Topic: EU and Russia: What are the Alternatives to Energy Driven Policy?

EU and Russia: What are the Alternatives to Energy Driven Policy?

Jacques Rupnik
We now have a panel on the EU—Russia relationship. What the alternatives are to the energy driven policy and obviously that relationship is of greatest importance to the European Union and perhaps more generally internationally. But the title assumes that energy is the key issue in that relationship and that is perhaps an assumption that may be questioned by some of our panelists, there may certainly be a debate about the hierarchy of priorities that the European Union can or should have in the relationship with Russia. Should it be energy? Should it be security? Should it be democracy and human rights? And obviously the order of priorities in those areas may vary and as you know they do vary within the European Union itself. Well, to address the problem of the EU—Russia relationship we have a very distinguished panel and it will be introduced by Alexandr Vondra who I do not think needs much introduction in Prague. Let me simply remind you that he was a foreign policy adviser to the president, he was ambassador to the United States and he is Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs in the current Czech Government.

Alexandr Vondra
Well, thank you, Jacques, for the introduction. My dear friends, I think I was asked to kick off the debate or to launch a discussion so let me just say a few remarks. In 2003, Anatolij Čubajs published a piece in the Russian daily Nězavisimaja Gazeta stating that Russia’s top 21st century priority is to build up a liberal empire. This is a quotation. According to this idea the return of Russia among superpowers is supposed to be orchestrated by economic tools rather than by direct military pressure. To the surprise of many, including the author himself, this concept has become a new doctrine of Russian foreign policy and a perfect ideological tool for the Kremlin to exercise more power in what is defined in Moscow as “the Near Abroad”:

- Gazprom is using pricing policy as a tool for punishing nasty neighbors on a daily basis.
- Russia’s major government-owned companies are trying to assume control of key economic entities across the post-communist territories by acquiring their assets.

The question we have to ask is the following: Is democracy compatible with any form of post-modern imperialism? Does Russia actually believe in genuine democracy? The answer to this question is crucial since a democratic Russia is a precondition to security both for Central Europe and the world. Why is that?

First: only with a functioning democracy can Russia internalize the principle of democratic sovereignty and will be able to accept as permanent the shift in the geopolitical balance in Central Europe after its former satellites have joined both the EU and NATO. Let me mention just one of many examples that shifts Russia away from full democratic commitment. President Putin has recently accepted the offer of the United Russia Party to lead the party in the next legislative election and thus will probably remain in power as Prime Minister. His choice was no doubt legal, but did it comply with the principles of democracy and democratic alternation?

Second: only a Russia committed to the universal values of freedom and democracy may act as our irreplaceable partner, not a competitor or adversary, in stabilizing the world order and solving all urgent crises in international relations such as Iran, Kosovo or ballistic threats from Islamist regimes. A new era of confrontation between the East and the West must be certainly avoided. Unpredictability of international relations in which Russia aspires to act as an arbiter, not as a part of the solution is a major threat to world security.

What are the conclusions? We are facing two main challenges in regard to the relationship with Russia:

The first challenge is to refrain from isolationist policies. Russia is our indispensable partner in the ever more complex global order and deserves to be acknowledged as such. Until mid-twentieth century Russia was an important part of the “concert of European powers”. Liberation of Europe from the Nazi terror would have been unthinkable without the sacrifices of the Russian people. Russian culture is inextricably linked to Europe. To this extent Russia was and still is a part of Europe. We must, therefore, not give up on a relationship with Russia, but this relationship must be that of equal partners. We also must never quit striving for democratization in Russia.

And the second challenge is to ensure European solidarity or, let’s say, even unity toward Russia. The Russian policy of bilateral deals and dividing Europe needs to be refused. Russia will only accept us as a partner if we can provide for united and symmetric European responses to its policy. Allow me to quote a somewhat hyperbolic old saying: “Russia respects more a powerful enemy than a weak friend.” We want to be Russia’s friends and we want to earn its respect.

Countries of Central and Eastern Europe are today part of the EU and NATO, and it is in their vital interest not to be seen as a region “apart” but as fully-fledged members of these entities. That should be the red line of our policy toward the whole world, including Russia. We will, however, need Europe on board for that.

