Nuclear Arms in Today’s World

Moderator: Josef Jařab

Panelists: Dana Drábová, Masashi Nishihara, Charles D. Ferguson, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Paul Wolfowitz

 

 

Josef Jařab opened the panel with the acknowledgement, “we definitely know we want to live in peace. How to achieve peace, however, is not easy.” He traced public perceptions of the 1945 attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, citing John Hersey’s 1946 article “Hiroshima”, as what led people to see “horrifying statistics” as “human tragedies.” Before opening the floor to panelists, he raised questions about the existence of a nuclear threat today, the effectiveness of political agreements like the recent US-Russian Nuclear Arms Reduction Pact, and the actions that citizens can take.

 

Dana Drábová emphasized “the dual face of nuclear energy” in the context of energy security issues, with the potential for major benefits on one hand, and the “great risk inherently connected with it” on the other. She also thought that while the immediate potential for nuclear war was low, greater threats could come from nuclear dispersal devices, or dirty bombs, which are easier to make and use and do not require state-run infrastructure. She concluded by asserting the importance of taking “steps to assure a global governance concerning nuclear security.”

 

With regards to nuclear deterrence, Dewi Fortuna Anwar cited conflicts in Asia during the Cold War period as evidence that “the presence of nuclear weapons does not deter countries from having hot wars.” She further argued the ineffectiveness of deterrence in the cases of terrorists who espouse “an ideology where death is celebrated”, and rogue states “not bound by current international law.” Turning to current disarmament efforts, she stated that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s value was diminished by the asymmetry of its application, which non-nuclear states claim puts them at a disadvantage. Finally, while she identified a nuclear weapons-free world as an ultimate goal, she acknowledged its improbability in the near future, and suggested a medium-term goal of creating more nuclear weapons-free zones.

 

Masashi Nishihara, highlighted the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as grounds for the eventual abolition of nuclear arms. However, he maintained that states need “to be practical; the complete abolition of nuclear arms must be a gradual process”. In describing the distrust between nations, Nishihara admitted that “reducing the possibility for nuclear war may encourage the possibility of conventional war” in the absence of proper international institutions and a political environment to guarantee the security of disarming nations.. Even if we achieve international commitment to disarmament, he said, suspicions would remain that nations were secretly stockpiling nuclear weapons, and so far international bodies have failed to regulate this. Nishihara argued that because such overriding mistrust that cannot be alleviated in the short run, “the concept of deterrence is changing, but it is still useful in preserving stability in many areas”.

 

Charles D. Ferguson similarly emphasized the need to focus on the conditions that heighten the risk of nuclear conflict, rather than solely “viewing disarmament through a nuclear lens.” He described, “in order to learn where and how to drill we need to understand that nuclear conflicts are a symptom of underlying diseases”. To address these symptoms, Ferguson cited the role of political transformation, security perceptions, and stronger alliances as well as the importance of civil society in pressuring governments to end the nuclear arms race. Ferguson argued the need to address specific issues within a country as a more realistic approach to reducing the risk of nuclear conflict and nuclear terrorism, which he claimed was “what is required is to make the security of all nations a top priority.” 

 

Paul Wolfowitz maintained an optimistic perspective towards nuclear proliferation as an instrument of deterrence, arguing that the use of atomic bombs to end World War II likely saved lives compared with traditional warfare. However, in response to the role of nuclear arms in the current political situation, Wolfowitz echoed Ferguson’s views, arguing that, “it wasn’t the weapons that caused the conflict, it was the conflict that caused the buildup of weapons.” He further stated that since “we can never eliminate the knowledge that nuclear weapons can be made,” a more effective strategy would be to reduce sources of conflict. Furthermore, he emphasized the enduring incentive to acquire nuclear arms as the “weapon of the weak”, as it provides a comparative advantage to weaker states. On this he alluded to Kant’s belief that peace would be attained when “war became so terrible as to be impossible”. However, this elevates the risk posed by nuclear weapons acquired by non-state actors, as Wolfowitz concluded by considering the implications of a successful nuclear terrorist attack on civil liberties as well as freedom and democracy worldwide. Therefore, Wolfowitz asserts that the reality of nuclear proliferation must be accepted in our policies, and we must instead look at the conditions and difficulties within countries that make this technology a threat to global security.

 

Although the speakers agreed that world security would benefit from the absence of nuclear arms, they showed that this is not a realistic expectation in the short-term, and offered different perspectives on how to formulate new policies to cope with these dilemmas in today’s political environment. The most prominent obstacles include asymmetrical treaties, distrust among powers, and the inability of weak states to prevent the abuse of nuclear technology by non-state actors. In order to realistically achieve the world we want to live in, the speakers argue that we must address these more nuanced challenges and develop a greater degree of trust worldwide.