

NEAR EAST - THE FIFTH WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION?

9. 10. 2005
Goethe Institut, Masarykovo nábřeží 32, Praha 1

• *GUESTS*

Ghassan Salamé
Professor of International relations at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris
Senior Advisor to the UN Secretary General

Tomáš Urubek
Head of the Unit for International Relations and Information on Countries of Origin
Department for Asylum and Migration Policies, Ministry of the Interior of Czech Republic

• *MODERATOR*

Salim Murad
Lecturer in political science
Department of Social Studies University of South Bohemia

• *ORGANIZER*

Forum 2000 Foundation

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EUROPEAN UNION AND USA

11. 10. 2005
Goethe Institut, Masarykovo nábřeží 32, Praha 1

• *GUESTS*

Dominique Moïsi
Deputy director of the French Institute of International Affair
Chief editor of Politique Etrangère - Ifri's quarterly publication
Regular columnist for the Financial Times

John O'Sullivan
Editor-at-Large of the National Review
Conservative political commentator and journalist in Britain and US

• *MODERATOR*

Lenka Kovačovská
Member of European Workgroup

• *ORGANIZER*

Association for International Affairs in co-operation with the Forum 2000 Foundation

ISLAM AND SECULARISM

11. 10. 2005
Goethe Institut, Masarykovo nábřeží 32, Praha 1

• *GUESTS*

Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd
Egyptian scholar of Islamic Studies
He is involved in the Working Group on Islam and Modernity at the Institute of Advanced Studies of Berlin

• *MODERATOR*

Simona Hlaváčová
Association for International Affairs

• *ORGANIZER*

Association for International Affairs in co-operation with the Forum 2000 Foundation

THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN POLITICS

10. 10. 2005
Goethe Institut, Masarykovo nábřeží 32, Praha 1

• *GUESTS*

Kim Campbell
Former Canada's Prime Minister - first female Prime Minister of Canada
Chair Emerita of the Council of Woman World Leaders
Secretary General of the Club of Madrid
President of the International Women's Forum

• *MODERATOR*

Kateřina Jonášová
Journalist - Lidové noviny, Reflex; Czech Republic, International project Womenęs Memory co-operator

Miluš Kotišová
Translater, Editor of independent women's policy web Hlidaci fena; Czech Republic

• *ORGANIZER*

Gender Studies in co-operation with the Forum 2000 Foundation

PRAGUE WATER WORKSHOP

10. 10. 2005
Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, Prague

• *GUESTS*

Khaled N. Elshuraydeh
Higher Council for Science and Technology, Jordan

Hillel Shuval
Haddasah Academic College, Israel

Gerhard Knies
TREC, Germany

Petr Drulák
Institute of International Relations, Czech Republic

Michal Stibitz
GeoMedia, Czech Republic

Fadia Daibes-Murad
International Water Law Research Institute, Palestine

• *MODERATOR*

Petr Seifter
London School of Economics, Great Britain

• *ORGANIZER*

Forum 2000 Foundation

DEMOCRATISATION OF BELARUS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

10. 10. 2005
Goethe Institut, Masarykovo nábřeží 32, Praha 1

• *GUESTS*

Aleksandr Milinkievich
Opposition presidential candidate, Belarus

Bronislaw Geremek
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland

Brian Bennett
Ambassador to Belarus, the United Kingdom

Boris Nemtsov
Politician, Russia

• *MODERATOR*

Petr Mareš
Former Deputy Prime Minister, the Czech Republic

TOPICS OF THE ROUDTABLE

Is it time to change the policy of the European Union towards Belarus?

What is the best way to support the democratic opposition?

Is Russia interested in democratization of Belarus?

- ***ORGANIZER***

People in Need Foundation in co-operation with the Forum 2000 Foundation

EXHIBITION: "BELARUS AT THE TURN OF 21ST CENTURY"

The exhibition had taken place in the foyer of Goethe Institut on Monday 10th and on Tuesday 11th of October. Then the exhibition moved to the Municipal Library till October 30, 2005.

- ***ORGANIZER***

People in Need Foundation in co-operation with the Forum 2000 Foundation and the Goethe Institut

2005 ACTIVITIES OF THE FORUM 2000 FOUNDATION

Forum 2000 Conference "Our Global Co-Existence: Challenges and Hopes for the 21st Century"

(October 9 – 10, 2005)

The Forum 2000 Conferences – the flagship activity of the Forum 2000 Foundation - traditionally provide a relevant platform for an up-to-date dialogue about important and difficult issues key to the future of mankind. The theme of the 2005 Conference was the nature and meaning of current conflicts preventing peaceful coexistence of the international community. The participants examined religious "justification" of the conflicts, economic and social divide and cultural misperceptions and alienation. The Conference plenary was divided into 3 panels: 1. Conflict or Co-Existence? Where do we go?; 2. Concepts of Co-Existence and Community; 3. Communicating between Communities: The Role of the Media in Conflict of Perceptions. The Conference was attended by more than thirty delegates including Václav Havel, Bronislaw Geremek, Ghassan Salamé, Gareth Evans, HRH El Hassan bin Talal, Dominique Moïsi, Robert Cooper, Anwar Ibrahim, Mike Moore, Kim Campbell, Boris Nemtsov, Yohei Sasakawa, and many others. Over two thousand observers took part in the main plenary session and in the accompanying activities, panels and seminars, among the observers were university students and professors, diplomats, Czech and international business leaders, NGO representatives, and journalists.