Jacques Rupnik
Thank you very much for this opening of our debate and I will now immediately give the floor to our first speaker—Viktor Orbán. It’s a great pleasure to see him in Prague and to see him after many years. When I first met him, he was a rebellious student leader during the last years of the communist regime in Budapest, the founding father of FIDESZ, the movement of the young democrats which has then turned into a political party that led him all the way to the Prime Ministry, and presently he is the leader of the opposition in the Hungarian parliament. So it is a great pleasure to welcome you in Prague and give you the floor.

Viktor Orbán
Good morning ladies and gentlemen. Alexandr Vondra said that he would try to kick off our discussion. The difficulty is that I agree with all the points he made so therefore, in order to generate at least some confrontation, if you don’t mind, I would like not just to comment on his sentences but try to use another approach to the whole issue we have just discussed. So the theme of this panel is, what are the alternatives to energy-driven policy between the EU and Russia? My answer in one line is: There is no alternative to that. Taking into consideration that energy will remain the key issue in the forthcoming several decades for the European Union, and taking into consideration that the energy issue is the main foreign policy instrument for the Russians, it is very clear that the issue will remain in the centre of relations between the EU and Russia. So the appropriate question for me is rather, what is the right energy-driven policy between Russia and the European Union? I would like to make just three or four points in five minutes. The first is when I say Russia, I understand the Russian political system and not the Russian people so that kind of distinction is very important especially because I try to be as open as possible and I would not like to make any impolite judgments on the Russian people. I am speaking about the Russian political system. I think in Europe we should be aware that by now there is a clear and essential difference between the Western and Eastern parts of Europe.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union we witnessed a kind of process—democracy—building process in Russia and now, one and a half decades later, we can see the result of this. The result is clear and seems to be valid in the long-term. The essential notions of the Western world are known now in the East, and Russia and the Russians, I mean the Russian politicians, use it in an internal and international context as well. Institutions in Russia and the West show similarity—elections, parliaments, limited terms for the president and so on. But the real competition of organized and structured political forces representing clear and distinctive political alternatives, which is the essence of the political system in the West, do not exist in Russia. The story is the same in the case of the economy. Notions of Westerners, I mean the Europeans, like market competition, transparency, have a different content or at least they are of less importance in the East, in Russia than in the Western part of Europe.

So, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Chairman, I think we face a strong partner who plays the game by very different rules than we do. They are effective and the West is non-effective. They are concentrated; the Western part of Europe is divided. My personal opinion is that the first step in creating a right policy toward Russia is to be aware of the real character of the situation we are in. I know that sometimes it is inconvenient to speak about Russia and Eastern Europe in the straightforward way which, I have done just now, but there is an advantage, may I say a reward, to being in opposition as we are at home, and this is the luxury of straightforwardness I would like to enjoy here as well. So finally, I would like to make a concluding remark. I would like to mention that there are countries where the fight for belonging to the West or to the Eastern part of Europe is still going on. One of these countries is our nation—Hungary. That makes us, Hungarians, sensitive to the political implications of a re-emerging Russia. I would like to make clear that this is not some obsolete Russo-phobia that guides Hungarian thoughts on this subject, but we experience day by day that the multi-party political system without democracy can exist. In addition, we have a double exposure in Hungary: 45% of our energy consumption is natural gas and 85% of natural gas imports come from one single source—Russia. So we are experienced and our thoughts are guided by experiences and pragmatism. We in the European Union must challenge efforts aimed at monopolizing our markets and increasing our energy exposure. We must make it clear at the same time to our Russian friends that such efforts are not directed against Russia but they are simply derivatives of our market rules, derivatives of how the West plays the game. We call it market economy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Jacques Rupnik
Thank you very much for the clarity and concision of your statement, what you call the luxury of straightforwardness. We enjoyed that luxury and we hope it will be the same with other speakers and I am certainly sure it will be the truth with the next speaker. The next speaker is another old friend, Adam Michnik, who is a writer, essayist and historian and a former leader of the democratic opposition in Poland. Today he is the editor-in-chief of the main Polish daily, Gazeta Wyborcza. It is a great pleasure to give him the floor.

Adam Michnik
I absolutely agree with what Saša said, and I also agree with what Viktor has just said. In other words, I am not feeling very comfortable now that I am supposed to make my remarks in a similar fashion, I have been trying to adopt a slightly different approach to this question. In what Alexandr Vondra said, there was a very correct description of what is currently happening in Russia. Saša referred to this article by Čubajs. I, too, will always remember my confrontations with this new doctrine behind Russian policy. Ten or eleven years ago, in New York, an international think-tank was having a meeting which I was invited to. At the meeting there was somebody who was an adviser to the Kremlin and afterward we decided to have a glass of vodka together and it was then that I decided to avenge myself. As it were, for all the years of occupation and I tried to explain to my Russian friend that tanks, their military force may be better but our vodka is definitely superior to the Russian vodka and I won. I drank more of the Polish vodka than he did and then I asked him what was going to be the official policy in Russia and he said it would remain the same as it had so far.

