The weekend of June 20, 2026, marked a turning point in Bolivia’s ongoing crisis, following more than 50 days of paralyzing blockades. The articles below, written by DSLA members Cecilia Requena, José Manuel Ormachea and Gustavo Pedraza at the height of the unrest, offer valuable perspectives on the historical context, economic challenges, and political dynamics shaping the crisis and its implications.
José Manuel Ormachea
Member of DSLA, National Senator of Bolivia
Bolivia is living through one of its most tragic moments in years. For more than 50 days, a group of social organizations commanded by Evo Morales from the Tropics of the Cochabamba Department has kept the Department of La Paz (most notably, the cities of La Paz and El Alto) – and, to a lesser extent, other departments – under siege. They have blocked the main highways connecting the seat of government with the rest of the country and abroad. This is preventing the arrival of basic goods essential for the survival of urban residents, including animal products (such as meat, chicken, eggs, and milk), as well as medicines, oxygen, and plasma, among other essential supplies needed to stock health centers.
This inhumane blockade against the country has a primary objective: to force the resignation of President Rodrigo Paz, who took office as Bolivia's chief executive just seven months ago.
The "Evista" movement, entrenched in the central region of Bolivia known as "El Chapare" (an area with the highest percentage of coca-leaf paste production destined for drug trafficking), intends to reclaim political power. They are deploying a strategy they have already used on two prior occasions: in 2003 and 2019.
The first attempt successfully triggered a prolonged period of social unrest that led to the resignation of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, and subsequently, President Carlos Mesa Gisbert. This maneuver effectively severed the entire line of constitutional succession by demanding the resignations of both the president of the Senate and the president of the Chamber of Deputies, until Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé, the president of what was then the Supreme Court of Justice, assumed office.
In the second instance – following an electoral fraud orchestrated by Morales himself in that year's elections, and after his resignation due to massive protests against him – he attempted to replicate the exact same strategy. He pressured for the resignation of the entire line of constitutional succession once again, aiming for the Military High Command to hand the presidency back to him.
However, the Chamber of Senators swore in opposition Senator Jeanine Áñez as president of the Senate and, consequently, president of Bolivia. This move respected the line of succession and halted the attempted self-coup via the forced succession that Morales intended.
Today, Morales is seeking the resignation not only of President Paz, but also of the entire line of succession, including Vice President Edmand Lara and the presidents of both legislative chambers. His goal is to force a new candidacy for the presidency in a new general election, despite being constitutionally barred from running again. Morales seems willing to incite further mobilizations, strikes, and highway blockades until his ability to run for office is accepted once more.
Meanwhile, the Paz administration is attempting to create avenues for dialogue with the Bolivian Workers' Center (Central Obrera Boliviana) and the Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia) to reach an agreement leading to demobilization. Nevertheless, Morales continues to urge protesters to reject any government concessions and to maintain their pressure tactics until President Paz steps down.
Allowing Bolivia's democracy to be stripped away once again would mean a substantive, and perhaps irreversible, setback for a recently reclaimed democracy. This is a democracy that was recovered in 2019 with the departure of a populist, aspiring autocrat like Evo Morales – who built a repressive apparatus against the opposition and bypassed the very constitution he ordered to be approved in 2009 to stay in power – but who was ultimately defeated in the streets and subsequently through democratic means in 2025.
We are living through defining moments that will determine whether we can consolidate ourselves as a full democracy or return to the autocratic model driven by Morales. Preventing this depends on the firmness of the Paz government: it must pacify the country through both negotiation and the rule of law, and ultimately bring Morales to justice for all the legal cases pending against him.
Gustavo Pedraza
Member of DSLA, Social Kapital Management, Bolivia
Bolivia is currently going through one of the most critical moments in its recent history. As I write these lines, the country suffered more than 50 days of road blockades that have suffocated our economy and fractured social coexistence. To an international observer, what is happening on our roads and in our cities might look like just another social protest. However, at its core, what is being decided in Bolivia is something much deeper: the very survival of our democratic institutions against the attempt of union sectors to supplant the authority of the state.