Non-governmental Organizations' Market (NGO Market)

(May 4, 2005)

The Student's Forum 2000, a youth branch of the Forum 2000 Foundation, organized the annual presentation of non-governmental organizations – "NGO Market". The event took place in the Municipal Museum of Prague. The NGO Market, in which more than 80 NGOs participated, was open to organizations active in the field of human rights, education, civil society development, political participation, democracy, youth involvement and in other related fields, regardless of their scope (local, regional, national, international) and range of activities. NGO Market, as in the previous years, was open to the public.

Exploring Water Patterns in the Middle East: Linking Technology, Business and Politics in the 21st Century to Fight Aridity and Shape the Region's Future

(long term project, launched October 10, 2005)

The main objective of this project is to address the complex issue of the Middle Eastern water situation from the political, business as well as technological point of view. The project is planned to take place over approximately two years and consists of a series of expert roundtables and seminars, as well as a final conference where political leaders will meet senior business executives, scientists and NGO-representatives. The project is held under joint auspices and political leadership of HRH El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan and Václav Havel.

Roundtable "Water in the Middle East: Prospects for Conflict or Cooperation"

(October 10, 2005)

This roundtable was the launching event of the Forum 2000 long term project "Exploring Water Patterns in the Middle East". The roundtable took place as a part of the annual conference "Our Global Co-Existence: Challenges and Hopes for the 21st Century". Among the participants were HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan, President of the Club of Rome; Uzi Arad, Head of the Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya, Israel; Bedor at New York University in Prague. The roundtable focused on the following issues: To what extent does modernization influence water consumption patterns and vice versa? What is the role of tradition? If the current alarming trends in demography, economic development and water consumption hold on, is the Middle East going to face even more serious crises soon again? Could a Community of Water and Environment be envisaged, having a value-added effect of mutual trust-building? The roundtable issued a series of outcomes and recommendations that serve as a basis for further analysis during the long term project. The roundtable outcomes are available on the Forum 2000 website and were distributed to relevant private companies, scientific institutions and governmental bodies.

Workshop "The Water Short Middle East and Africa"

(October 10, 2005)

The workshop was organized by the Forum 2000 Foundation, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), and the Czech Institute of International Relations (IIR). As an expert workshop, it was directly associated with the roundtable "Water in the Middle East: Prospects for Conflict or Cooperation" mentioned above. Among the participants were Khaled N. Elshuraydeh, Secretary General of Higher Council of Science and Technology (HCST), Jordan; Hillel Shuval, Gerhard Knies - Coordinator of Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy Cooperation, Germany; Petr Drulák, Director, Institute of International Relations, Czech Republic; Michal Stibitz, Executive Manager of Geomedia Ltd, Czech Republic; Fadia Daibes-Murad, International Water Law Research Institute; Lydia Kan, Eva Diegel and Pavel Seifter, London School of Economics, Great Britain. The outcomes of the workshop were discussed at the roundtable "Water in the Middle East: Prospects for Conflict or Cooperation" and are included in a document that was issued from the roundtable, and is accessible at the Forum 2000 website.

Shared Concern Initiative

(continuous project)

In 2005, the Shared Concern Initiative (SCI) issued joint statements on the situation in Burma and Belarus. The SCI was inspired by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Václav Havel, F.W. de Klerk and HRH El Hassan bin Talal. It is a global network of prominent and respected former statesmen and thought leaders who feel that current international issues can be more effectively addressed with a common voice. The SCI, after endorsement by a simple majority of its members, issues opinion statements on most pressing current global problems. The SCI statements are released in newspapers around the globe in cooperation with the Project Syndicate. Organizational and administrative support of SCI is provided by the Forum 2000 Foundation.