There has always been an empire, we will be an empire, but this does not mean that we will be sending out tanks anymore. We will be using gas and oil instead, and this is exactly what happened later; this is exactly what the Kremlin has been doing. It is quite clear what this policy entails. In other words, it is an attempt at rejuvenating this empire. There is, of course, one idea behind this and that is the disintegration of the transatlantic alliance and also the disintegration of the European Union. Today when we are asking ourselves how we should respond to this vision of Mr. Putin—and I am following up on what Viktor was saying—we really need to try to promote democracy, democracy in Russia, we need to rely on all those people in Russia who are committed to defending democracy in Russia even though these people are very weak or may seem to be weak now. But let us remember those times when we, too, were seen as very weak people and it was then that we were hoping that it would be the democratic forces that would provide some kind of help to us—people living in countries run by generals and secretary generals of the party. We should not be trying to revive some anti-Russian policies. Viktor Orbán said that he rejects these sentiments.

So do I, but I do not think anybody ever declared himself or herself as Russophobic just like no one would call himself an imperialist. In other words, in response to Russophobia we should be extremely sensitive because phobists are stupid and very often we feel absolutely helpless, we feel then that we are in fact slaves of our doctrine. When I watch politics in relation to the EU and to the world, I very often see certain problems—I am talking about my country—in response to Russian policy. We should definitely opt for further strengthening of Europe. The European Union should never be seen as an enemy of the United States. On the contrary, the European Union should be a very strong partner of the United States because this transatlantic alliance is a safeguard of democracy and freedom in the world. But there is an obstacle to further integration, such things as xenophobia, nationalism and other elements that we know from my country, of course, do create an obstacle. I think the situation is very dangerous today. It is definitely more dangerous than it was some years ago—watching all the tensions for example between Slovakia and Hungary or listening to some of the political rhetoric of my government for example vis-à-vis Russia or vis-à-vis Germany. I often feel that these conflicts and the same applies to religion, as it was discussed at the previous panel, we feel that there is a Satan, a Satan that is planning all these conflicts, that is behind all these conflicts trying to make sure that they will develop into true open conflicts. And in relation to the Russian empire we often feel absolutely helpless and we are even more helpless in a situation when we feel that there is no democracy in Russia. We need to be wary of any imperialism, and democracy is the right way of approaching this and I believe that this is connected with our own security.

Jacques Rupnik
Thank you, Adam, and I note the strong convergence between Adam Michnik and Viktor Orbán at this panel. Our next speaker is Alyaksandar Milinkevich, who is a scientist and academic, leader of the Belarusian opposition, as you well know, and the holder of the Sakharov Prize awarded by the European Parliament.

Alyaksandar Milinkevich
The prize of the oil and gas is not the most important thing. What matters most is the general framework of dealing with the problems which are on the table, the problems faced by the world today.

I will speak about the relations between Belarus and Russia, a very specific type of relations that could serve as an example of how the energy issues could easily become very political ones. Over the relatively short period—about fourteen years—the nature of relationship has changed. At the beginning of his presidency, the Belarusian dictator thought that he would be able to unite two countries—Belarus and Russia—and that he would be able to catapult himself into the Kremlin. That was in the mid-1990s. At that time Yeltsin was president in the Kremlin and was losing his power, he was aging and it was the time when the program or the agenda for the unification of the two countries started to be developed.

Lukashenkа’s plan collapsed because of the new strong president of Russia. Lukashenkа continued to declare his desire to create the union of two countries, what in the Kremlin’s mind meant Belarus’ incorporation into Russia. Because of these promises he was guaranteed supplies of oil and natural gas at a good price. He failed to use the advantage of cheap energy resources to carry out reforms in my country, reforms that were necessary then, and continue to be necessary today. He used these gifts to strengthen his hold of power and to preserve the command over social issues too.

Today in Russia nobody in high policy believes in these promises so the era of gifts has come to an end and my country must pay the normal market price for these resources, for these fuels. But our economy is not prepared to do that so it is very difficult to solve these economic issues. The economy of Belarus is the last economy, which has not been transformed.