The current crisis has crystallized into an eight-point ultimatum presented by the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) to the government of President Rodrigo Paz. Among their demands, one legally and politically unacceptable pretension stands out: the right to veto any law or decree issued by the executive branch or the legislative assembly. As a lawyer and analyst, my position is unequivocal: one cannot dispense with the state and the laws to govern.
It is fundamental for the international community to understand that these blockades are not a show of strength, but rather of failure and desperation. We are facing a union leadership, spearheaded by the COB and sectors aligned with Evo Morales, which has pushed the country to the brink without achieving results. In doing so, they have lost credibility with a citizenship that is truly suffering from food and fuel shortages.
What we are witnessing today is a psychological tactic of "fleeing forward": projecting maximalist strength when, in reality, the leaders are exhausted and looking for a "dignified" exit from a conflict they themselves do not know how to end. However, the cost of that exit cannot be the capitulation of the constituted authority. A handful of leaders cannot condition the public policies of a government that received a mandate from more than 3.5 million citizens.
Bolivia's economic fragility serves as the backdrop to this conflict. The country faces an inescapable reality: the economy is weak, and the state is, in many ways, "on its knees." The COB demands the maintenance of hydrocarbon subsidies and the rejection of any rapprochement with organizations like the IMF. Nevertheless, factual reality tells us that Bolivia cannot function today without access to external credits to guarantee its sustainability.
It is legitimate to discuss sector-specific demands or refinancing, but the constitutional prerogative of the executive branch to establish the country's economic policy is nonnegotiable. We cannot allow the "caprice" of a few to define everyone's future in a meeting lasting only a few hours.
Bolivia is attempting to emerge from a 20-year cycle where the imposition of a few set the line for an entire government. We stand on the threshold of what I call "post-masismo," a period that must be characterized by democratic practice, institutional respect, and the full enforcement of the law. We cannot afford to "drown at the shore" just as we were attempting to cross the river toward institutional normalcy.
If the government capitulates to the demand for a union veto, the state as we know it will cease to exist. Instead, we will transition to being governed by unions and social organizations that will impose their will through permanent blockades.
The path to pacification does not rely on magical solutions, but rather on reclaiming our institutions and rebuilding the principle of authority with firmness and without violence. Democracy is not just about voting; it is the absolute respect for independent bodies – executive, legislative, judicial, and electoral – and for the rules of the game that allow us to live in peace. The future of Bolivia depends on the law prevailing over force today, more than ever.
Cecilia Requena
Member of DSLA, Member of the Chamber of Deputies, Bolivia
To understand what has been happening in Bolivia from a distance, one must move beyond binary narratives. Superficial or ideologically motivated external perspectives often pigeonhole our reality into dichotomies of "left/right," indigenous/nonindigenous, poor/rich, or East/West, which obscure reality rather than clarify it. The narrative of indigenous and popular sectors defending national interests does not hold up against an analysis of the demands of this mobilization, which ended up being openly coup-oriented, including declarations from discredited leaders like Evo Morales. The consequences of the prolonged road blockades on the people and the country ultimately led to widespread popular rejection and a demand for state intervention to end the population's suffering, which was caused by the siege of the metropolitan region of the seat of government but also affected other departments that were left cut off.
Objectively, after more than 50 days of blockades on the country's main highways, the economic crisis inherited by President Rodrigo Paz’s administration has worsened to critical levels. An additional loss of 5 percent of GDP is estimated. The already difficult living conditions of the poorest and most vulnerable people have been exacerbated, especially in La Paz and El Alto, preventing, hindering, and/or inflating the cost of access to basic foods, healthcare services, school and higher education, and transport – ranging from urban to international. It has also crippled the ability to work for the majority of the population who are working in the informal economy or self-employed (nearly 80%) and live day-to-day.
A large part of the economy has ground to a halt, and sectors such as tourism, industry, commerce, transport, and foreign trade have been severely impacted. The consequences will extend far beyond the end of the conflict, which seems to have already begun with the government's recent agreement with the Central Obrera Boliviana and the declaration of a state of emergency (in the early hours of June 20) – applicable specifically to the remaining blockades, as well as the carrying of firearms and dynamite.