FORUM 2000 DELEGATES 1997 – 2004

- **SHARIF M. ABDULLAH**
  Director of the Commonway Institute in the USA
- **PATRICIA ADAMS**
  Economist and executive director of Probe International
- **YILMAZ AKYÜZ**
  Turkish economist and scholar
- **TARIQ JAWAID ALAM**
  Students' Forum 2000 delegate from Pakistan
- **MADELEINE ALBRIGHT**
  Chair of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs,
  the PEW Global Attitudes Project and president of the Truman Scholarship Foundation
- **H.E. SHEIKH MOHAMMED MOHAMMED ALI**
  Islamic scholar, researcher and politician. Human rights and political activist in Iraqi opposition
- **SABAH AL-RAYES**
  PACE, Kuwait
- **EDUARDO ANINAT**
  Chilean economist, politician and scholar. Former Minister of Finance
- **OSCAR SANCHEZ ARIAS**
  Former President of Costa Rica. Nobel Peace Prize laureate (1987)
- **TIMOTHY GARTON ASH**
  Political scientist and writer, England
- **KEN ASH**
  Deputy director for food, agriculture and fisheries at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
- **HANAN ASHRAWI**
  Former Minister of Education of Palestine, member of the Palestine Legislative Council
- **EDITH AWINO**
  Students' Forum 2000 delegate, Kenya
- **MEHMET AYDIN**
  Dean of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Dokuy Eylül in Izmir, Turkey
- **PATRICIO AZOCAR AYLWIN**
  Former President of Chile between 1990 and 1995
- **MARK AZZOPARDI**
  Students' Forum 2000 delegate, Malta

- **CATHERINE BARBER**
  Economic policy adviser for Oxfam Great Britain and lecturer in economics at the University of Oxford
- **ANDRIS BARBLAN**
  Historian and political scientist, Secretary General of the Association of European Universities.
- **DEBI BARKER**
  Executive director of International Forum On Globalization
- **ALEXANDRE CHAMBRIER BARRO**
  Gabonese economist
- **HIS ALL HOLINESS BARTHOLOMEW**
  Head of the Greek Orthodox Church
- **THOMAS BATA**
  Czech born businessman, Canada
- **WALDEN BELLO**
  Philippine professor of sociology and public administration
- **CARLOS FELIPE XIMENES BELO**
  Nobel Peace Prize laureate (1996), East Timor
- **ROBERT L. BERNSTEIN**
  President of Human Rights Watch, USA
- **KURT BIEDENKOPF**
  Prime Minister of Saxony
- **AKIN BIRDAL**
  Former president of the Human Rights Association of Turkey
- **SYLVIA BORREN**
  Director of Dutch nongovernmental organization Novib, one of the member agencies of Oxfam International.
- **LYDIA BOSIRE**
  Delegate of the Students' Forum, Kenya
- **WILLIAM BOURDON**
  Paris attorney and president of Sherpa, former secretary-general of the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues
- **JEAN LOUIS BOURLANGES**
  Chairman of the European Movement in France
- **JOSEP BRICALL**
  Former President of the Association of European Universities

- **HANS VAN DEN BROEK**
  Member of the European Commission
- **IGNATZ BUBIS**
  Chairman of The Central Council of Jewish Organizations in Germany
- **MARTIN BÚTORA**
  Sociologist and writer, President of the Institute for Public Affairs in Bratislava
- **MARIO CAFIERO**
  Argentinean politician
- **FRITJOF CAPRA**
  Physicist and systems theorist
- **JORGE G. CASTAÑEDA**
  Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mexico
- **CORNELIUS CASTORIADIS**
  French philosopher
- **MAMADOU CISSOKHO**
  Honorary president of the Conseil National de Concertation et de Coopération Ruraux
- **BILL CLINTON**
  42nd President of the United States.
- **HILLARY CLINTON**
  First Lady of the USA
- **LORD RALF GUSTAV DAHRENDORF**
  Political scientist and sociologist
- **HIS HOLLINESS THE DALAI LAMA**
  Supreme spiritual representative of Tibet
- **LORD DESAI OF ST CLEMENT DANES**
  Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics
- **STEPHEN M. DAVIS**
  Specialist on international corporate governance. President of Davis Global Advisors
- **THOMAS C. DAWSON**
  American economist. Director of the External Relations Department of the International Monetary Fund.
- **FREDERIK WILLEM DE KLERK**
  Former President of South Africa. In 1993 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize together with N. Mandela

- **GUIDO DE MARCO**
  President Emeritus, Malta
- **JAMES DEANE**
  Founding member and Executive Director of Panos Institute
- **JIŘÍ DIENSTBIER**
  Czech politician, scholar and author. Minister of Foreign Affaires of Czechoslovakia from 1989 until 1992.
- **THOMAS A. DINE**
  President of the Radio Free Europe
- **WARIS DIRIE**
  Somali born activist and fashion supermodel
- **DEBORAH DOANE**
  Chair of the CORE (Corporate Responsibility) coalition of over 40 NGOs
- **DITTA DOLEJŠIOVÁ**
  Students' Forum 2000 delegate, Slovakia.
- **RIANE EISLER**
  Cultural historian, USA.
- **KAKUHAN ENAMI**
  Representative of the Tendai school of Buddhism and envoy of His Holiness the Patriarch.
- **AMITAI ETZIONI**
  German born American sociologist and social psychologist.
- **GARETH EVANS**
  Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia.
- **H.E. SHEIKH FAWZY FADEL EL ZEFZAF**
  President of Al Azhar Permanent Committee of Dialogue among Heavenly Religions
- **MARIA CELINA DEL FELICE**
  Students' Forum 2000 delegate, Argentina
- **FRANZ FISCHLER**
  Member of the European Commission responsible for Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries, and former Austrian federal minister of agriculture and forestry.
- **RIAN FOKKER**
  Spokesperson of NOVIB (Oxfam Netherlands)
- **JOERG FORBRIG**
  Students' Forum 2000 delegate, Germany