It is a planned economy; we are not competitive even in relation to our neighbors, and not at all at a European level. The energy issues in my country are very, very, very difficult because we did not undergo the required reform and the question is what should the relations be with Russia, with Europe? And as far as energy supplies are concerned my friends, myself, and friends from the democratic opposition, are now not included in the dialogue between the regime and the rebels and we cannot help to resolve these energy issues because Belarus is a transit country. We would like to resolve this issue together and we often ask if there is a need to cooperate? Is there a need to have an unconditional kind of relationship with the regime? Or a conditional one? And that is a moral issue. Of course the easiest type of relation would be an unconditional one, taking into account only economic issues, but on the other hand we have political prisoners in our country and more than 300 students were kicked out of universities, many of whom are continuing their studies now in the Czech Republic and elsewhere. In my opinion, when we establish economic relations which are so important for us, we have to deal with these issues together and the European Union should lay down conditions, moral conditions, as had been explained also by the European Commission. I think this is a moral-based policy, which is absolutely necessary in order to resolve the issues relating to the liberalization and democratization of my country.

And one other point: in Russia, in Belarus and in Western Europe people should have an interest in Russia becoming a democratic country—that is in our common interest. Of course, there are problems with democracy. Very often I am asked whether Russia has a great political and economic influence in our country, whether it could help to oust our dictator. Yes, there is an influence but it is not an absolute influence. I believe that one of the keys to the solution of issues relating to the democratization of Russia is also the democratization of my country, Belarus, and the independence of Ukraine. If both Ukraine and Belarus are democratic and independent, then it will be easier for Russia to start real democratic reforms. What Adam Michnik says is true, these post-imperial feelings do exist in Russia and they prevent Russians from starting a real development of their democratic life. I believe that the most important thing is to support democratic forces in my country, in Ukraine and in Russia. That is one way of approaching the solution to these energy related issues.

Jacques Rupnik
Thank you very much Alyaksandar Milinkevich. Thank you in particular for raising a very interesting issue. I mean, there has been a lot of discussion about the way Russia is using the energy leverage against democratizing regimes on its periphery. The case of Ukraine was obviously frequently discussed and is very topical today. You have mentioned something about the way Russia is now squeezing its Belarussian neighbor and therefore the question is: is Russia undermining a dictatorship in Belarus, and thus unwittingly contributing to its erosion or possibly destabilization? So this is an interesting dimension, let’s say addition, to our reflection about the energy leverage as it has been used by Russia. Our next speaker, Mr. Martin Bútora from Slovakia, is a well-known sociologist. He was an ambassador to the United States, he’s the founder of the Institute for Public Affairs in Bratislava and it is a pleasure to give him the floor now.

Martin Bútora
Let me place this discussion about energy and relationships between the EU and Russia in a broader context. One hundred and fifty years ago, a great Russian poet, Fyodor Tyutchev, wrote a short poem that is very well known to every Russian student. It says—One cannot understand Russia by reason / And measure her by a common yardstick. / She has a peculiar nature / One must simply believe in Russia.

Tyutchev was deeply convinced that Russia has a mission, a pan-Slavic mission. He believed that the struggle between Russia and the West is fast approaching and inevitable. He believed that Russia is the only reign of peace, of faith, an empire that would reunite all Christian churches under Russian leadership. But while in his articles one can hear tones of fervent messianic Russian nationalism, Tyutchev was also a cosmopolitan, an educated aristocrat, a diplomat who spoke perfect French, spent more than twenty years abroad, and both his German wives did not speak Russian at all. And in spite of all this, in spite of this background and his knowledge of the foreign world, he proclaimed as inevitable a clash between “a triumphant Slavdom led by Russia and a Western conspiracy”.

I am quoting this Russian poet because his verses are used by prominent Russians even today, as we see from the reaction of Russian President Putin to a wish expressed by French President Sarkozy. “I would like to better understand Russia,” said Sarkozy upon his arrival for a visit to Moscow. The Russian leader responded: “Well, we have a very well-known poem on this topic…”—and he quoted Tyutchev. While, in fact, contemporary Russian leadership does not provide too many reasons to be trusted, at the same time it helps us to understand Russia. So let me summarize briefly what we are facing beyond the energy discussion.