The crisis did not emerge from nowhere, nor did it begin as a movement to overthrow the government. While not excluding other motivations, the conflict may have been ignited by a combination of factors that touched sensitive nerves: First, the surprising approval early this year of Supreme Decree 5503 – containing ambitious economic measures – which had to be repealed due to popular mobilization and technical and political errors. Second, the approval, without prior public consultation, of Law 1720, which affected a sensitive aspect of the agrarian regime. The western and collective lowland indigenous movements interpreted this law as a dangerous signal that the "commodification" of land would advance unchecked, with potential direct or indirect impacts on their territories. This law also had to be repealed at the government's request following the Indigenous March from the Amazon and the expansion of the conflict to other social sectors.
This chain of events confirmed the unexpected shift evidenced by the appointment of ministers from the agricultural elites of the eastern part of the country to several key cabinet portfolios, even though the vote that elected Paz president came from the West, particularly from those who had previously supported the Movement for Socialism (MAS). This solidified the perception of a political "betrayal" and the abandonment of his electoral base. Added to this was the scandal of contaminated gasoline – a problem inherited from the previous administration, worsened, still unclarified, and far from resolved – which damaged thousands of engines across the country.
It is important to debunk the versions circulating in certain sectors of the international community regarding a supposed violent repression involving deaths and torture. For now, the deaths that have occurred have not been the result of state action; rather, they were a direct consequence of the blockades. This is ratified by reports from the ombudsman, who is frequently accused of being favorable to the MAS because he was elected by the legislative assembly during the previous administration.
The Paz government has deliberately opted for a strategy of "wearing down" the mobilization instead of confrontation, avoiding the declaration of a state of emergency in order not to fuel the vicious cycle of violence that, in Bolivia, has frequently preceded the fall of democratic governments. Tragically, we already mourn more than 20 deceased individuals, including children. These include sick patients who could not cross the barricades to reach a hospital; truck drivers blocked in remote areas of the Altiplano highways who died in the cabs of their trucks after weeks of inhumane conditions; and people who suffered fatal accidents while having to use secondary roads to bypass blockades.
Civil organizations representing cancer and diabetes patients have denounced the inability of patients to attend dialysis and radiotherapy sessions. It is estimated that, for this reason, the actual death toll is higher. There was also a permanent crisis involving newborns and sick children at risk due to a lack of access to medical oxygen caused by the blockades, compounded by the lack of sufficient food in health centers. Faced with such a situation, a large part of the population did not accuse the state of abuses, but rather of an omission of duties by failing to guarantee the human rights of the majority against a mobilized minority.
The country's challenges are formidable and must be faced while, hopefully, making progress toward overcoming the structural and historical weaknesses of the democracy established in 1982. Despite having major differences with Paz's policies, the attempt to overthrow a government just seven months after it was elected, as proposed by the mobilizations in recent weeks, is not an acceptable way out. There are constitutional mechanisms for those who wish to propose a mid-term recall referendum.
In any case, the deep economic crisis we find ourselves in is an inheritance from the MAS regime, which squandered the economic boom derived from the raw materials super-cycle, missing the opportunity to diversify the country's economic matrix. It also systematically and deliberately weakened democratic institutions, benefiting the very trade union and guild corporations mobilized today.
Bolivia voted for a change of direction and remarkably managed to do so in peace. That will must be respected, as well as executed with governing capabilities that, for now, have been severely lacking. Everything indicates that Paz will have the opportunity to correct the course.
Bolivian society has its own challenges. For example, contributing to reconciliation and seeking common ground while respecting diversity, justice, and well-distributed prosperity; and evading the polarization, hate speech, violence, separation, and refusal to recognize "the other" that are present above all on social media. For anyone willing to see, the blockades have also exposed our economic interdependencies and, more importantly, the remarkable commitment to nonviolence made by the victims of the blockades in La Paz and El Alto, despite prolonged and acute daily suffering. A reactivation of the sense of citizenship against traditional corporations that harm people without apparent compassion in the name of "the people" could provide continuity to this Bolivian transition toward more democratic political forms that respect everyone's rights.
Hopefully, those interested in our country from abroad will accompany us on this path with a willingness to better understand a reality that, like that of other nations, is complex.
The views expressed in these works are the responsibility of its authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Forum 2000 Foundation or its staff.