- **ROSENDO FRAGA**
  Argentinean journalist, political analyst and historian
- **ALBERT FRIEDLANDER**
  Rabbi of the Westminster Synagogue, London
- **FRANCIS FUKUYAMA**
  American writer and political scientist
- **JOSTEIN GAARDER**
  Norwegian writer
- **IVAN GABAL**
  Czech sociologist
- **PETER GABRIEL**
  World renowned singer and propagator of ethnic music; founder of the organization WOMAD (World of Music, Arts and Dance).
- **JOSEPH GANDA**
  Archbishop of Freetown and Bo, Sierra Leone.
- **HENRY LOUIS GATES**
  Director of Harvard's W.E.B. Du Bois Institute for Afro-American Research.
- **JOACHIM GAUCK**
  Former Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Files
- **SUSAN GEORGE**
  French political scientist, born in the United States. Vice president of ATTAC France.
- **BRONISLAW GEREMEK**
  Historian and Member of the Polish Parliament
- **ANTHONY GIDDENS**
  British sociologist, director of the London School of Economics
- **ANTHONY C. GIFFARD**
  American scholar specializing in mass media. Member of the Board of the Inter Press Service.
- **HANS VAN GINKEL**
  Rector of the United Nations University in Tokyo.
- **ANDRÉ GLUCKSMANN**
  French philosopher and writer
- **EDWARD GOLDSMITH**
  British scientist, ecologist and scholar, an eminent representative of the world environmental movement and founder of The Ecologist magazine

- **ÁRPÁD GÖNCZ**
  Former President of Hungary
- **NORBERT GREINACHER**
  Professor of Theology, University of Tübingen, Germany
- **EDUARDO MARCAL GRILO**
  Director of Gulbenkian Foundation; former Minister of Education of Portugal
- **TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA**
  Vice president and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines
- **TOMÁŠ HALÍK**
  President of the Czech Christian Academy
- **JOHN HALL**
  Sociologist, McGill University, Montreal, Canada
- **HRH EL HASSAN BIN TALAL**
  Prince of the Jordan Hashemite Royal Dynasty
- **VÁCLAV HAVEL**
  Former President of the Czech Republic.
- **HAZEL HENDERSON**
  Futurologist, USA
- **PHIL HENDERSON**
  The German Marshall Fund, USA
- **EVELINE HERFKENS**
  UN secretary-general's executive coordinator for the Millennium Development Goals Campaign.
- **THOR HEYERDAHL**
  Norwegian ocean traveler and author.
- **COLIN HINES**
  Author of Localisation, Great Britain
- **MAE-WAN HO**
  Professor of Biology at the British Open University
- **JEREMY HOBBS**
  Oxfam America, USA
- **TAKEAKI HORI**
  Anthropologist, advisor to the President of the Nippon Foundation

- **ELLEN HUME**
  Former White House Correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, USA
- **CHI STEVE CHAN**
  Taiwanese politician
- **JOSEPH CHAN**
  Sociology Professor at The University of Hong Kong
- **CLEMENT C. P. CHANG**
  Founder of Tamkang University, Taiwan
- **TZE CHI CHAO**
  President of World League for Freedom and Democracy
- **THE RT. H. LORD HOLME OF CHELTENHAM**
  Chairman and member of the Steering Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce Environment Commission
- **SHUNLING CHEN**
  Students' Forum 2000 delegate from. Taiwan
- **SHIH- MENG CHEN**
  Taiwanese politician and economist, and president of the Ketagalan Institute
- **VICTORIA PEREYRA IRAOLA**
  Students' Forum 2000 delegate, Argentina
- **AKIRA IRIYAMA**
  Vice president of the Sasakawa Africa Association and professor at Rikkyo University's Graduate School of Social Design Studies
- **MIHOKO ITO**
  Students' Forum 2000 delegate, Japan
- **VJAČESLAV IVANOV**
  Professor of linguistics at the University of California at Los Angeles, USA
- **MAREK JACINA**
  Students' Forum 2000 delegate, Canada
- **ASMA JAHANGIR**
  Lawyer, Chair of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
- **JOSEF JAŘAB**
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