First, Russia aspires to emerge as an alternative model of modernization, an alternative to Western liberal democracy, and does everything to present itself in a very popular way and to a certain extent it is popular among many countries and many people in this world. Secondly, Russia is systematically building its state doctrine as a mixture of Soviet legacy and imperial heritage. We see the actors contributing to it, actors conceiving and practicing this new state doctrine, like the Orthodox Church, a priest recently blessing the new Russian S400 rocket, intellectuals participating in rewriting Russian history marked by a growing absence of memory of Stalinism and of Stalin. Thirdly, I think contemporary Russian policy is based on president Putin’s conviction that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century. Fourthly, and more importantly, I think Russia is openly challenging the very substance of the EU integration and of the European model. The European Union was created as a response to the horrors of the twentieth century, as a response to the damages of nationalism and of rivalries between nation states. Many features, which we see in contemporary Russia, are simply moving in the opposite direction. Ivan Krastev and the others even think that Russia not only does not consider the EU as a global player, it even regards the European Union as, I am quoting “a temporary phenomenon, interesting experiment but with no future”.

Even if all that I have said and what many of the panelists and you in the hall and many, many other concerned policy makers know very well is really quite serious, at the same time I see some signs of hope. I think there are rising concerns over Russian policy, over certain elements of Russian policy both within the European leadership and also in the European population and there are repeated surveys from different sources confirming this increasing sensitiveness. What we see now is, I think, the end of a strategic partnership based on common values. This was the policy some years ago and this is no more the case. There would be both a cooperation in areas where it is possible and useful and confrontation in other areas and I think this is a mental challenge for Europe to understand and to perceive a Russian position and the relationship between the EU and Russia in this way.

How are we prepared for this change? Well, on the level of the presidency, with Portugal now and Slovenia next, we cannot expect those two countries to engage too much in Russian issues, but with France, which will take over in the second half of 2008, we can perhaps foresee some changes. On the level of individual countries there is some hope regarding Germany, where a change might be only gradual, but perhaps more coherent. There are evident signs of change in France, there seem to be more determination to deal with Russia, more criticism of human rights in Russia and this goes on in combination with restoring good relations with the United States, with revived Atlanticism. And as for the United Kingdom, I think that chances for joining the new policies are quite good. There are some problems, however, with some smaller countries, countries depending on energy like Slovakia, like Bulgaria, Hungary and some others. They have been mimicking the big players during the previous decade in their attempts to forge bilateral ties with Russia. Some of them are pursuing their narrow economic interests at the expense of strategic thinking on the EU, on Russia and on the relationship between the EU and Russia. There are also problems with disunity on some other issues like missile interceptors in Poland and radar base in the Czech Republic, which, obviously, Russian political elites are immediately skillfully using to undermine European unity. And there are problems related to Kosovo—if the EU is not able to act there, we could question where it can act.

Finally, I think an important aspect here is communication, increased and deepened communication among the all EU member states including the small ones, not only the big ones. I think public diplomacy matters as well, and the same can be said about the support for Russian opposition. Only by respecting all the factors that I mentioned, the EU, as a whole, will be better prepared to gradually progress in finding its new strategy toward Russia.

Jacques Rupnik
Thank you, Martin Bútora, for reminding us we cannot understand Russia only by reason and for giving us a five-point recipe about how to approach it. Our next speaker is Mr. Paul Wolfowitz, who is the former President of the World Bank.

Paul Wolfowitz
I guess I am here as the only American to talk about the Russian-European issue, and I find myself in the same situation as most of the previous speakers in that I do not see much to disagree with.

Let me just try to elaborate a little bit, first of all on Saša Vondra’s first point about the importance of remaining engaged with Russia. It does seem to me that one of the factors that can over the longer term change Russian policy for the better is the attraction of Europe. I am not the Russian expert here but it does seem to me that there is a good deal of ambivalence in the Russian view of whether they are separate or whether they aspire to be part of the West, defined as Europe. And I think that the more that attraction to be part of Europe can be played with, I think better the hopes for the future.

I know that there is a certain American ambivalence about the EU, but I believe on the whole the strengthening of the EU and the expansion of the EU has been something that has been a very positive influence not only within Europe but on the margins of Europe, in Turkey and in Russia, and I hope that can continue and I think it underscores the importance of the point that one should distinguish as much as possible the Russian government from the Russian people. It also underscores the importance of healing as many possible divisions within Europe, although I realize one has to be realistic about the fact that individual countries will certainly pursue their own interests.

Second, I think, is the attraction of democracy and while one can be very disturbed by the current trends in Russia, I do not feel those trends are inexorable, and I think we are living in a very different world than the world of the nineteenth century, and over time the Russian people will in fact demand the kinds of benefits that they see in Europe, particularly if they begin to see it in their neighbors like Ukraine and Belarus.

Third, to shift to economics, I think this energy-based economy may be a great boon to Russia at the moment. Certainly the Russian economy looks much stronger today than it did ten years ago when frankly we feared it was on the verge of collapse. But I think for the long term Russia has to build an economy that is much more diversified; it is not going to keep up with the modern world, it is not going to be competitive in the global economy simply depending on benefits of resources. That means more focus on education, more focus on building markets and that will bring internal change in Russia. Maybe I am too optimistic and I do not mean to be an economic determinist here but I think natural resources by themselves are not the future of prosperous economies.

Fourth, I think part of the reason Russia is able to do what it does today is that it enjoys a relatively strong security position; there is really no one that threatens Russia now. But if threats emerge in the future they are not going to come from Europe or the United States. They’re going to come, as they to some extent already have come, from Islamic extremism and even more importantly they might come—I am not predicting they will come, but they might come—from a strengthened, belligerent China, in which case Russia will be looking to strengthen its relationship with Europe and the West, not to prey on it.

Finally, maybe in this respect I am now going to disagree slightly, I am not sure how strong energy is ultimately as a weapon. In individual cases it can have an effect. Mr. Milinkevich made the point that these gifts of cheap energy eventually lose their value. Since energy is a fungible resource, beyond a certain price, you will simply go somewhere else to secure it. I believe the experience of Georgia, not with energy so much as with wine exports, demonstrates the ability of a country under pressure to adjust in a global market and to find different outlets for its products and different sources for energy. This significantly limits the value of energy as a weapon, particularly if energy is also your main source of income, you have to sell it somewhere.

Finally let me make a point outside this discussion. I do think that to some extent the discussion we have been hearing this morning underscores a second, or maybe a third reason why it is important for the world to address the challenge of climate change. Energy will be a much less powerful weapon if we find more diverse resources of energy. I think there is an opportunity with resources being devoted to reduce carbon emissions, to use energy more efficiently and the benefits will not only come in the climate. I believe they will come in relatively reduced energy prices and less coercive power in those countries that have resources of energy so I think it is a very important reason to pursue energy efficiency.

Jacques Rupnik
Thank you very much Mr. Wolfowitz, particularly for bringing on the agenda the whole issue of the usefulness or not of the energy leverage and therefore the geo-strategic importance for Europe, for the European Union in dealing with Russia on this energy question, the whole pipeline discussion, the alternative routes for energy. This is something we have not dealt with much but is obviously a crucially important issue, a crucially important choice. It is not just about economics, it is not just about oil, these are long-term geopolitical issues that stay there as well. We have been talking about Russia, we have heard different views from American speakers, from all over Eastern Europe. Our last speaker is from Russia and he has been listening to the different views on Russia that have been presented. He may have his own response to it and perhaps tell us more about not just how Europe behaves towards Russia but also how Russia views Europe. This last speaker is Grigory Yavlinsky. He is an economist, he was a member of the Russian Duma and he is the chairman of the Yabloko Party.

Grigory Yavlinsky
Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. I am very thankful to every panelist because everybody was speaking very kindly about Russia and said a lot of very correct and important things. The only objection which I have on almost everything expressed here is that I think there is an alternative to the policy driven by energy. I have no doubt about that and I will try to convince you in that as well.

What kind of a policy? Certainly it is not about technical items, it is not about alternative routes of energy, simply because it is not very practical and cannot be realized in the nearest future. Secondly because Russia would exist even if for example Hungary would take gas from some other places in the world. Russia would still exist like a nuclear superpower and would be able to export gas and other natural resources to such countries like China and India. So it is unavoidable to find a way to create correct and promising policies between Europe and Russia and the US and Russia. So what kind of a policy must be implemented? I will try to formulate six main points of that policy and to give some comments on that.

The first principle of this policy is one of the most difficult. It is to tell the truth. Not only by writing articles in the newspapers but most importantly by having the top level political leaders speaking the truth, whether it is the United States or the European Union, to say that nicely, in a diplomatic way not only during private lunches, but openly and loudly to Russian people. It is very difficult, but this is the key. I want to add that the truth would be important only if it would come along with a practical example. Believe me it is very difficult to speak in Russia about human rights when five times a day in news you have reports from Iraq or from Guantanamo. It is very difficult to convince Russian people about human rights in Europe when all the time you have reports about secret prisons all over Europe and secret CIA deals; it is very difficult to give real arguments. So it is maybe the first point.

The second point, I cannot agree that this is the end of the policy based on principles and values and human rights and all these things. No, it is only the beginning. It is absolutely necessary to restart that kind of policies and here is the third point.

The policy of so to say a half-partnership and a half-confrontation that we could see in the last fifteen or twenty years has reached a dead end. This is the worst way of making politics in the post Cold War era because especially in the military area it simply has no future, it does not work and I can give you some examples. Certainly there is a question that who can provide another policy? Russia at the moment is an authoritarian state; it is not a democratic state at all. Period. So we are speaking now about the West. Picture with the West is rather complicated because the West is taking approach of so-called realpolitik. What does realpolitik mean? I will give you an example.

You were asking me at this panel about the energy policy. Let us go back to January 2006 and the operation on gas prices from Russia to Ukraine. What has in fact happened? The European Union was very concerned about what’s happened at that moment. But at the end of the day a deal was made between Gazprom and Ukraine in a very shadow, semi-criminal way under the eyes of the European Union, all Brussels’s commissions and the whole world. They all responded about a great solution. It was not a solution; it was the promotion of a very special shadow deal. And if the European Union really does care about transparency and about Ukraine, the EU supported Ukraine in the negotiation with Gazprom and maybe in the financial way as well. The same situation happened with Belarus later.

So there is a question of whether it is really policy based on some principles and if the EU really wants transparency, accountability, and to create modern market cooperation or you are ready simply to take gas on any conditions. It is very important to have the answer.

There is another example which is even more evident. Russia has really big problems with the human rights, democracy and so on. Very few people speak about that. All problems are comprised in the item that Russia is not importing Polish meat. That makes a kind of a farce from the politics. Polish meat is the real economic problem, but not of such a size that it can replace all the substantial political questions which, really exist.

I also want to say that I do not believe that under such policy of half-partnership-half-confrontation it is possible to avoid bilateral relations with whatever country on sensitive issues. You can hear a lot of serious accusation of Russia in corruption, and Russia is highly corrupted. But to speak friendly, corrupted Russian officials keep their bank accounts neither in Saddam Hussein’s banks nor in North Korea. They keep their accounts in the different banks in the West. That means that Russian corruption is a kind of joint venture. It would never be successful without your help. I am saying this because I simply want you to be a bit more realistic about all this.

Now, there are three other points. It is very important to have European strategy for twenty-five, thirty years about Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. It is necessary to have an idea of what do you want to see in the future. You can certainly say that Russia at the moment is an authoritarian country but you have started your unification policy in 1947 when relations between Germany and France for example were rather special and half of Europe was under Stalin’s power. Nevertheless, after sixty years of efforts you’ve got a great success story of the European Union. Now it is necessary to formulate the future and its road map. It is necessary to start to debate not only gas pipelines but the way of living in the middle of the twenty-first century. It is a special panel and a special debate of course, I would be very happy to speak on that. We have our vision about that, but it is very difficult to create any kind of alternative without an answer to this key question. If meat and pipeline are the main substance of a discussion and there is nothing else in there, then certainly they will be always used as political tools.

Another extremely important issue and I am very happy that Mr. Wolfowitz is here. The next year will be the last one of the START I Treaty. There will be no treaty about nuclear weapons from 2009. What does that mean? Russia is still a nuclear superpower. So without making a new treaty (and I would suggest a treaty on offensive and defensive strategic arms) all other forms of Forum 2000 speaking about Russia would speak not about gas, but about this issue. I think it is a very painful thing. It is necessary to take a step back and to make this treaty once again, this or some kind of similar treaty. Certainly this is a step back because it would leave unaffected classic paradigm of mutually assured destruction. I am sorry about that. I did not think ten years ago that we should come back with this. But there is no way forward without that and that would be the basis for the joint ABM treaty for the future, which is absolutely necessary. Russia and the United States and NATO need joint ABM treaty, anti-ballistic missile treaty for sure against terrorist launches but first it is necessary to come to the general treaty once again. Russia is not the ally at the moment, it is not a country like France or Britain for example, it is a different story and in that case it is necessary to be very realistic.

And the last but certainly not least element of this policy is to create in Russia liberal democracy and to prevent imperialism, authoritarianism and nationalism. It is our task for 99% and we promise we will do it though we do not know when.

Thank you very much.

Jacques Rupnik
Thank you very much Grigory Yavlinsky. I think the applause suggests that the task you have just mentioned has at least tacit support in this town, and it is also worth noting that it takes a Russian democrat to say in Prague that European integration is a remarkable success story. But you raised a number of important issues and I am sure there will be a response from perhaps other panelists. I will first ask the panelists whether they want to respond to each other and only at the end, if we have the time, we will have the opportunity to ask the panelists questions.

Paul Wolfowitz
Let me just say something quickly on the issue of the START treaty. Mr. Yavlinsky has raised a very important issue that I think needs to be addressed with some urgency. I do not know what the answer is and to be honest I am skeptical about trying to make it a larger treaty rather than a simpler, smaller one but just to keep the verification provisions alone of the START treaty is important and we are in danger of being preoccupied with too many things and letting that slip by. I am very sympathetic to the idea that we need to reform the whole issue of nuclear weapons in this era; their framework of deterrence was something that grew up during the Cold War and we are still kind of stuck with it. It needs to change and it needs to take much more account of the fact that we are all potentially vulnerable to disasters, and terrorist use of nuclear weapons.

Jacques Rupnik
Yes. Any other response from panelists to what they’ve heard? Well, if not then we may have the possibility to answer questions from the audience. Well, you can raise your voice and I will repeat your question. It has to be a question. We do not want another panelist. Yes, we have heard the question, yesterday Mikhail Gorbachev, the question was or the remark was, yesterday Mikhail Gorbachev has said that he supports Vladimir Putin so the question is…

Grigory Yavlinsky
To me.

Jacques Rupnik
Grigory Yavlinsky, what does it mean?

Grigory Yavlinsky
It means that he is Gorbachev.

Martin Bútora
I think we heard Mr. Gorbachev also speak out very critically about this decline of memory of Stalinism and the Stalinist era and I believe memory is very important in building trust between the generations and between all those who have been suffering and here Gorbachev was quite clear. His message is that it is important to cope with the Stalinist past.

Jacques Rupnik
Well, you wanted somebody from France, there you have it. President Sarkozy is today in Moscow and I can tell you that what he has to say to Russia is quite different from what his predecessor would have said to Vladimir Putin. It is also worth noting that he is going to Moscow after receiving the Polish Prime Minister and the Czech Prime Minister, which happened yesterday after giving an important speech in Budapest, where he said “I will never tell anybody to shut up and I come here to listen, I want to hear the voices of Central Europe on the big European agenda” and it is with this idea of trying to seek what is the European perception of Russia that he is going to Moscow. As you know he has already spoken on a number of these issues, he has very strongly spoken out on Chechnya, for instance. Bernard Kouchner, the Foreign Minister, was in Moscow and mentioned the memory of Anna Politkovskaya, met with all the NGOs and human rights groups and other associations, so for those who were waiting, like myself, for a change in French policy on Russia, something is in the making. I would add that Martin Bútora said leadership matters. Well, change of leadership matters in France. In Germany there certainly has been a shift since Schröder. Chancellor Merkel, her attitude during the German presidency, during the European summit, the way she spoke out that the Russian president should respect the opposition, the way they treated Garry Kasparov, etc. So I think there are important changes that should be noticed. They are not noticed much in the Czech press but they do happen.

I find it interesting that we started with the idea of the European Union and Russia and is energy the crucial issue? Is this the key issue that the European Union has to address? And we have moved on to discussing what Russia is, how to interpret Russia, whether we can understand it by simply using Western criteria, can we apply to Russia the same kind of democratic standards that we use for the West and we ended up with discussing the legacies of the Soviet period in Eastern Europe and to what extent in the relationship with Russia that legacy still plays a part. Well, that is, I think, telling about the diversity at least of approaches to Russia within Europe. Obviously, we are in Central Europe, and those legacies are of crucial importance in understanding the perceptions of Russia or the role of Russia in this region. Obviously you would have different views in other parts of the European Union as well. What I think is quite certain is that Russian policy will be a defining moment for the European Union as an actor on the international scene. It will be a major test as to whether we can have European energy policy vis-à-vis Russia and more generally can we have a common position on human rights, on security issues and energy issues in the European Union. Well, thank you very much to all the panelists for at least having a very stimulating and lively discussion on this subject. This session is now closed.